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Federal Ministry of the Interior of  
the Federal Republic of Germany

# **2005 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution**

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## **Organisational Data**

### **I. Organisational data pursuant to Section 16 (2) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, BVerfSchG*)**

#### **1. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)**

Federal funding for the BfV was € 137,972,423 in 2005 (2004: € 141,047,434). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution had a total of 2,448 staff members (2004: 2,429).

#### **2. Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD)**

Federal funding for the MAD amounted to € 73,899,577 in 2005 (2004: € 73,446,953). The Military Counterintelligence Service had 1,308 staff members (2004: 1,277).

### **II. Other organisational data**

In January 2006, the federal government and its agencies (*Bund*) and the states (*Länder*) together had a total of 1,034,514 personal data entries in the NADIS\* database (January 2005: 1,003,959). Of these, 593,333 entries (57.4%) were based on security checks (January 2005: 56.5%).

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## Democracy and Protection of the Constitution

### I. Protection of the Constitution under the Basic Law

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, known as the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*, GG), guarantees German citizens a variety of basic rights, including the right to freedom of expression (Article 5), freedom of assembly (Article 8) and freedom of association (Article 9). These rights are extended even to opponents of our state's fundamental democratic order. But limits to these rights must be clearly set wherever it becomes obvious that they are being misused in order to undermine the free and democratic order and thereby destroy the foundation on which these same rights are based.

Drawing on the painful lessons learnt from the failure of the Weimar Republic, whose constitution lacked effective mechanisms for its defence, the principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values has been anchored in the Basic Law.

<sup>1</sup>“Strong democracy”

This principle is characterised by three essential features:

- **commitment to values**, i.e. the state recognises its attachment to certain values it considers especially important and which are therefore not negotiable;
- the **readiness to defend values**, i.e. the state is willing to uphold these most important values against extremist positions; and
- preventive action to **protect the Constitution**, i.e. the state does not wait to react until extremists have violated the law.

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<sup>1</sup> JESSE, Eckhard: “Der Verfassungsschutzauftrag der abwehrbereiten Demokratie: Theorie und Praxis” (Protection of the Constitution as a mandate of a democracy prepared to defend its values: theory and practice), and LANGE, Hans Gert: “Verfassungsschutz in der Demokratie - ein Instrument zur Sicherung des inneren Friedens” (Protection of the Constitution - an instrument for ensuring internal peace in a democratic state), both in: Federal Ministry of the Interior (eds.), *Wehrhafte Demokratie und Rechtsextremismus* (A strong democracy and right-wing extremism) (Series: *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit* [Texts on internal security]), Bonn 1992, pp. 7 seqq. and pp. 19 seqq.

The principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values is clearly expressed in a number of the Basic Law's provisions:

- Article 79 (3) provides that fundamental principles of the constitution – including the inviolability of human dignity under Article 1 (1) – are unalterable and thus may not be modified by legislative process.
  - Under Article 21 (2), political parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic fundamental order may be declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG).
  - Article 9 (2) provides that associations which oppose the constitutional order or the idea of international understanding shall be prohibited.
  - Under Article 18, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) may declare certain basic rights to be forfeited if these rights are abused to attack the free and democratic basic order.
  - Articles 73 No. 10 *litt. b* and 87 (1) 2<sup>nd</sup> sentence provide the basis for the establishment and operation of the Federal and *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution.
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## II. Offices for the Protection of the Constitution: Tasks and powers

### Tasks

Pursuant to the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*, BVerfSchG), the main task of the federal and *Land* authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution is gathering and analysing information on the following:

- activities directed against the free and democratic order or against the existence or security of the Federal Republic or of one of the federal states (*Länder*), or intended to unlawfully hinder federal or *Land* constitutional bodies or their members from carrying out their official duties;
- intelligence activities or those that endanger state security, carried out on behalf of a foreign power within the area of the territorial application of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution;
- activities in the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which – by actual, or preparations for intended, use of force – threaten the foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany;
- Activities within the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which are directed against the idea of international understanding, in particular peaceful co-existence.

### Information-gathering

The agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution gather most of the information needed for fulfilling their tasks from publicly accessible sources. Where this is not possible or effective, they may, within the limits of clearly defined legal powers and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, use intelligence methods for covert information-gathering. These resources include informers, surveillance, video and audio recordings, and interception of correspondence, mail and telecommunications in accordance with the Act (adopted by virtue of Article 10 of the Basic Law) to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts and Telecommunications (*Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses* - short title: *Artikel 10-Gesetz*, abbr. G 10).

The Act to Fight International Terrorism (short title: Counter-Terrorism Act - *Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus*) extended the powers of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). Among other things, the Act gives the BfV the right, under narrowly defined conditions, to gather information from financial enterprises, airlines, postal services, telecommunications services, and teleservices providers.

- Security vetting** In addition, the agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution are responsible for assisting with security clearance checks of personnel granted access, in the public interest, to classified information or of persons actually employed in, or recruited for, security-sensitive posts within essential civil or military establishments. The BfV's powers in this context are governed in detail by the Security Clearance Check Act (*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz, SÜG*).
- No police powers** In carrying out their duties, the agencies for the protection of the Constitution have no police powers, i.e. among other things, they may not perform arrests or searches or seize any property.
- Bound by the law** The agencies for the protection of the Constitution are bound by the general law. This means above all that they may not violate any laws when carrying out their duties.

Within their area of responsibility, the authorities for the protection of the Constitution help to ensure the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany. As provided by law, they work closely, on a basis of trust, with other security authorities, in particular the other federal intelligence services: the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD), responsible for the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr); and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), responsible for foreign intelligence; and with police and criminal prosecution authorities. In view of the increasingly international nature of threat phenomena, the BfV also maintains active contacts with its partner services abroad.

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### III. Supervision of the authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution

<b>Federal Government</b>	The activities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) are subject to supervision by the Federal Government and the German Bundestag. The Parliamentary Control Body established for this purpose is to be regularly provided with comprehensive information on the general activities of the BfV, MAD and BND and on incidents of special significance (Section 2 of the Parliamentary Control Body Act ( <i>Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremiumsgesetz</i> , PKGrG)). Upon request, this body must be permitted by the Federal Government to inspect records and files, and to conduct staff hearings. The Parliamentary Control Body appoints the independent G-10 Commission which, always in advance of any such operations, will consider the permissibility and necessity of restrictions of the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications in accordance with Article 10 of the Basic Law. The same applies to the new information-gathering powers granted by the Act to Fight International Terrorism (see Section II above).
<b>Parliamentary Control Body</b>	
<b>G-10 Commission</b>	
<b>Right to information</b>	The BfV is legally obligated to provide data subjects, upon request, with information about their personal data files free of charge, if such persons provide reference to specific information and can demonstrate a particular interest in such information (Section 15 (1) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution). Disclosure of information will be denied only if any of the reasons for refusal as listed in sub-section 2 of Section 15 applies.
<b>Supervision by the courts</b>	Should a person (data subject) claim that measures taken by the BfV have violated his or her rights, these measures are subject to judicial review.
<b>Supervision by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection</b>	The Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG) contains a large number of provisions pertaining to data protection legislation which provide for extensive control exercised by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection (BfD).

#### IV. Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution

##### Annual reporting

The Annual Report is intended to inform the public and increase general awareness about anti-constitutional activities in the Federal Republic of Germany. This report is based on intelligence collected by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in the course of its legally assigned duties, in co-operation with the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. This report cannot give an exhaustive overview but provides information about the essential findings, and analyses and evaluates significant developments and correlations.

With regard to the associations (political parties, organisations and groups) described in this report, the legal prerequisites for monitoring by the BfV have been met. “Suspicious cases” are those in which groups display concrete signs of anti-constitutional activities, though they are not yet clearly extremist (Section 4 (1), third sentence of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution). However, the intelligence situation for the groups described may vary greatly depending on the scope and detail of information gathered, which in turn can influence the observation methods used by the BfV.

Assessing a certain group as “extremist” does not always imply that *all* of its members pursue extremist aims.

All figures given for the potential membership of the organisations and associations mentioned in the report refer to Germany and are in some cases estimated and rounded off. Also, it should be pointed out that the agencies for the protection of the Constitution do not have individual intelligence regarding all persons. This follows from the fact that the main mission of these agencies is to observe organisations; this does not require detailed intelligence on all individual members of the observed organisations.

The English version was translated by the Translation Service of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are translated from the German.

Finally, it should be noted that the Annual Report does not provide an exhaustive list of all associations that the agencies for the protection of the Constitution may consider relevant.

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## V. Protection of the Constitution through information and awareness

At the federal level, the task of protecting the Constitution by providing information and raising awareness is carried out jointly by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV); at the state level it is the responsibility of the *Land* Ministries of the Interior and the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. Maintaining a dialogue with citizens about the tasks of the agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution is a central focus of this effort. In working with the public, these agencies provide information about their intelligence in order to enable each individual to make up his or her own mind regarding the threats anti-constitutional forces pose to the rule of law in our country.

Fundamentalism, extremism, xenophobia and violence are a constant challenge to a democratic and social state based on the rule of law. Fighting all forms of political extremism wherever they appear is therefore an ongoing priority of domestic policy.

The Federal Government considers it extremely important to prevent and fight such phenomena.

The Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – Against Extremism and Violence (Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz – gegen Extremismus und Gewalt), initiated by the Federal Government and presented to the public on 23 May 2000, plays a special role in strengthening civil society and consensus on the values enshrined in the Constitution. This alliance combines and mobilises forces in society to fight extremism, xenophobia and violence. One of the Alliance's key tasks is to promote, support, network and publicise local initiatives and projects by providing information, advice and documentation (see [www.buendnis-toleranz.de](http://www.buendnis-toleranz.de) on the Internet).

The Alliance also encompasses important public support programmes aimed at fighting xenophobia, racism, right-wing extremism and violence, such as XENOS, CIVITAS and ENTIMON, within the framework of the action programme “Youth for Tolerance and Democracy – Against Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism” (“Jugend für Toleranz und Demokratie – gegen Rechtsextremismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus”); see also [www.bmfsfj.de](http://www.bmfsfj.de).

Another instrument for countering xenophobia, racism and violence is the Forum Against Racism (Forum gegen Rassismus, FgR). This body was established in March 1998, and by now its membership in

cludes some 80 organisations and public agencies, including 50 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating at the national or regional level. It also serves as the National Round Table established in keeping with the principles of the Vienna-based European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC).

In order to preserve the free and democratic fundamental order, it is necessary to continually confront the various forms of extremism on a political and intellectual level. Thorough information and awareness-raising about the nature and scope of extremist activities are an essential part of this effort.

The series *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit* (Texts on Internal Security) published by the Federal Ministry of the Interior also comprises monographs which, irrespective of the position taken by the editor, provide a platform for a policy discussion.

In addition to this series, the Federal Ministry of the Interior published a volume in 2005 entitled *Feindbilder und Radikalisierungsprozesse – Elemente und Instrumente im politischen Extremismus* (Negative images and processes of radicalisation: Elements and instruments of political extremism). The essays in the volume are based on expert lectures given at the BfV's annual symposia in October 2003 (negative images and extremism) and 2004 (processes of radicalisation). The essays focus on the topic of Islamic extremism (see also [www.bmi.bund.de](http://www.bmi.bund.de)).

As part of its public information activities, the BfV disseminated information on its fields of activity and current findings on its website, at numerous exhibitions and fairs, via a wide range of publications and by answering a large variety of questions from the general public.

The Internet is an important public information tool. The BfV website contains detailed information on the BfV's responsibilities and fields of activity. The primary focus is on roughly 15 publications available for downloading. On its "News" and "Exhibitions" pages, the site also provides regularly updated news about activities related to the protection of the Constitution and current information on the travelling exhibitions organised by the BfV.

In 2005, the public continued to show great interest in the BfV's travelling exhibitions. About 80,000 people visited the two exhibitions on democracy and extremism, which travelled to 22 different sites throughout Germany: "Protecting democracy - Against extremism in Germany" (*Es betrifft Dich! Demokratie schützen - Gegen Extremismus in Deutschland*), and "Democracy is vulnerable - Right-

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wing extremism in Germany" (*Demokratie ist verletzlich - Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland*). In addition to individual visitors, mainly school classes visited these exhibitions to find out more about extremism and the forms it can take. BfV staff members accompany each exhibition to provide guided tours on site and answer visitors' questions.

In addition, the BfV took part in various fairs, such as the educational fair *didacta* in Stuttgart.

In 2005, the BfV printed and distributed a total of roughly 63,000 brochures. In addition, these publications can be accessed via the BfV's website, which is visited by many interested Internet users.

**Contact address**

For all questions regarding the protection of the Constitution, please do not hesitate to contact the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) at any time:

**Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)**

**Merianstrasse 100**

**50765 Cologne**

**Phone: 01888 - 792-0**

**Fax: 01888 - 10-792-2915**

**E- mail: [poststelle@bfv.bund.de](mailto:poststelle@bfv.bund.de)**

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On the Internet, the BfV can be found at:

[www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de)

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## Politically motivated crime

### I. Defining politically motivated crime

#### Definition of “politically motivated crime”

At the decision of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers of the *Länder* (IMK), a new system for defining “politically motivated crime” was introduced effective 1 January 2001. Political motivation is the central criterion for identifying such offences. An offence is defined as politically motivated if the circumstances of the offence or the attitude of the offender lead to the conclusion that it is directed against individuals due to their political beliefs, nationality, ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, ideology, origin, sexual orientation, disability, appearance or social status. This information is evaluated from various perspectives, paying particular attention to the nature and seriousness of the crime, the motive, and whether it has any international or extremist elements. At the same time, the catalogue of violent crimes was expanded and standardised nation-wide.

With this differentiated presentation, data can be analysed according to specific needs, providing a foundation for targeted use of appropriate measures for deterrence and prevention.

The figures quoted in this Annual Report on politically motivated crimes with an extremist background are based on information from the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

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## II. Politically motivated crimes

In 2005, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 26,401 politically motivated crimes (2004: 21,178). This figure includes 14,373 (54%) propaganda offences (2004: 11,860, or 56%). Another 2,448 of these (9.3%) are categorised as politically motivated violent crimes (2004: 1,800, or 8.5%).

### **Classifying politically motivated crimes**

In 2005, 15,914 politically motivated crimes were classified as “right-wing” (2004: 12,553), 4,898 were classified as “left-wing” (2004: 3,521), and 771 were classified as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners” (2004: 603). In 4,818 cases (2004: 4,501) it was not possible to assign the offence to a particular category.

### **Extremist criminal offences**

In 2005, 18,501 (70%) criminal offences were classified as extremist (2004: 14,183, or 67%). Of these, 15,361 (2004: 12,051) were classified as “right-wing”, 2,305 (2004: 1,440) as “left-wing” and 644 (2004: 461) as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners”. In 191 cases (2004: 231), there were indications of an extremist background, but the offences were recorded without further classification.

### **III. Politically motivated crime with an extremist background, by category**

#### **1. Right-wing crime with an extremist background**

##### **1.1 Overview**

##### **Rise in right-wing extremist crime**

Crimes motivated by right-wing extremism constitute a subset of the class of right-wing politically-motivated crime. In 2005, 15,914 criminal offences were classified as right-wing politically motivated crime (2004: 12,553). Of these, 10,905 (2004: 8,455) were propaganda crimes pursuant to Sections 86, 86a of the Criminal Code (StGB) and 1,034 (2004: 832) were violent crimes. In this area, 15,361 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2004: 12,051), including 958 violent crimes (2004: 776). The number of criminal offences with a right-wing extremist background thus rose by 27.5%, while that of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background rose by 23.5%. Violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background made up 6.3% of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background (2004: 6.4%). Of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background, 85.7% (2004: 86%) were either crimes involving illegal propaganda activities (10,881; 2004: 8,337) or incitement to hatred and violence against individuals or certain segments of the population (2,277; 2004: 2,065). Overall, 316 offences (2004: 199) fell into the category of violent crimes against actual or supposed left-wing extremists, and 116 offences (2004: 67) fell into the category of violent crimes against other political opponents.

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Crimes with a right-wing extremist background <sup>1</sup>		
<b>Violent crimes:</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	6	2
Bodily injury	640	816
Arson	37	14
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	2	3
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	25	39
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	6	9
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	2	0
Robbery	9	23
Extortion	5	6
Resisting public authority	44	46
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>958</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	243	445
Coercion, threat	97	90
Illegal propaganda activities	8,337	10,881
Desecration of cemeteries	20	30
Other criminal offences, esp. incitement to hatred	2.578	2.957
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,275</b>	<b>14,403</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>12,051</b>	<b>15,361</b>

<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

As in the past three years, in 2005 there were again no homicides with a right-wing extremist background.<sup>2</sup> One of the two attempted homicides involved the following incident:

In Weissach im Tal, Baden-Württemberg, between midnight and 2 a.m. on 15 October, a 17-year-old threw a glass bottle which he had filled at home with a mixture of petrol and oil at a house in which a number of foreigners lived. The Molotov cocktail hit the house between the first floor and top floor, shattered and burned up. The building did not catch fire. At the time of the incident, a total of eight persons, four of them children, were asleep in the two flats. A pizzeria located on the ground floor was closed at the time. About a week earlier, the perpetrator had been in a fight at an educational facility in Weissach with one of the residents. He was also involved in an arson attack on a dormitory for asylum seekers in Weissach on 8 November. As of December 2005, he was in detention awaiting trial.<sup>3</sup>

## **1.2 Targets of right-wing violent crimes with an extremist background**

In 2005, 355 right-wing violent crimes, or 37.1%, showed an extremist and xenophobic background (2004: 368). Another 316 (33%) violent crimes were directed at real or supposed left-wing extremists (2004: 199, or 25.6%).


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<sup>2</sup> In its decision of 17 November 2005, the Dortmund Regional Court did not see any political motivation for a homicide committed in Dortmund on 28 March 2005 that was initially classified as a right-wing crime with an extremist background. Following an argument, the 17-year-old perpetrator stabbed and killed a 31-year-old member of the punk alternative scene. The two argued over the victim's appearance and that of his companion. The court found the 17-year-old guilty of manslaughter and sentenced him to seven years in youth custody.

<sup>3</sup> The Stuttgart public prosecutor has brought charges against the 17-year-old, who remains in custody. The trial is scheduled to begin in June 2006.

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**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
by type



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).  
Only the most important types are included.

### 1.2.1 Violent right-wing crime with an extremist and xenophobic background

Violent right-wing crime with an extremist and xenophobic background		
	2004	2005
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	5	1
Bodily injury	310	322
Arson	29	9
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	1	1
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	7	5
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	1	2
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	0
Robbery	4	9
Extortion	2	1
Resisting public authority	8	5
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>368</b>	<b>355</b>

<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### **1.2.2 Right-wing crime with an extremist and anti-Semitic background**

In 2005, a total of 1,658 right-wing crimes with an extremist and anti-Semitic background were reported. This represented an increase of about 25.9% from the previous year (1,316). The number of right-wing violent crimes with an extremist and anti-Semitic background rose from 37 in 2004 to 49 in 2005. Overall, 5.1% of all violent right-wing crimes had both an extremist and an anti-Semitic background.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

### 1.2.3 Violent crimes by right-wing extremists against actual or supposed left-wing extremists


Violent crimes by right-wing extremists against actual or supposed left-wing extremists		
	2004	2005
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	1	1
Bodily injury	171	288
Arson	4	2
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	1	1
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	11	11
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	4	3
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	0
Robbery	4	8
Extortion	1	1
Resisting public authority	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>316</b>

<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### **1.3 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land***


In absolute terms, the highest number of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background occurred in North-Rhine/Westphalia (121 registered offences); in terms of crimes per 100,000 residents, however, North-Rhine/Westphalia lies towards the bottom of the scale. It is followed by Lower Saxony (119, in the middle of the scale as a proportion of total population), Saxony-Anhalt (107, at the top of the scale as a proportion of total population), Brandenburg (97, in second place as a proportion of total population), Saxony (89) and Bavaria (77).

### Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\* by Land



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*per 100,000 residents and Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and population data from the Federal Statistical Office.

## **2. Left-wing crimes with an extremist background**

### **2.1 Overview**

#### **Rise in left-wing extremist crime**

Crimes motivated by left-wing extremism constitute a subset of the class of left-wing politically-motivated crime. A total of 4,898 criminal offences (2004: 3,521) were classified as left-wing politically motivated crimes; of these, 1,240 were classified as violent crimes (2004: 789). In this area, 2,305 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2004: 1,440), including 896 violent crimes (2004: 521).

The number of criminal offences with a left-wing extremist background thus rose by 60.1%, while that of violent crimes rose by 72%.

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Crimes with a left-wing extremist background <sup>1</sup>		
<b>Violent crimes:</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	0	1
Bodily injury	226	391
Arson	31	29
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	144	298
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	19	53
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	0
Robbery	12	13
Extortion	1	1
Resisting public authority	88	110
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>521</b>	<b>896</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	490	713
Coercion, threat	19	42
Other criminal offences	410	654
<b>Total</b>	<b>919</b>	<b>1,409</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>1,440</b>	<b>2,305</b>

<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).



This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

## **2.2 Targets of left-wing violent crimes with an extremist background**

Left-wing violent crimes motivated by extremism included a total of 449 violent crimes directed against actual or supposed right-wing extremists (50.1%; 2004: 273); 68 related to the campaign against nuclear energy (7.6%; 2004: 11); and 16 related to anti-globalisation protests (1.8%; 2004: 10).

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**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by type*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). Only the most important types are included.  
 \*\* Including activities directed against CASTOR transports of nuclear waste.

### 2.2.1 Violent crimes by left-wing extremists against actual or supposed right-wing extremists


Violent crimes by left-wing extremists against actual or supposed right-wing extremists		
	2004	2005
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	0	1
Bodily injury	149	249
Arson	16	4
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	70	159
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	12	7
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	0
Robbery	10	11
Extortion	1	1
Resisting public authority	15	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>449</b>

<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### **2.3 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land***


In absolute terms, the highest number of violent crimes with a left-wing extremist background occurred in Lower Saxony (184 registered offences); in terms of crimes per 100,000 residents, however, Lower Saxony is in fifth place. It is followed by Berlin (124, at the top of the scale as a proportion of total population), Saxony (108, in third place as a proportion of total population) and Bavaria (107, in the middle of the scale as a proportion of total population).

### Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\* by *Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*per 100,000 residents and Land*



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and population data from the Federal Statistical Office.

### **3. Politically motivated crimes by foreigners**

#### **3.1 Overview**

Politically motivated crimes by foreigners include the subset of politically motivated crimes with an extremist background. In 2005, 771 criminal offences (2004: 603) were classified as politically-motivated crimes by foreigners; of these, 71 were classified as violent crimes (2004: 86). In this area, 644 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2004: 461), including 47 violent crimes (2004: 61).

The number of politically motivated crimes by foreigners with an extremist background thus rose by 39.7%, while that of violent crimes in this area fell by 23%.

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
Politically motivated crimes with an extremist background committed by foreigners <sup>1</sup>		
<b>Violent crimes:</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Homicide	4	0
Attempted homicide	0	0
Bodily injury	24	24
Arson	0	3
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	4	2
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	0	4
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	0
Robbery	2	1
Extortion	17	11
Resisting public authority	9	2
Sexual offences	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	31	23
Coercion, threat	28	20
Other criminal offences	341	554
<b>Total</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>597</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>461</b>	<b>644</b>

<sup>1</sup> The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### **3.2 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land***

The most politically motivated violent crimes by foreigners took place in North-Rhine/Westphalia (14), followed by Berlin (7), Baden-Württemberg (6) and Hamburg (5).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of politically motivated crime by foreigners\*  
by Land**



\* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

## Right-Wing Extremist Activities

### I. Overview

#### 1. Ideology

##### Nationalism and racism

Right-wing extremist ideology is characterised by nationalist and racist beliefs and attitudes. It is governed by the idea that ethnic affiliation with a nation or race determines the value of a human being. Because, according to right-wing extremist thinking, human and civil rights are subordinate to this criterion, right-wing extremists fundamentally contradict Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, which accords these rights special priority and protection. Right-wing extremists thus reject the universal principle of equality for every individual as specified in Article 3 of the Basic Law.

##### Authoritarian state and *Volksgemeinschaft* ideology

They typically call for an authoritarian political system in which the state and the people – in their view an ethnically homogeneous group – join together as a single unit within a supposedly natural order. In this ideology of *Volksgemeinschaft*, a National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics, the state's leaders intuitively act in accordance with the supposedly uniform will of the people. Starting from this premise, right-wing extremists believe that a state based on right-wing extremist ideology can do without the essential elements of a free democratic order, such as the people's right to exercise state authority through elections, or the right to form an opposition and take action.

##### Ideologically heterogeneous

Right-wing extremism in Germany demonstrates differing forms of nationalist, racist and anti-Semitic elements and differing goals. The right-wing extremist political parties, by contrast, represent more nationalistic positions. For them, the nation is the supreme principle; this results in devaluing human and civil rights and in particular denying equal rights to those who are not members of the "German people", which they define strictly in ethnic terms. Their aim is to establish an authoritarian state that would do away with the free and democratic order. Neo-Nazis concentrate more on targeted political activities, which are often intended to provoke specific action. Their beliefs are oriented on National Socialist notions of a totalitarian state

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based on racist principles and led by a “Führer”. In their view, the German people are “superior” and must therefore be protected from “racially inferior” foreigners and Jews. Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence – particularly right-wing extremist skinheads – usually have a confused view of the world marked by xenophobic and often racist attitudes. With spontaneous acts of violence and aggressive music that incites hatred, they express their desire to “free” Germany of foreigners.

## 2. Developments within right-wing extremism

Right-wing extremist criminal offences and acts of violence are an especially flagrant expression of right-wing extremist ideology.

### Rise in right-wing extremist violence

The number of such offences increased in 2005 (see also Section III, 2, “Politically Motivated Crime”).

### Smaller right-wing extremist following

By contrast, the right-wing extremist following shrank in 2005 (see 3). In particular, other than the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) the parties of the right-wing extremist spectrum lost many members. The number of right-wing extremists prepared to use violence rose slightly in 2005. Nearly 50% of right-wing extremist skinheads and other violent right-wing extremists live in eastern Germany. The number of neo-Nazis also rose.

### Sentences for forming a right-wing terrorist association

On 7 March 2005, the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court found 12 members of a group calling itself “Freikorps Havelland” guilty of membership of a terrorist association, among other things, and gave them sentences of up to several years in youth custody. The court found that members of the group had participated in arson attacks on seven Turkish or Asian takeaways and restaurants between August 2003 and May 2004 (see also Section II, 2).

In April and May 2005, the Bavarian Higher Regional Court in Munich returned verdicts on members of the group Kameradschaft Süd. The group’s leader, Martin WIESE, was sentenced to a total of seven years in prison for leadership and membership of a terrorist association as well as other crimes. Three other defendants were given sentences ranging from 27 months to five years and nine months for membership of a terrorist association and other crimes (see Section II, 2).

There were no further indications of terrorist activity by right-wing extremists in 2005, although security authorities repeatedly

confiscated weapons and explosives. But there were no indications that terrorist violence was under serious discussion within the right-wing extremist scene. For tactical reasons, the majority of right-wing extremists oppose the use of terrorist violence to achieve political aims (see Section II, 2).

**Influence of right-wing extremist skinhead music**

Many young people continue to find skinhead music appealing. Through such music, they come into contact with the right-wing extremist scene. Skinhead music thus plays an important role in bringing together and consolidating groups of extreme right-wing youth willing to use violence. "Project Schoolyard", a plan first developed in late 2003 to distribute free CDs, specifically targeted young people outside the right-wing extremist milieu. While security authorities successfully prevented distribution of the CD in 2004, neo-Nazis managed to give out the "Schoolyard" CD in some German *Länder* starting in August 2005. The skinhead subculture continues to be active particularly in organizing concerts. The number of concerts again increased in 2005. The number of skinhead bands has also grown, as has the number of distributors.

Although numerous skinheads take part in major NPD events (see Section II, 3), the skinhead scene tends to resist organised integration into right-wing extremist political parties.

**Neo-Nazi scene's changed relationship to NPD**

The number of neo-Nazi followers, most of whom are organised in about 160 groups known as *Kameradschaften*, increased again in 2005. The neo-Nazis' strategy of organising as many demonstrations as possible is attractive to many young people. Neo-Nazis have set up "action offices" or "action alliances" in an attempt to counteract fragmentation within the scene. In 2005, neo-Nazi activity focused on protests opposing the Federal Government's social security reforms. The NPD's calls for a "German popular front" increased the party's appeal among neo-Nazis. As a result, the NPD succeeded in integrating prominent neo-Nazis into its organisation (see Section III).

**Significant growth in NPD influence**

In 2005, the NPD continued to pursue its strategy of a right-wing "popular front", using its alliance with the DVU, the so-called Pact for Germany, as well as its close ties to the neo-Nazi scene to improve its chances for election. Again in 2005, its fundamental antagonism to the free and democratic order was documented in numerous public statements: For example, the NPD agitated on behalf of a racist and nationalist *Volksgemeinschaft* and disputed the legitimacy of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The party also attempted to relativise the crimes of the National Socialist regime by describing the World War II air attack on Dresden as a "holocaust of bombs".

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But election results in 2005 did not bring the parliamentary breakthrough that the party had hoped for (see Section IV, 1).

**DVU increasingly overshadowed by NPD**

Despite a slight drop in membership, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union) in 2005 remained the largest and best-funded right-wing extremist political party. But the party, which is dominated by its chair Dr Gerhard FREY, increasingly found itself overshadowed by the NPD. This is the result of a lack of internal party debate, due to the dominance of the party chair, and the relatively advanced age of party members, who are satisfied to follow the conventional right-wing extremist positions represented in the weekly *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ, National newspaper/German weekly).

In view of the DVU's reservations about neo-Nazis allied with the NPD, the "Pact for Germany" between the DVU and NPD is under great pressure to succeed. If the alliance fails in the medium term to deliver the desired votes, FREY is likely to go back on his agreement with the NPD (see Section IV, 2).

**REP still plagued by internal quarrels**

Again in 2005 there were concrete indications that the party Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans) was pursuing right-wing extremist activity. Following painful losses in the *Land* and national parliamentary elections, conflict flared up again over party chair Dr Schlierer's policy of distancing the REP from other right-wing extremist organisations. A particular bone of contention was the REP leadership's refusal to participate in the NPD's "popular front" strategy and join in an electoral coalition with the NPD and DVU. The party also failed to set any new priorities or raise its public profile, and its membership continued to shrink to about 6,500 (see Section IV, 3).

**Unsuccessful attempts to make the movement more intellectual**

Right-wing extremists' attempts at developing a more intellectual image lost intensity and remained largely ineffective again in 2005. Even the "Dresden School", the NPD's attempt at a right-wing extremist counterpart to the leftist Frankfurt School, showed few signs of life. Nor did other right-wing extremist organisations or institutions have any impact (see Section V).

**Anti-Semitism**

Anti-Semitism continues to play an important role in all areas of right-wing extremism. This is especially true of less direct forms of anti-Semitism, which are on the increase along with open incitement against Jews. This indirect form of agitation speculates on latent anti-Semitic attitudes among the general public, where it attempts to increase its influence (see Section VI).

### 3. Organisations and following

**Right-wing extremist following continues to shrink** At the end of 2005, there were 183 right-wing extremist organisations and associations in Germany (2004: 168). Membership of these organisations and the number of unaffiliated right-wing extremists totalled 39,000, or about 4.4% fewer than the previous year (40,700).

**Slight increase in number of violent right-wing extremists** The number of subculture-oriented<sup>5</sup> and other right-wing extremists willing to use violence rose by 4% to 10,400. This category includes right-wing extremists who support the use of violence but have not yet committed any violent crimes. The largest group by far is made up of right-wing extremist skinheads whose subculture orientation clearly distinguishes them from other violent right-wing extremists, such as neo-Nazis.

**Renewed increase in number of neo-Nazis** The number of neo-Nazis increased by about 8% to 4,100 (2004: 3,800). The degree of organisation within the neo-Nazi scene also increased: 105 groupings demonstrated at least a minimum of organisational structure (2004: 87). This also included a significant proportion of the roughly 160 *Kameradschaften*.

**Right-wing extremist party membership continues to fall** Only about 21,500 people currently belong to any right-wing extremist political party (2004: 23,800). This number includes REP members, although not every member of the party can be considered a right-wing extremist. This drop of about 10% is due to further membership losses of the REP (about 1,000) and DVU (about 2,000).

The number of other right-wing extremist organisations, such as the Gesellschaft für freie Publizistik e.V. (GFP, Society for free journalism, reg'd society) and the Artgemeinschaft Germanische Glaubens-Gemeinschaft wesensgemäßer Lebensgestaltung e.V. (AG-GGG, Community of believers in a Germanic lifestyle, reg'd society), shrank in 2005 to 73 (2004: 76). About 4,000 members/activists belong to this spectrum (2004: 4,300).

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<sup>5</sup> Not only skinheads are willing to use violence or actually behave violently. To a minor extent, neo-Nazis and – to a still smaller extent – members of right-wing extremist parties also demonstrate such behaviour. Therefore, willingness to use violence cannot be the only criterion for distinguishing between skinheads and neo-Nazis. The subcultural aspect, i.e. the fact that skinheads disassociate themselves from society's general standards, is much more important. This includes wearing military clothing, listening to aggressive music and drinking excessive amounts of alcohol.

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<b>Right-wing extremist following <sup>1</sup></b>						
	<b>2003</b>		<b>2004</b>		<b>2005</b>	
	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
Subculture-oriented and other right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence <sup>2</sup>	2	10,000	2	10,000	2	10,400
Neo-Nazis <sup>3</sup>	95	3,000	87	3,800	105	4,100
<b>Political parties</b>	3	24,500	3	23,800	3	21,500
of which REP <sup>4</sup>		8,000		7,500		6,500
DVU		11,500		11,000		9,000
NPD		5,000		5,300		6,000
<b>Other right-wing extremist organisations</b>	69	4,600	76	4,300	73	4,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>42,100</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>41,900</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>40,000</b>
After deducting multiple memberships <sup>5</sup>		<b>41,500</b>		<b>40,700</b>		<b>39,000</b>

<sup>1</sup> Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.

<sup>2</sup> Most of the subculture-oriented and other violent right-wing extremists (mainly skinheads) are not organised in groups. The statistics list not only those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those right-wing extremists presumed on the basis of pertinent indicators to be prepared to use violence.

<sup>3</sup> After subtracting multiple memberships within the neo-Nazi milieu. This figure includes only those neo-Nazi groups and those of the 160 *Kameradschaften* that demonstrate a certain degree of structure and permanence.

<sup>4</sup> Not all REP members can be assumed to pursue or support right-wing extremist aims.

<sup>5</sup> Totals were adjusted to reflect instances of multiple membership of political parties and other right-wing extremist organisations (2005: 1,000).

#### **4. Periodical publications**

In 2005, the number of right-wing extremist publications dropped to 90 (2004: 103). The total print run amounted to around 4.2 million copies (2004: 4.4 million); 51 of these publications appeared at least four times a year.

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## II. Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence

### 1. Violent right-wing extremist following

#### Violent scene stable at high level

The number of right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence rose slightly in 2005 to a total of 10,400 (2004: approx. 10,000). The majority of these are right-wing extremist skinheads.

### 2. Right-wing terrorism

#### Members of two right-wing terrorist groups sentenced

For the first time since 1988, members of right-wing extremist groups were sentenced on charges of membership in a terrorist association (see Section I, 2).

#### “Freikorps Havelland”

On 7 March 2005, the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court found 11 members of a group calling itself “Freikorps Havelland” guilty of founding and/or belonging to a terrorist association, as well as other crimes, and gave them sentences of up to several years in youth custody under Section 129a of the Criminal Code (StGB). The 20-year-old chief accused received a sentence of four years and six months in prison. The remaining defendants were given suspended sentences of up to two years.

The court found that the defendants had formed a group they called “Freikorps” or “Freikorps Havelland” in order to carry out systematically planned arson attacks on foreign-operated restaurants in the region with the intent to intimidate their foreign operators and drive them out of business. Different members of the group participated in arson attacks on a total of seven Turkish or Asian takeaways and businesses in the Havelland district of Brandenburg between August 2003 and May 2004. The attacks resulted in damages totalling more than €600,000. Worth noting was the fact that the young defendants were not politically active or members of any other right-wing organisations. The defendants have appealed their sentences.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The court found another defendant guilty on two counts of arson, attempted aggravated arson and property damage and gave him a suspended sentence of two years in youth custody. This sentence is not subject to appeal.

On 9 March 2006, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) rejected the appeal by the chief accused and four co-defendants as manifestly unfounded. The sentences set by the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court for five of the eleven defendants found guilty of membership in a terrorist association under Section 129a StGB are therefore not subject to appeal.

**The group led by  
Martin WIESE**

The Bavarian Higher Regional Court found eight members of the one-time inner circle of the Munich group Kameradschaft Süd, including its leader Martin WIESE, guilty of membership or leadership of a terrorist association under Section 129a of the Criminal Code.

On 4 May, WIESE was sentenced to seven years in prison for leadership of a terrorist association and violations of the Weapons Act and Explosives Act, among others. The court sentenced three other neo-Nazis to prison terms ranging from 27 months to five years and nine months for membership of a terrorist association and other crimes. The court had already given four members of the group on 5 April suspended sentences of 16 to 22 months for membership of a terrorist association. None of these sentences is subject to appeal.

The group, made up of members of the Kameradschaft Süd leadership, was plotting a violent revolution. All participants approved of and supported a plan to detonate an explosive device at a cornerstone-laying ceremony for a Jewish community centre in Munich on 9 November 2003. Members of the group had acquired illegal weapons and explosives for this purpose. But security authorities discovered the plot in advance and were able to prevent the attack.

**Weapons and  
explosives**

Many right-wing extremists are fascinated by weapons and explosives. Police found a number of weapons, parts and ammunition – some of it live – at the homes of three right-wing extremists in Rosenheim, Bavaria, in April. The find included four carbines, several pistols, a revolver, a fake anti-tank mine, a homemade silencer, several loaded magazines and a variety of ammunition. Following the ban on the neo-Nazi group Alternative Nationale Strausberger Dart, Piercing und Tattoo Offensive (ANSDAPO, Alternative national Strausberg dart, piercing and tattoo offensive; see Section III), in July the police confiscated an anti-tank shell, an MG 42 machine gun missing a barrel, sawed-off barrels for submachine guns, air pistols and ammunition. There were no indications connecting the weapons to specific attack plans.

For tactical reasons, most right-wing extremists reject the use of violence to overthrow the system. In their view, it is too easy for the authorities to infiltrate terrorist associations, and terrorist attacks have few prospects of success. Right-wing extremists also fear that terrorist activities could lead to even greater state control and surveillance, further reducing their scope of activity.

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**Discussion of violence related to current events**

The intensity of debate within the right-wing extremist scene regarding the use of violence is regularly influenced by outside events. In previous years, debate increased in connection with rioting by militant members of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party; see "Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State", Section II, 2.2). In autumn 2005, rioting by immigrant youths in France fanned discussion.

Activities by left-wing extremists often provide the impetus to violence. For example, in private e-mail messages, a user of a right-wing extremist Internet forum advocated preparing offensive action during violent confrontations with political opponents, the police and all who harm the German people. According to these e-mails, "balanced" militancy included physical attacks along with property damage and arson attacks on homes, private property and facilities.

**3. Right-wing extremist skinheads****No firmly held worldview**

Right-wing extremist skinheads constitute a significant element of the right-wing extremist spectrum in Germany. Their subculture lifestyle is oriented more towards satisfying their individual needs than towards systematic political activity. Nor does the majority have a firmly held right-wing extremist worldview.

**Not highly structured**

This scene is largely made up of loosely organised cliques of violent right-wing extremists. As a result, they are held together not by hierarchical structures, but by the group members' personal relationships, often of long duration. The main focus is on spending their free time together, mostly by going to right-wing extremist parties or skinhead concerts. If skinheads regularly attend politically oriented events, in particular demonstrations, it is primarily because right-wing extremist events of this kind, with their activist elements, promise a certain kind of excitement.

But the scene remains dangerous: By participating in this milieu, young people come into contact with right-wing extremist ideology and may seek solutions to personal problems in the false promise offered by a sense of belonging and supposed racial superiority. The skinhead music typical for the scene serves as a special medium for attracting young people and plays an important role in disseminating elements of nationalist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic ideology.

**Changes in outward appearance**

Some segments of the scene have moved away from the previously typical "skinhead look": Instead of shaved heads, boots and bomber

jackets, fashionable clothes, trainers and body piercing are now popular, especially in eastern Germany. This development can be traced to the influence of other subculture trends, such as the largely apolitical hardcore milieu. Often, skinheads can now be recognised only from certain clothing brands or manufacturers with symbolic significance.

**Concentration in eastern Germany**

The right-wing extremist skinhead scene continues to be concentrated in eastern Germany. Although it contains only about 20% of the total population of the Federal Republic of Germany, nearly half of all right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence live in this region. Significant numbers of followers are found particularly in the greater Berlin area and in certain parts of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. This is true to a limited extent also for urban areas in western Germany, such as the Ruhr region.

**Relationship to neo-Nazis**

The relationship between skinheads and neo-Nazis remained ambivalent in 2005, although members of both milieus cooperate in *Kameradschaften* in many regions. While neo-Nazis do not think skinheads show sufficient political awareness, skinheads nonetheless represent an important pool of potential support for neo-Nazi activities. For this reason alone, neo-Nazis take into account the interests of this subculture when planning their rallies in order to attract as many skinheads as possible and thus gain more public attention. This is why bands from the skinhead scene are frequently engaged to play at neo-Nazi demonstrations.

**Relationship to right-wing extremist political parties**

The skinhead scene remains sceptical of right-wing extremist political parties. Although the scene has no contact worth mentioning to the DVU or REP (due in part to these parties' efforts to distance themselves from violent elements), it has increasingly accepted the NPD and become more integrated in the party organisation. This is largely the result of the NPD's longstanding policy of openness towards neo-Nazi and violent elements of the right-wing extremist spectrum. This is especially apparent in cooperation between the NPD and subculture scene in the case of major NPD demonstrations and party events which include a musical element. For example, at least 1,000 skinheads attended a concert following the *Land* party conference in Pössneck, Thuringia, on 2 April.

Despite such event-related cooperation, skinhead participation in organised party structures and activities remains the exception. Most skinheads are still unwilling to become involved in long-term political activity.

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### **3.1 Inter-regional skinhead organisations**

The only right-wing extremist skinhead groups active nation-wide were the Hammerskins and Furchtlos & Treu (Fearless and loyal).

#### **Hammerskins**

Organised in regional chapters, the Hammerskins had about 100 members in 2005, the same number as in the previous year. The group, which is oriented on National Socialist and racist ideology and has been active in Germany since the early 1990s, hardly appeared in public. In a very few cases, Hammerskins members organised skinhead concerts, such as one in Dettelbach, Bavaria, on 17 September, which about 350 people attended. But Hammerskins functionaries meet regularly at the national and international level.

#### **Furchtlos & Treu**

The group Furchtlos & Treu, founded in 1999, claims to have several sections in both Germany and Croatia; like the Hammerskins, in 2005 it hardly appeared in public.

### 3.2 Blood & Honour after the ban

#### No nation-wide organisation

After the skinhead organisation Blood & Honour was banned by the Federal Minister of the Interior in 2000, its former leaders, particularly those in south-western Germany, tried to continue the banned group's activities at least to some degree, but they were unable to maintain or restore its nation-wide organisation. Former Blood & Honour activists have maintained close contacts at the regional level, however. Police in Weiterstadt, Hesse, on 17 June confiscated from a former member of the Baden section several articles of clothing bearing the logo of the banned organisation. The police opened an investigation on suspicion that the subject had violated the ban.

### 3.3 Right-wing extremist skinhead music

#### Skinhead music very important for right-wing extremist scene

Skinhead music plays an important role in the violent right-wing extremist subculture and beyond. The xenophobic and anti-democratic lyrics influence and reinforce the vague right-wing extremist attitudes of those who belong to this milieu. The music also fosters a sense of identity and helps mobilise supporters; right-wing extremists also use it outside the scene to attract young people to their events and organisations.

#### Distribution of right-wing extremist CDs to young people

Over the past two years, neo-Nazis and the NPD have made several attempts to win young converts to their cause by distributing free CDs to schoolchildren.

#### “Project Schoolyard”

With help from notorious music distributors, bands, *Kameradschaften* and individuals, the neo-Nazi initiators of “Project Schoolyard” produced roughly 50,000 CDs in 2004. In addition to music by right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters, the CDs also contained information on how to contact right-wing extremist groups. According to the public prosecutor and local court in Halle, as well as the Stendal Regional Court, the CD conveys anti-democratic, racist, Nazi ideology; it has been subject to a general confiscation order since August 2004. The property of the person who commissioned the CD's production was searched but failed to turn up any of the CDs; however, the confiscation order prevented their distribution for nearly a year.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The Stendal local court acquitted the suspect on 8 February 2006. The judgement is not yet final.

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Copies of the sampler first appeared in several *Länder* in August 2005. Contrary to the original plan, however, the CDs were rarely handed out to young people in public. Instead, activists left them at schools that were not in session, in mailboxes of private citizens and public institutions, and on parked cars. About 4,000 CDs were confiscated by the police nation-wide.

**NPD distribution campaigns**

The NPD took up the idea of “Project Schoolyard” during the *Land* parliamentary elections in Saxony in 2004 with its own CD sampler entitled *Schnauze voll? – Wahltag ist Zahltag!* (Fed up? Election day is payback time!). It used this form of propaganda again in the run-up to *Land* and national parliamentary elections (see Section IV, 1). Along with a new version of the CD produced for the parliamentary election in Saxony, the NPD distributed what it called the “Schoolyard” sampler entitled *Hier kommt der Schrecken aller Linken, Spiesser und Pauker!* (Here comes the worst fear of every leftist, square and nerd!) The sampler distributed by the NPD had no content that was punishable by law.

**Major increase in right-wing extremist skinhead concerts**

After the neo-Nazi organisation Blood & Honour was banned in Germany in 2000, the number of right-wing extremist skinhead concerts initially dropped, but since 2002 it has grown steadily. Growth in 2005 was especially strong: There were 193 concerts, an increase of 56 or roughly 40% over the previous year.<sup>8</sup> Average attendance was 160, which was consistent with previous years. Most of the concerts had audiences numbering between 100 and 300; eleven concerts drew more than 300 persons. There was a higher-than-average number of concerts in eastern Germany. Activities were concentrated particularly in those regions where the NPD or members of the scene had access to concert venues, for example in Baden-Württemberg and Saxony.

**Regional concentration**

The largest concert took place in Pössneck, Thuringia, on 2 April following the NPD’s *Land* party conference. More than a thousand people attended the event, a “farewell concert” for the leader of the Berlin neo-Nazi band Landser, who had been sentenced to several years in prison on charges of forming a criminal association. Due to the band’s cult status among right-wing extremists, fans came from all over Germany and abroad to see the singer perform with well-known members of other right-wing extremist bands shortly before he went to

<sup>8</sup> Figures given by the *Land* offices for the protection of the constitution and the *Land* criminal police offices may differ due to different deadlines and different criteria for inclusion.

prison. A banning order proved ineffective, as those travelling to the concert managed to avoid the checkpoints.

On the other hand, intensive intelligence-gathering and checks succeeded in preventing 22 concerts from taking place. And after speaking with the authorities, persons renting out the venues for such events often cancelled their rental contracts with concert organisers.

In 2005, police broke up about 13% of concerts already in progress; there were only a few instances of spontaneous resistance.

In a few cases, organisers applied for official permission to hold their events; if the authorities responsible for public order made this dependent on certain conditions, event organisers usually complied.

**Reasons for the increase**

There are several reasons for the increase in right-wing extremist skinhead concerts.

Event organisers have adapted to the measures used by security and order authorities and make an effort not to give them any reason to ban the events or set conditions. Further, organisers continue to operate in secret, working with only a small group to prepare for events. They sometimes rent – on false pretences – several venues for the same event. The number of concerts has risen particularly wherever organisers have access to venues belonging to members of the scene, for example in Thuringia, Saxony, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. The NPD also plays an important role: Not only has it used the music as a form of propaganda during its election campaigns, it has also frequently provided space for concerts and organised appearances by right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters. In doing so, the party reckons that police are less likely to intervene in a party function, even when the event is actually focused on the music.

**Right-wing extremist bands**

The number of right-wing extremist skinhead bands in Germany actively performing or recording rose to 142 in 2005, up from 106 in 2004. About 56% of these bands have been active for a number of years.

**Landser verdict final**

The Federal Court of Justice rejected an appeal by the lead singer of the band Landser on 10 March; as a result, sentencing of band members on charges of forming a criminal association, among others, is now final. A week after his farewell concert in April, the singer started serving his prison sentence of three years and four months.

In December, the Stuttgart public prosecutor's office brought charges against four members of the Baden-Württemberg skinhead band Race

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War on suspicion of forming a criminal association (Section 129 of the Criminal Code), among others. After the conviction of the Landser band members, this is the second time a skinhead band has been charged with this offence. Band members operate in a highly conspiratorial manner to pursue their criminal aims of disseminating National Socialist ideology throughout Germany and Europe which is seditious or intended to incite or endorse criminal behaviour.

**Fewer new recordings with punishable content**

On the one hand, the conviction of Landser members enhanced the band's cult and martyr status. On the other hand, it appears to have had a deterrent effect on other German right-wing extremist bands, as the number of CDs with punishable content fell slightly.

Some of these are re-releases or compilations of previously released songs, however, and are produced by foreign distributors. An example is the CD *Vorwärts für Deutschland* (Forward for Germany) by the band Bataillon 500, which contains the following lyrics:

"I believe in the Reich and in German victory. I believe in the Reich and in white race war. I believe in the Führer, who was Germany's greatest son. I believe in the rebirth of the white nation."

The sampler *Blood & Honour Vol. 5*, sold by a U.S. distributor, also contains previous releases by the German right-wing extremist bands Race Hatred and Race War.

German right-wing extremist bands are increasingly recording their music in English, to make it both more difficult for the authorities to identify any criminal content, and more attractive to an international audience.

**More appearances at right-wing extremist events**

The number of right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters appearing at other kinds of right-wing extremist events increased again in 2005, to 47 from 38 in 2004. Most appeared at election campaign rallies. There were also performances at two demonstrations. Right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters from Germany and abroad performed at open-air concerts such as the "Festival of races" organised by the NPD in Jena, Thuringia, on 11 June.

**Right-wing extremist singer-songwriters**

In 2005, 26 right-wing extremist singer-songwriters performed at 52 right-wing extremist events (2004: 15 performers at 42 events). The most popular of these were Frank RENNICKE, Michael MÜLLER and Annett MÜLLER.

### 3.4 Distributors of right-wing extremist skinhead music

**More music distributors**

There is an independent network to produce and distribute right-wing extremist music and propaganda materials. Right-wing extremist skinhead bands can choose from about 25 labels to produce their music. Members of the scene can buy such music, which is not available in shops, from more than 75 mail-order distributors active nation-wide (2004: about 60). In addition, there are numerous shops which are also popular meeting-places for the regional scene. Mobile dealers offer their wares at concerts.

The growth of music distributors active nation-wide is largely due to the widespread use of the Internet. Almost all music distributors active in Germany now use the Internet because it requires relatively little effort and financial outlay; with their regularly updated product selection, they are able to reach a wide audience of potential customers. In recent years, the Internet has taken on a major role in music distribution. Even interested persons who have no contacts to the scene can gain access to right-wing extremist music through the Internet.

But Internet use has also made distributors and their forums extremely vulnerable to hackers. Taking advantage of gaps in security, left-wing extremist groups were able to hack into websites of several skinhead music distributors and publish on the Internet data from several thousand customers.

Most sellers of CDs and clothing who are based in Germany derive most of their income from the sale of items that are not illegal in this country. Because laws abroad differ, recordings that are punishable under German law are usually produced and sold by foreign distributors, also via the Internet. U.S. companies in particular have targeted the German market and play a major role in producing and distributing CDs of German groups whose music is anti-Semitic, incites hatred and glorifies National Socialism.

Again in 2005, while investigating skinhead music distributors, law enforcement authorities confiscated large quantities of right-wing extremist recording media and propaganda materials in Bremen, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine/Westphalia, Saxony and Thuringia, among others.

### **3.5 Skinhead fanzines**

**No increase in the number of right-wing**

The number of right-wing extremist fanzines did not rise in 2005. About 17 titles of this kind appeared in printed form or online. They

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**extremist fanzines** mostly contain interviews with right-wing extremist bands, singer-songwriters, music distributors and fanzine editors; reports on experiences and concerts; reviews of right-wing extremist recordings, DVDs and fanzines; and advertising for right-wing extremist distributors.

As in the past, fanzines are subject to a high level of fluctuation, probably because editors find it difficult to get scene insiders to write articles about recent events and lack motivation to produce the publications. Some longstanding fanzines were no longer published in 2005, while some new ones were launched, such as the magazine *Nordwind* (North wind), put out by a distributor in Rhineland-Palatinate. With its highly professional appearance, it follows in the footsteps of the magazine *Rock Nord* (Rock north), which has existed for nearly ten years.

In addition to appearing in printed form, fanzines are also published on the Internet, as they can be updated more frequently and are less expensive both for producers and readers. Like competing media – websites of music distributors, newsletters and forums – online fanzines and similar websites serve as an information and communications medium for the latest concert information and reviews, CD reviews and the like. Online fanzines have not yet become firmly established, however, in part due to their irregular publication and their apparent inability to provide the current information users expect.

### III. Neo-Nazism

#### Ideology

Right-wing extremist ideology is based on nationalist, racist and anti-Semitic elements. As the foundation for their views, neo-Nazis often refer to the “anti-capitalist” 25-point programme of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP, National Socialist German Workers’ (Nazi) Party) from 1920. Their ideas about the state and society are oriented on the “Führer principle”: The ideal state that neo-Nazis are striving for would be headed by a leader (*Führer*) – one not elected by democratic means and thus impossible to vote out of office – who would carry out the supposed will of the people (*Volk*). Based on this notion, neo-Nazis reject democratic principles and rights such as the protection of minorities and freedom of opinion, as these would hinder the formation of a *Volksgemeinschaft* (the Nazi term for a community based on shared racial characteristics) and thus the subordination of the individual to the larger group.

Neo-Nazis strictly oppose relationships between Caucasians and people of colour, as they believe that “a mixing of races” with inferior “non-whites” will cause the “white race” to die out. They describe as inferior those ethnic groups which do not fulfil their racist criteria and declare them to be a threat to the existence of their own people. This kind of incitement often makes persons of foreign origin targets of violent crimes motivated by right-wing extremism.

#### Relationship to violence

The aggressive neo-Nazi ideology leads to a constant preoccupation with violence. Neo-Nazis’ fundamental affinity for violence finds expression in numerous debates, especially within Internet discussion forums. And authorities again found weapons in 2005. For some neo-Nazis, paramilitary exercises are part of their political work.

#### Appearance in public

When appearing in public, many neo-Nazis tend towards a certain reticence in order to avoid arousing immediate antipathy. Neatly dressed and well-groomed, they attempt to gain public sympathy by presenting themselves as “clean” political activists. They also avoid making statements with obvious racist or neo-Nazi content. Instead of a crude xenophobia, neo-Nazis may use an exclusionary notion of the nation-state like the one formulated by neo-Nazi Axel REITZ at a rally in Bochum on 26 June:

“As a National Socialist, I can understand the Jews wanting to have their own nation and putting their interests first; then one must allow the same for the German people ...”

While this approach is intended to suggest the desire for international understanding, its racist nature is apparent: In a “racially homogeneous” state, persons of other races would, at the very least, be granted fewer rights.

Reference to the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II played a major role in neo-Nazi demonstrations in 2005. Neo-Nazis also took up themes which received great political interest among the democratic, pluralistic society, such as the merging of social assistance and unemployment assistance as a measure of welfare reform (slogan of a demonstration in Altenburg, Thuringia, on 15 April: “The enemy is not on the right, but above: No to ignorance and the dismantling of the welfare state”) and child abuse (slogan of a demonstration in Eisenach, Thuringia, on 8 October: “Our children – our future! Say no to child abusers and yes to more rights and protection for our children!”).

With this strategy, neo-Nazis attempt to overcome their political isolation and position themselves as representing the interests of broad segments of the population. Although the actors’ neo-Nazi arguments are not initially apparent in these cases, the demonstrations were nonetheless intended to exploit general political themes for their own ends.

**Building “black blocs”**

In a few cases, groups known as “black blocs” attempted to create a militant opposition to the state and to their own political opponents (see also “Left-Wing Extremist Activities”, Section IV, 1). Borrowing from left-wing extremist terminology, they also call themselves “autonomous nationalists”. An announcement of a demonstration in Leipzig on 1 May stated that the “bulls” (police) had been given their way too often. According to the announcement, the reaction was “autonomous and radical structures” that were now “taking the offensive for a revolutionary nationalism/socialism” requiring neither “revolutionary theoreticians” nor parties. But the majority of the scene rejects this strategy. In the view of right-wing extremist Christian WORCH, this is where two fronts meet: those who advocate discipline and closed ranks versus those – referring to the “autonomous nationalists” – who place greater importance on “acting autonomously and taking responsibility for one’s acts”. According to WORCH, this is a paradigm shift, possibly in conjunction with the rise of a new generation.

**Number of supporters**

In 2005, the neo-Nazi following grew to about 4,100 activists (2004: about 3,800), as neo-Nazis again succeeded in interesting young people in their ideology and integrating them into *Kameradschaften*.

**Organisations and networks**

The neo-Nazi scene is largely organised in groups known as *Kameradschaften*. Headed by a leader (*Kameradschaftsführer*), who determines the group's objectives and maintains contacts with the leaders of other such groups, *Kameradschaften* typically have up to 25 members, who are usually in their early 20s. Group meetings are usually more like regular pub evenings, although some may include political orientation or lectures. *Kameradschaften* mainly appear in public at demonstrations or when distributing propaganda material.

Since the late 1990s, neo-Nazis have founded loosely structured networks which they call "action offices" (*Aktionsbüros*) or "action alliances" (*Aktionsbündnisse*) to make up for the lack of organisation and the large degree of fragmentation in the scene. Neo-Nazis hope these networks will allow them to take action at the regional and national level and in particular collect information from "comrades" about major events. For example, "action offices" put out announcements, also via the Internet, of upcoming demonstrations and report on topics and planning which are important for the scene.

**Hilfsorganisation für nationale und politische Gefangene e.V. (HNG, Relief Organisation for Nationalist and Political Prisoners and Their Families, reg'd society)**

With around 600 members, the Hilfsorganisation für nationale und politische Gefangene e.V. (HNG, Relief Organisation for Nationalist and Political Prisoners and Their Families, reg'd society) is the only neo-Nazi association with nation-wide relevance. Founded in 1979, the group devotes itself to right-wing extremists in prison, in order to prevent them from leaving the right-wing extremist milieu. Via ads in its publication *Nachrichten der HNG* (HNG news), the group helps initiate contacts to like-minded persons serving prison time and offers convicts an editorial platform to express themselves. HNG is important above all as a meeting-place for persons from the entire right-wing extremist spectrum. For example, about 140 persons attended the organisation's annual meeting in Gremsdorf, Bavaria, on 16 April. According to the HNG, a greeting from the NPD was read out at the meeting, among other things.

**Demonstrations**

The number of neo-Nazi demonstrations increased to 145, from 87 in 2004. This growth is due in part to the ban on the main neo-Nazi march commemorating the death of Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess; in its place, the scene organised a large number of other demonstrations.

Neo-Nazis also exploited opportunities offered by the national parliamentary elections and the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II to present themselves in public. Although there were more demonstrations than in 2004, the non-partisan neo-Nazi camp was able to mobilise more than 1,000 participants for only two of them: a

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rally in Magdeburg on 15 January remembering the 60th anniversary of aerial attacks on the city during World War II; and a “heroes’ memorial ceremony” in Halbe, Brandenburg, on 12 November.

**Rudolf Hess  
memorial march in  
Wunsiedel**

On 16 August, the Federal Constitutional Court denied an appeal by right-wing extremist Jürgen RIEGER to lift the Bavarian Administrative Court’s ban on the “Rudolf Hess Memorial March” in Wunsiedel. The Bavarian authorities based their decision on the amended Section 130 of the Criminal Code (StGB).<sup>9</sup> In most cases, the demonstrations did not display any direct reference to Hess, who died in 1987, even though the NPD’s requests for permission described them as substitutes for the banned march. Instead, they were mainly in protest of Section 130 of the Criminal Code and what they claimed were limits on the freedom of expression in Germany.

**Relationship to NPD**

The relationship between the neo-Nazi spectrum and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) is an ambivalent one. On the one hand, neo-Nazi “Free Forces” supported the NPD during its national and *Land* parliamentary election campaigns, by handing out campaign materials, providing security for information stands and attending major party events. Neo-Nazis were also included on NPD candidate lists all over Germany, even in some cases as direct candidates for the German Bundestag.

On the other hand, neo-Nazis have numerous reservations about the NPD. Some accuse the party of not showing enough appreciation for neo-Nazi support. And the NPD’s alliance with the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union) provoked sometimes harsh criticism, as the DVU party chairman, Dr FREY, is not especially popular with the neo-Nazi scene.

Neo-Nazis were also unhappy with the demonstration held by the NPD and its youth organisation on 8 May for the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. They accused the NPD of giving up on the march as originally planned, out of fear for its public image and under pressure from the police and counter-demonstrators. Many neo-Nazis regarded this as a betrayal of participants, some of whom who had travelled long distances to attend (cf. Section IV, 1).

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<sup>9</sup> Amended by legislation of 24 March 2005 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 969), which went into force on 1 April 2005. This amendment makes it a punishable offence to disrupt the peace in public or in an assembly by endorsing, glorifying or justifying the National Socialist dictatorship in a way that violates the dignity of its victims.

The issue of cooperating with the NPD led to a lasting debate within the neo-Nazi scene. For example, the Nationales Infotelefon Rheinland (NIT, Rhineland national telephone hotline) published the following statement supporting the NPD on its website on 13 September:

“By endorsing a worldview that opposes the foundations of this system, by propagating a social model that is based on *Volksgemeinschaft* and opposed to capitalism, we are consciously positioning ourselves outside the dominant society. ... Many nationalist activists who have not formed parties due to their hostility to the system therefore regard support for the NPD’s Bundestag campaign as an opportunity to test public acceptance of nationalist views and to step up their efforts at the grass-roots level.”

By contrast, on 6 August the right-wing extremist website Störtebeker-Netz (Störtebeker network) called on supporters to boycott the election:

“Parliamentarianism is not just a democratic backdrop for the rule of greedy capital, but also the angel of death for our German people [*Volk*]. ... As we see it, the NPD and DVU are parties of the Federal Republic just like the CDU and SPD. The system wants the NPD to tie as many dissatisfied persons and enemies of the system as possible to the senseless Parliamentary System in order to make them harmless. Count us out.”

This unresolved relationship with the NPD is an indication of fragmentation within the scene and raises doubt as to whether neo-Nazis have developed any political theory of their own, apart from adapting certain standard elements from Nazi ideology. Like the rest of the right-wing extremist camp, the neo-Nazi scene has so far relied on non-contentious issues such as the commemoration of Hess and the debate over the supposed dismantling of the social welfare system in order to keep up an appearance of political viability.

**Bans on neo-Nazi groups in Berlin and Brandenburg**

On 9 March, the interior minister of the city-state of Berlin issued bans on two neo-Nazi groups, Kameradschaft Tor and Berliner Alternative Südost (BASO, South-east Berlin alternative). The interior ministry banned the groups on the grounds of their similarity to National Socialism and their active hostility to the free and democratic basic order.

On 12 April, the interior minister of Brandenburg issued a banning order for the Kameradschaft Hauptvolk and its subsidiary organisation Sturm 27 (Storm 27), named after an SA group in Brandenburg. The

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aims and activities of the *Kameradschaft* were opposed to the constitutional order and the idea of international understanding and violated the Criminal Code. On 14 July, the group Alternative Nationale Strausberger Dart, Piercing und Tattoo Offensive (ANSDAPO, Alternative national Strausberg dart, piercing and tattoo offensive) was banned on the same grounds.

**“Anti-anti-fascist”  
activities**

Following in the footsteps of left-wing extremists, neo-Nazis gather and publish information about their political opponents (see “Left-Wing Extremist Activities”, Section IV, 1). Doing so is primarily intended to unsettle those affected rather than as preparation for right-wing extremist violence. There was only one incident in which such “anti-anti-fascist” activity was directly linked to militancy: Conflicts between left- and right-wing extremists in Berlin and Potsdam escalated in June and July 2005. After left-wing extremists brutally attacked a member of the “right-wing” scene in June, right-wing extremists retaliated with a violent attack on two members of the “left-wing” scene on 3 July. In both cases, police initially investigated on suspicion of attempted murder.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> On 20 March 2006, the Potsdam Regional Court sentenced five of the right-wing extremist defendants under juvenile criminal law. The 18-year-old chief accused was given a sentence of three years and three months in prison on a charge of serious bodily injury. Three defendants aged 19 to 21 were given two-year suspended sentences; a third received a warning for failure to lend assistance. On 29 March 2006, the court found the remaining six adult defendants guilty of having jointly committed serious bodily injury and issued sentences ranging from a two-year suspended sentence, to three years and nine months, to five years. The Potsdam public prosecutor’s office had originally filed charges of attempted murder, but the court was unable to find any evidence of intent to kill.

## IV. Political parties

### 1. Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)

Founded:	1964
Headquarters:	Berlin
National chairman:	Udo VOIGT
Membership:	6,000 (2004: 5,300)
Publication:	<i>Deutsche Stimme</i> (German Voice) monthly, Circulation: 21,000
Subsidiary organisations:	Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund e. V. (NHB, National-Democratic University Union, reg'd society)

#### 1.1 Objectives

In 2005, the NPD continued to pursue the goal of creating a “national popular front made up of the NPD, DVU and unaffiliated forces” to serve as the springboard for an all-encompassing “German popular movement”.<sup>11</sup> The NPD’s aggressive agitation makes no secret of its aim to overthrow parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, although for tactical reasons it still officially rejects the use of violence.

The NPD’s public statements demonstrate its similarity to National Socialism; the party’s activities are racist, anti-Semitic, revisionist and aimed at denigrating the democratic order and rule of law set down in Germany’s constitution, known as the Basic Law.

#### ***Volksgemeinschaft* as the new order**

The party continues to maintain its openly aggressive antagonism towards the free and democratic order. As party chairman Udo VOIGT noted in the party publication *Deutsche Stimme* (German Voice), a

<sup>11</sup> See the NPD press release dated 24 May 2005.

“*Volksgemeinschaft* is the best form for a large number of people to live successfully in a group.”<sup>12</sup>

**“Reich” idea**

In a pamphlet issued by the NPD party executive to candidates and functionaries for the Bundestag elections, the NPD describes its aim as “ensuring the complete viability of the German Reich”: Though, according to the pamphlet, the Reich has continued to exist under international law since “23 May 1945, the day the Dönitz government was arrested”, it is no longer sovereign or capable of action.<sup>13</sup>

**Attacks on the legitimacy of the Basic Law and on human rights**

In this pamphlet, the party also claims that the Basic Law has a “legitimacy deficit”, adding:

“The Basic Law has its flaws: It [was] dictated by the Western allies, it was never voted on by the German people, and its basic rights provisions are dripping with human righteousness, de facto giving Germans the same status as foreigners in their own country.”  
(Pamphlet published by the NPD party executive for the Bundestag elections: *Eine Handreichung für die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung. Argumente für Kandidaten und Funktionsträger*, p. 24)

Karl RICHTER, editor of the journal of right-wing extremist theory *Nation & Europa: Deutsche Monatshefte* (Nation & Europe: German monthly; see Section VIII) and head of the parliamentary advisory service for the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony, disputed the universal validity of human rights in a text for the “Dresden School” published on the website of the NPD organisation in Saxony on 9 May:<sup>14</sup>

“The human rights fallacy. Objective ‘human rights’ do not exist; rather, they are an ideological construct formulated in the wake of the French Revolution and even more so in the course of the 20th-century conflicts over worldviews, which at the start of the 21st century serve as a universal vehicle for justifying a global policy of intervention and interference, with the aim of annulling national sovereignty. ... the

<sup>12</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2005, p. 9. *Volksgemeinschaft* is a National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics (translator’s note).

<sup>13</sup> Pamphlet published by the NPD party executive for the Bundestag elections: *Eine Handreichung für die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung. Argumente für Kandidaten und Funktionsträger* (An aid to public speaking: Talking points for candidates and functionaries), September 2005, p. 27.

<sup>14</sup> According to Jürgen GANSEL, part of the NPD party executive and member of Saxony’s *Land* parliament, the “Dresden School” is a “circle associated with the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony; using theory that truly represents the people [volkstreu], it aims to prepare the intellectual groundwork for a new social order.” See *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 10/2005, p. 10.

‘Dresden School’ vehemently [rejects] the fiction of so-called ‘human rights’; it will support any opportunities for ‘rollback’ on a case-by-case basis and on principle.”

**Race collectivism/  
Volksgemeinschaft**

The NPD associates racist-collectivist notions with the new order it strives to set up. These notions are manifested particularly in the concept of *Volksgemeinschaft*. According to Jürgen GANSEL, a member of the NPD party executive and of Saxony’s *Land* parliament, the “Dresden School” aims to “overcome the liberalistic system” in order to replace the “liberal party regime” with popular rule [*Volksherrschaft*] which in his view actually deserves the name. This would result in “true popular rule in which the government and the governed are identical, as demanded by democratic theory.” The people, as an “organic community of shared life and solidarity” would again be at the “centre of the effort to locate the identity of the self”. According to GANSEL, the “Dresden School” is working to achieve a “new social order” in which the individual’s desire for freedom is “brought into harmony” with the need for overall order.<sup>15</sup>

The basic incompatibility of the social model propagated by the NPD with the free and democratic basic order is apparent here in the demand for “identity of the government and the governed”, which is characteristic of totalitarian systems.

**Positive attitude  
towards National  
Socialist ideas**

The notion of *Volksgemeinschaft* advocated by the NPD also follows in the anti-democratic tradition of National Socialism (i.e., the Nazi party), which used the term in particular to refer to a community united by blood and fate, in which the interests of the individual are unconditionally sacrificed to those of the race-based community.

The NPD is aware of this connection, and the pamphlet mentioned above offers a response to possible accusations of talking like “Nazis”.<sup>16</sup> Just because “something already existed during the Third Reich” does “not automatically make it bad”. The NPD does “not reject something just because it existed from 1933 to 1945”, the pamphlet says, adding that the idea of “solidarity in a *Volksgemeinschaft* [is] absolutely correct”.

As NPD national manager Frank SCHWERDT explained in the news programme *Kontraste* which aired on German public broadcaster ARD on 10 February:

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<sup>15</sup> “Statement by Jürgen Gansel, NPD Member of the *Land* Parliament, on the nature and objectives of the ‘Dresden School’ ” dated 3 May 2005 and published on the website of the NPD in Saxony.

<sup>16</sup> See footnote 14, p. 26.

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“We prefer the socialist model, the social model in this country, but a socialism based on this country, this nation. That is why we call it ‘National Socialism’”.

When asked, “Is that National Socialism?”, SCHWERDT answered:

“You can call it that.”

**Hero-worship of Nazi figures; playing down crimes of the Nazi regime**

The similarities between the NPD and National Socialism become obvious when one looks at the hero worship of leading representatives of the Nazi system. For example, party chairman VOIGT expressed his admiration for Adolf Hitler in an interview with the daily *Die Welt* on 12 February; his only criticism was that Hitler was responsible for “Germany’s greatest defeat”:

“Only a great statesman can commit great crimes. ... Of course Hitler accomplished fantastic things, he did away with unemployment in just a few years. ... Historical National Socialism cannot serve as a model for us. We have Hitler to thank for Germany’s greatest defeat. But I do not see why, because of political correctness, every political figure in Germany is expected to say only certain kinds of things.”

In the same interview, VOIGT mentioned Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, as one of a series of “positive examples from history”.

As Klaus-Jürgen MENZEL, NPD member of the Saxony *Land* parliament, explained in the ARD news programme *Kontraste* on 22 September:

“I continue to regard the Führer as a great statesman, perhaps one of the best we ever had. And I stand by that statement.”

**Belligerent and aggressive agitation against political opponents**

Official party statements and those by leading party members attacking the free and democratic basic order and its representatives continue to demonstrate a belligerent, sometimes even militant, tone. Though the party has regularly spoken out in official statements against the use of violence, central NPD figures often stray from the official party line, offering renewed evidence of the NPD’s still-ambivalent attitude towards violence.

In an article entitled “Party corruption instead of the common good” published in the February issue of *Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte*, Karl RICHTER wrote that the degenerate form of parliamentarianism practised in the Bundestag and *Land* parliaments had one undeniable advantage:

“Worn out, obsolete regimes can be disposed of much faster and usually ‘with less bloodshed’ than in a totalitarian system.”

By noting that the desired overthrow of a parliamentary system “usually” occurs “with less bloodshed” than that of a totalitarian system, RICHTER thus does not rule out the use of violence.

At a demonstration in Magdeburg on 15 January predominantly attended by neo-Nazis and skinheads, Thomas WULFF, a leading neo-Nazi and member of the NPD party executive, declared:

“The national opposition in Germany has risen up and is in place to give the final blow to a collapsing system of lies and hypocrisy and social exploitation! ... They can already sense that we are coming, and I call on you, comrades: Let us fight side by side for the future of our people [*Volk*]...”

At the same demonstration, Ralph TEGETHOFF, another leading neo-Nazi and NPD member, struck a similarly aggressive tone:

“As political soldiers and forces true to the people, you are called to work every day at being good role models, being disciplined, being physically fit and strong. ... As in the war for Prussian liberation in 1813. Arise and let the storm break loose! Long live Germany, long live the free German Reich!”

Leading party activists were sentenced on charges of incitement, among others, again in 2005.

**“Strategy of speaking out”**

In a foreword to the pamphlet of talking points put out for the Bundestag elections,<sup>17</sup> VOIGT again urged supporters to attend events organised by political opponents in order “to demand answers from established politicians and candidates ... “in line with the strategy of speaking out”.<sup>18</sup>

NPD supporters applied this strategy in several cases: About 30 NPD supporters disrupted an event held by the leftist party PDS in Berlin on 29 July and attended by leading PDS candidate Gregor GYSI. The Aktionsbüro Rhein-Neckar reported on its website on 18 August that about 50 NPD activists and autonomous *Kameradschaften* disrupted a campaign event in Ludwigshafen, Rhineland-Palatinate, on 17 August, at which then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was present. According to an NPD announcement published on the Internet on 22

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<sup>17</sup> See footnote 14, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Already in 2003 and 2004, VOIGT emphasised the importance of this “strategy of speaking out” (*Wortergreifungsstrategie*) for the “struggle for national liberation”. The strategy forces political opponents to face the NPD’s demands and objectives, he said.

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August, about 15 NPD members disrupted another campaign event attended by the chancellor in Hanover on 20 August.

#### Opposition to social reforms

The NPD continues its efforts, sometimes using militant language, to portray itself as part of a social protest movement or to initiate such a movement. For example, in an announcement entitled “Get involved in the German freedom movement” published on its website on 16 April, the party urged supporters to take “the people’s wrath ... into the streets”. “Functionaries of the Federal Republic” have sold themselves for “exploiters’ capital” and forgotten the German people, the announcement stated, adding that the consequences of the “dictatorship of capital” were becoming clearer every day; mass unemployment, increasing numbers of foreigners, child poverty, loss of values and misery were growing daily. Further, the party demanded the following:

“Those (still) in power must be shown who the real authority is in our land: the German people.

Everyone is willing to fight for something: one’s own future or that of one’s children, preservation of our way of life and our people and the idea of more justice for all. But one also has to take responsibility and stand up for this. The system is on its last legs, and the masses are being placated with the little bit of prosperity left, but for how long? ... We must get up and take an active part in resisting this traitorous system. ... Activism also means making sacrifices and subordinating one’s own well-being to a greater idea.”

In a similar vein, the NPD association of Baden-Württemberg on 21 April published on its website a call to a “day of battle against globalisation and dismantling of the social insurance system, on behalf of *Volksgemeinschaft* and the welfare state” on 1 May. It went on to say that the “Berlin bloc parties ... in alliance with trade unions and employers’ associations” had betrayed the “working population”.

“Sold out to capital, to international high finance, which brought the world the madness of globalisation.”

“All parliamentarians, managers and labour union functionaries are in the pay of total capitalism”, which is destroying nation-states, social networks and national economies; this is what is meant by globalisation, the text says. The text ends with the following appeal:

“We have a natural right to work and live in the land of our fathers! And it is time to take back our country! We are willing to fight for our rights, and we say to Germans: Your interests are our political aim! The problems of working people and the economy can be solved only

**Racism and xenophobia**

in the context of a united German *Volksgemeinschaft* in peace and freedom! Therefore: Join our ranks!”

Again in 2005, the NPD acted in an aggressively racist and xenophobic manner rooted in what it calls in its party programme its “reality-based image of humanity”.

Referring to plans to return foreigners to their countries of origin (*Heimführung*), the NPD’s pamphlet of talking points issued for use during the Bundestag elections also deals with “children from mixed-ethnic relationships (*Mischlingen*)”.<sup>19</sup> The pamphlet notes that such plans do not apply to offspring of “mixed ethnic relationships between members of ethnically and culturally related European peoples”. Only “non-Europeans” are to be returned to their countries of origin; such persons rarely “mix with Germans”, the pamphlet states, as the “marriage and reproductive behaviour” of most non-Europeans remains “limited to members of their own ethnic or cultural circle”. Regarding children from relationships of “mixed ethnicity”, the pamphlet contains the following defamatory statement:

“Mongrels resulting from relationships between Germans and non-Europeans will ultimately choose to leave a Germany in the process of nationalising itself, because they prefer a multi-cultural environment. They will seek out foreign countries where there is no single race, where bastards are nothing out of the ordinary and the resulting ethno-cultural neglect and lack of community is ever-present. ... Forced to wander between multi-cultural worlds and to face the cruel fate of homelessness, mongrels should blame their irresponsible and selfish parents rather than the Germans, who want to be a *Volksgemeinschaft*.”

(Pamphlet published by the NPD party executive for the Bundestag elections: *Eine Handreichung für die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung. Argumente für Kandidaten und Funktionsträger*, pp. 8-9.)

In his statement on the nature and objectives of the “Dresden School”, Jürgen GANSEL, a member of the NPD party executive, also reveals the racist foundations of the party’s xenophobia:

“The ‘Dresden School’ declares political war on multi-culturalists and those who would repopulate Germany with foreigners. ... The ideologues of multi-culturalism use all the means at their disposal to encourage a massive land-grab by people of alien cultures and races ... Policy that leads to a multi-ethnic situation is criminal, because it paves the way to ethnic suicide and denies Germans their right to

<sup>19</sup> See footnote 14, p. 8.

their traditional homeland [*Lebensraum*]. But the policy of repopulation also uproots foreigners from their natural communities and alienates them from their own homelands, origins and identity. This intentional multi-culturalisation will ultimately lead to a mass of ethno-cultural eunuchs damned to a pitiful existence as wanderers between different worlds. The 'Dresden School' raises its voice in protest: Germany must remain the land of the Germans. And where this is no longer the case, it must once again become the land of the Germans." ("Statement by Jürgen Gansel, NPD Member of the *Land* Parliament, on the nature and objectives of the 'Dresden School' " dated 3 May 2005 and published on the website of the NPD in Saxony)

The NPD's view of humanity is thus diametrically opposed to the principle of universal equality as specified in Article 3 of the Basic Law. In an article entitled "*Volksgemeinschaft*, not 'managed' immigration! Guidelines for a national-democratic policy" published in the party organ *Deutsche Stimme*, Holger APFEL, deputy NPD party chairman and head of the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony, stated that "once the dying system is replaced", the "forces who wish to preserve the German people" must initiate "the large-scale return of foreigners" and "re-awaken the powers of the German people"<sup>20</sup> For this reason, he wrote, the central issue is not how to manage "excessive foreign influence", but how to "find the way back to the *Volksgemeinschaft*". Further immigration would result in the "total ethnic and political Balkanisation of Germany and the entire European continent", APFEL wrote. He went on to state that Europe was degenerating into "nothing more than a multi-ethnic housing area" forced to exist without a cultural identity but with "unimagined potentials for conflict". APFEL demanded:

"Europeans must completely reconquer the regions where they traditionally lived [*Lebensraum*]. This also means that those Germans who wish to survive, as well as the Europeans, will have to send the liberal-capitalist, excessive foreign influence regimes packing. Furthermore, our people do not need immigration by unwelcome foreigners who are alien to our country and culture; instead, we need them to be returned in a socially sustainable way, as described in detail in the National-Democrats programme to return foreigners. ... Only in a *Volksgemeinschaft* with enough children of our own will our people have a future." (*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2005, p. 4)

<sup>20</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2005, p. 4.

The NPD also exploited the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July for its agitation against foreigners and the Western community of values. For example, under the heading “The total surveillance state?”, the Saarland NPD association on 14 July stated on its website that the London bombings had a “deeper background” that most people apparently preferred not to talk about:

“If so-called Western civilisation believes it has to invade foreign countries and make war on behalf of its megalomaniacal, power-hungry and money-hungry policies, then we shouldn’t be surprised when people defend themselves. Calling them cold-blooded terrorists while failing to mention how many thousands of people have been killed in the most dreadful way by the weapons of the ‘Western world’ constitutes the worst kind of hypocritical propaganda.”

Referring to rioting by immigrants in France, the NPD stated on its website on 7 November that it found “its strict opposition to mass immigration and the establishment of a multi-cultural society confirmed”. Elsewhere on its website, the NPD declared:

“If the powers in the Federal Republic should also stage such riots, it will be necessary to talk about setting up prison camps and creating vigilante groups to enforce nationalist liberated zones to prevent foreigner-dominated areas of fear in German cities.”<sup>21</sup>

#### **Anti-Semitism**

In 2005, the NPD also continued to spread anti-Semitic propaganda, vigorously rejecting criticism of such efforts. In its pamphlet of talking points for candidates and functionaries, the party responded to the charge of anti-Semitism as follows:<sup>22</sup>

“Of course we exercise our right to criticise the big mouths and endless demands for money of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. ... Sixty years after the end of the war, we refuse to let the Holocaust industry, a term coined by the Jew Norman Finkelstein, blackmail us pseudomorally, make up our minds for us politically, and squeeze us dry financially. ... No German needs to put up with the cult of guilt and victimhood cultivated by the Jews for the past 60 years. And the psychological warfare waged by powerful Jewish groups against the German people must stop immediately. Lastly, we must finally put a stop to the Holocaust industry, which uses moralising pretexts only to financially blackmail the Germans again and again.”

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<sup>21</sup> NPD website, 8 November 2005.

<sup>22</sup> See footnote 14, p. 9 et seq.

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(Pamphlet published by the NPD party executive for the Bundestag elections: *Eine Handreichung für die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung. Argumente für Kandidaten und Funktionsträger*, p. 9 et seq.)

Such propaganda belongs in the category of “secondary anti-Semitism”: It holds Jews responsible for the antipathy directed at them because of their supposed instrumentalisation of German guilt for the Holocaust in order to blackmail. Criticism of alleged conduct by Jewish representatives is intended to hide the actual racist attitudes of right-wing extremists.

Karl RICHTER operates on the same level. His article “The ‘Holocaust’ cudgel” in the March issue of *Nation & Europa - Deutsche Monatshefte* claims that Jews are carrying out a subtle attack on the German people, which, in its “special role as the eternal villain” is being subjugated without end. In this way, RICHTER claims, the Holocaust functions as a “Jewish substitute for religion”:

“The problem is that this new type of civil religion requires constant exorcism: never again! and constant invocation of the enemy: the German. ... But nowhere is it written that Germans have to accept their role as the eternal villain in the new Holocaust religion. They must continue to reject it. ... being damned to play the role of culprit is fatal. ... The cult of guilt commands the rank of a new German state doctrine. It poisons every attempt at actively shaping the future.”  
*Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte*, No. 3/2005, pp. 14, 18 et seq.)

In an article entitled “The hereditary fiefdom of Jewish capital managers” published in the May issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, Thoralf TRENKMANN, a member of the publication’s editorial staff, alleges the “global power of Jewish capital strategists” who make up an “oligarchy hostile to the peoples of the world”:

“Like an octopus, dollar imperialism has a chokehold on the world, and it no longer makes the slightest attempt to hide it. The global power of Jewish capital strategists – no matter what nationality they may happen to have – seems to be waxing to its historical peak ... This is why the East Coast’s hereditary fiefdoms within institutions of the global economy do not exist by chance, nor are they harmless. They are the power centres for an oligarchy hostile to the peoples of the world.”  
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2005, p. 2)

TRENKMANN here applies the standard anti-Semitic myth of world Jewry striving to rule the world.

## Revisionism

The NPD uses revisionist arguments in attempting to replace the historical representation of the National Socialist period with views that range from favourable to offering justification for the regime. The party does so because it sees its vision of an authoritarian and ethnically homogeneous state incriminated by the historically correct representation of the Third Reich. The NPD seeks to relativise the mass murder of Jews by referring only to “fighting European Jewry” and to “enormously exaggerated actual or alleged atrocities of the National Socialists” which it contrasts with alleged, horrific Allied war crimes involving millions of victims. The party denies the Hitler regime’s responsibility for starting World War II, loudly opposes what it alleges are anti-German “historical lies” and claims that “the German people have been subjugated to guilt”.

In an announcement of a demonstration in Berlin on 8 May (motto: “60 years of the liberation lie - Stop the cult of guilt”) published on the NPD website on 5 May, the party stated:

“Psychological warfare has been waged against the German people since 8 May 1945. This is necessary in view of the horrific Allied war crimes. German cities were intentionally destroyed by Anglo-American air war criminals and hundreds of thousands of civilians were murdered. More than a million German prisoners of war were killed by the Western Allies. The Red Army committed dreadful atrocities. The expulsion crimes demanded 6 million victims. ... The occupiers ... mutated into ‘liberators’, their crimes into ‘deeds of liberation’. This absurdity had to be hidden behind the enormously exaggerated actual or alleged atrocities of the National Socialists. ... We keep being told that the war and the fight against European Jewry is our fault and that the Allied crimes are our well-deserved punishment for it.”

In an address to the Saxony *Land* parliament on 21 January, the NPD MP, GANSEL, stated:

“The causes for the bombing holocaust of Dresden were not related to 1 September 1939 nor to 30 January 1933. The plans to destroy the German Reich had existed long before the first National Socialist was born in Versailles. ... At this time, I ... would simply like to inform you that our parliamentary group will use the coming years to cut a broad swath through the thickets of anti-German historical lies. And today in this parliament, we have started the political battle for historical truth and against the German people’s subjugation to guilt.”

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In a supplement to the May issue of *Deutsche Stimme* entitled “8 May 1945: We are not celebrating”, GANSEL wrote in an article entitled “Liberation or defeat? A plea for the end of a misleading term”:

“Calling 8 May 1945 ‘the day of liberation’ can rightly be understood as the biggest language fraud in 20th-century German history. ... The German Reich, which had thrown off the chains of Versailles for the brief period of 1933 to 1939 and become a very attractive national, socially responsible, authoritative and strong state, was now a mortuary. ... Germany had become a recipient of orders, a laboratory, a zone of exploitation and a tomb for the capitalist-communist world coalition.”

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2005, supplement, p. 1) Further, the NPD provides well-known right-wing extremist revisionists a forum for their activities. For example, the February issue of *Deutsche Stimme* contained an interview with British Holocaust denier David IRVING, who is currently serving a prison sentence,<sup>23</sup> which contained the following statement:

“According to today’s standards, Churchill is certainly a war criminal. ... On the one hand we have the Hitler familiar from the English press, from Hollywood, and on the other we have the man these people [in Hitler’s milieu] experienced - a completely different Hitler.”

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 2/2005, p. 3, 21)

**Agitation against  
parliamentary  
democracy and the  
rule of law**

In 2005 the NPD continued to agitate in a polemical, defamatory and derogatory manner against the democratic system based on the rule of law. In doing so, those responsible focused in particular on undermining the constitutional order by claiming that it lacked legitimacy and that Germany continued to be ruled from abroad.

An announcement of a demonstration in Berlin on 8 May (motto: “60 years of the liberation lie - Stop the cult of guilt”) published on the NPD website on 5 May stated that “occupation collaborators and a series of organised professional Jews” would be putting on “a monstrous, absurd ‘cult of guilt’ show” on that day. This “spectacle” would reinforce the “brainwashing process known as ‘re-education’”, the announcement said, adding that the “cult of guilt” formed the “foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany [*BRD*]”; if that were removed, the Federal Republic would lose its “legitimacy”.

<sup>23</sup> In a court proceeding brought by IRVING, a London court in 2000 concluded in its decision that IRVING was a racist, anti-Semite, Holocaust denier and falsifier of historical facts. During the suit, numerous respected historians had provided evidence of IRVING’s manipulation of sources.

According to party chairman VOIGT, as quoted in the March issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, the *Volksgemeinschaft* the NPD is striving for demands a sovereign nation-state. This is why, he stated, the party denounces both the current “sell-out by Brussels” and the “limits on sovereignty which the Federal Republic inherited already at its founding”.

VOIGT went on:

“Furthermore, in terms of *Realpolitik*, the Federal Republic’s political system is marked by a vassal mentality that would be hard to top, especially in relation to the EU and the USA and repeatedly in relation to certain representatives of Jewish interests. ... Now that the Federal Republic’s criminal code has already mutated into a code of attitude crimes, the next thing will be a law on attitude assembly in Germany. The political class of the Federal Republic, which has claimed the state as its booty, has thus totally left the realm of the free and democratic basic order and is criminally and arbitrarily persecuting patriots in order to force them to the margins of society.”  
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2005, p. 9)

The “Dresden School” also analyses the alleged “sovereignty lie”:

“Judging from both its historical roots and the current treaty situation, the Federal Republic of Germany is not a sovereign state – not even with German-German unification in 1990. This finding can be explained by Germany’s incapacity following the Wehrmacht’s capitulation in May 1945, which was never overcome, neither by the entry into force of the Basic Law, nor by subsequent bilateral and international treaties to which the Federal Republic acceded. ... The ‘Dresden School’ will strive to resolve the question of German sovereignty and statehood ... one way or another.”  
(Karl Richter, “The ‘Dresden School’: Mission, content, structure”, website of the NPD association in Saxony, 9 May 2005)

In line with this argument, the pamphlet of talking points issued for the Bundestag elections provides tips for “delegitimising” the “Federal Republic state of conscience”.<sup>24</sup>

“The latest amendment to the law on incitement makes it a crime to ‘endorse, glorify or justify the National Socialist dictatorship.’ ... When answering questions that may arise during town hall discussions, you can refer to this law muzzling freedom of speech and the outrageous

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<sup>24</sup> See footnote 14, p. 28. The German original uses *BRD*, the German abbreviation for “Federal Republic of Germany”, as a pejorative (translator’s note).

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restriction of freedom of opinion on historical-political issues, in order to delegitimise the Federal Republic state of conscience. In this way, you can attack the Federal Republic censorship state based on arguments while saving yourself the old historical debate over the Third Reich, thereby getting directly to current issues which Germans are much more concerned about.”

(Pamphlet published by the NPD party executive for the Bundestag elections: *Eine Handreichung für die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung. Argumente für Kandidaten und Funktionsträger*, p. 28)

## 1.2 Organisation and development

### Growing membership

The NPD continued its cooperation with the DVU and “Free Forces” initiated in 2004 under the name “German popular front”. Despite rather mixed results overall – disappointing showings in *Land* parliamentary elections in Schleswig-Holstein and North-Rhine/Westphalia but respectable results in the 2005 national parliamentary elections – the NPD was able to increase its membership to about 6,000 (2004: 5,300; 2003: 5,000). The strongest *Land* association is the one in Saxony. But the party was weakened in both political and personnel terms in late 2005 when three MPs in Saxony’s parliament announced their decision before Christmas to leave the parliamentary group and the party, causing a decline in party membership.

### Financial situation

Because the NPD gained the percentage of votes in the Schleswig-Holstein and national parliamentary elections needed to qualify for reimbursement of campaign expenses, it will receive significant public funding. But the party’s troubled financial situation is not likely to improve greatly due to the party’s expensive campaign in the Bundestag elections; according to its chairman, VOIGT, the party spent €1.2 million on campaigning.<sup>25</sup>

### Demonstrations as sign of successful alliance policy

In 2005 the NPD continued its “battle for the streets”. The number of demonstrations and public events put on by the NPD and its youth organisation Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats), usually together with neo-Nazis and skinheads, rose significantly, from about 40 in 2004 to 60, due in part to a large number of campaign events.<sup>26</sup> The NPD and JN also organised more right-wing extremist concerts.

<sup>25</sup> Press conference in Berlin on 4 August 2005.

<sup>26</sup> There was also a large number of information stands.

In addition, NPD members applied for permits to hold a number of primarily music-oriented events at which party members or functionaries spoke:

- In Pössneck, Thuringia, the NPD organised a skinhead concert on 2 April to follow the *Land* party conference; performers included Michael REGENER, a former singer with the band Landser, and about 1,000 persons attended.<sup>27</sup>
- The JN organised a number of concerts in Mücka, Saxony; up to 800 persons attended. A concert featuring skinhead bands from all over Europe with the motto “Festival of races” was held in Jena, Thuringia, on 11 June; about 500 persons attended. An NPD functionary had applied for permission to hold this event.
- On 9 July, the NPD hosted “Rock in the Park” in Gera; the event was described as the kick-off to the Bundestag campaign and was attended by 750 persons, including party chairman VOIGT.

Rather than holding a central rally, the NPD organised a number of decentral events for 1 May, which were attended by up to 180 persons. The JN organised a demonstration held in Berlin on 8 May, the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, with the motto “60 years of the liberation lie – Stop the cult of guilt”; about 3,300 persons took part.

**Attitude towards  
neo-Nazi scene**

Although there is currently no notable opposition to cooperating with neo-Nazis, the relationship between the neo-Nazi scene and the NPD remains ambivalent.

The neo-Nazi scene continues to have massive reservations regarding the party (see Section III), even though prominent neo-Nazis like Thomas WULFF and Torsten HEISE are both members of the NPD party executive and have described current cooperation as positive overall.<sup>28</sup>

As in the past, the NPD and neo-Nazi “popular front” can therefore be characterised as a marriage of convenience; in view of serious differences between the partners, its stability will depend on its success and measurable advantages for both sides. With this in mind, it continues to be very difficult for the NPD leadership to keep the neo-Nazi scene committed to its “popular front” strategy over the long

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<sup>27</sup> REGENER has said that he joined the NPD in early October 2004. Since April 2005, he has been serving a prison sentence of three years and four months after being convicted of leading a criminal association.

<sup>28</sup> “Ein Jahr im Zeichen der Volksfront” (A year with the popular front), published on the right-wing extremist website Eine Bewegung werden (Becoming a movement), 3 May 2005.

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term. But in 2005, the party again succeeded in attracting a significant portion of this clientele to work together in a “German popular front”.

Tensions between the NPD and neo-Nazis also have an impact on the NPD’s relationship with the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union). DVU national chairman Dr FREY vigorously rejects all cooperation with neo-Nazis.

NPD chairman VOIGT nonetheless stated in the party organ *Deutsche Stimme* that the party’s alliance with the DVU and cooperation with unaffiliated right-wing extremists had proved to be viable, reliable and forward-looking.<sup>29</sup> In a press release dated 24 May and with an eye to the national parliamentary elections, the NPD referred to a campaign by a “united National Right under the patronage of the NPD” and a “nationalist popular front made up of the NPD, DVU and unaffiliated forces” that is growing into a “German popular movement”.<sup>30</sup>

**“Pact for Germany”  
with the DVU**

After the two parties agreed in 2004 to cooperate on elections, such as the parliamentary elections in Brandenburg and Saxony, on 15 January VOIGT and FREY agreed in their “Pact for Germany” to continue their cooperation in upcoming European, national and *Land* elections. According to the agreement, the NPD will campaign in the next Bundestag elections, leaving the European elections in 2009 to the DVU. The DVU will then include “six or seven candidates belonging to the NPD or closely associated with it” in its list of candidates (see also 2.2, below).

**Unsuccessful bid to  
form alliance with  
REP**

Ahead of the national parliamentary elections on 18 September, the NPD and DVU repeatedly tried to persuade Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans) to join its “popular front” strategy. However, the REP national leadership categorically refused to participate in the NPD-dominated campaign alliance. The last letter of the NPD and DVU national chairmen to their REP counterpart on 30 May failed to receive a reply.<sup>31</sup>

**“Popular front”  
strategy not without  
controversy**

The NPD’s strategy of promoting a right-wing “popular front” created controversy within and beyond the party. The national chairman of the JN, Stefan ROCHOW, criticised the strategy in remarks published on the Internet on 28 November. There he called the “popular front” of the NPD and DVU a “reactionary, right-wing, nationalist and social-

<sup>29</sup> *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 10/2005, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Press release published on the NPD website, 24 May 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Website of the NPD national organisation, as of 24 June 2005.

demagogic alliance” that was a failure from the very start. He tempered his comments, however, by saying that the political situation was so critical that at the moment, one could only support an “NPD/DVU as opposition party”.<sup>32</sup> The NPD party leadership distanced itself immediately from ROCHOW’s comments, calling them a “sign of political immaturity”. The NPD’s deputy national chairman, Peter MARX, expressly declared his support for collaboration with the DVU.<sup>33</sup>

There was also criticism from within the neo-Nazi camp. In the online forum of the neo-Nazi website Freier Widerstand (Independent resistance), neo-Nazis on 10 August called for a boycott of the national parliamentary elections, saying that the system had assigned the NPD the job of committing to the system as many dissatisfied persons and system opponents as possible.

**Three NPD MPs in Saxony’s parliament leave the party and parliamentary group**

In late 2005, three NPD MPs in Saxony’s parliament resigned from the parliamentary group and the NPD: Mirko SCHMIDT, deputy chairman of the NPD association in Saxony, on 7 December; Klaus BAIER, member of the NPD executive in Saxony, on 20 December; and Jürgen SCHÖN, deputy chairman of the Saxony party association, on 23 December.

When handing in their resignations, SCHMIDT, BAIER and SCHÖN made serious accusations against the party’s national leadership and against the leadership of the parliamentary group in Saxony. For example, SCHMIDT said he could no longer accept the NPD’s open endorsement of National Socialism. He said that in the Saxon parliament, the party was only interested in supporting a “fourth Reich” instead of devoting itself to social issues as it had declared before winning seats in the parliament. SCHMIDT blamed the party leadership around Udo VOIGT, along with the parliamentary group chairman Holger APFEL and manager Peter MARX. SCHMIDT said that APFEL had reduced the NPD MPs to marionettes forced in all decisions to follow the will of a small, authoritarian leadership and unable to vote in line with their conscience.<sup>34</sup>

**Participation in** For the national parliamentary (Bundestag) elections on 18

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<sup>32</sup> Published on the Störtebeker-Netz website on 19 August 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Published on the Störtebeker-Netz website on 19 August 2005.

<sup>34</sup> *Sächsische Zeitung* newspaper of 19 December 2005.

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**elections**

September, the NPD ran candidates in every German *Land* using open lists which included DVU candidates, leading neo-Nazis and members of other right-wing extremist parties; the NPD also had direct candidates in 295 out of a total of 299 constituencies. The party received 748,568 of the second votes (1.6%), an increase of 533,336 votes (1.2 percentage points) compared to the Bundestag elections in 2002. The party received 1.1% of the votes in western Germany (and West Berlin), and 3.6% of the votes in eastern Germany (and East Berlin). The NPD had its best results in Saxony, with 4.8%, followed by 3.7% in Thuringia and 3.5% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. It did worst in North-Rhine/Westphalia, receiving only 0.8% of the votes.

As the statistics of the Federal Returning Officer show, in the latest elections, 5.2% of young male voters (age 18 – 24) nation-wide voted for the NPD, as did 9.5% of all voters in eastern Germany, including 4.7% of male voters of all ages.<sup>35</sup>

In the Schleswig-Holstein parliamentary elections on 20 February, the NPD gained 27,676 of the second votes (1.9%). Although this represented an improvement of 12,555 votes, or 0.9 percentage points, over the *Land* elections in 2000, the NPD remained far from achieving its goal of entering the *Land* parliament. It did best in the constituency of Neumünster, receiving 3.1 % of the votes. It received between 2.0% and 2.9% of the votes in another 20 constituencies, out of a total of 40 constituencies.

In the *Land* parliamentary elections in North-Rhine/Westphalia on 22 May, the NPD received 73,969 votes (0.9%) and was therefore not eligible for public matching funds. Surprisingly, the NPD gained more votes than the REP (0.8%). The NPD had above-average results only in the constituencies of Bochum III – Herne II and Duisburg III, gaining 2.2% of the votes in each. In the 2000 *Land* parliamentary elections, the NPD got only 2,357 votes (0.0%).

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<sup>35</sup> Source: Federal Statistical Office (ed.), *Wahl zum 16. Deutschen Bundestag am 18. September 2005, Heft 4: Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmabgabe der Männer und Frauen nach Altersgruppen, 2006* (Elections for the 16th German Bundestag on 18 September 2005, No. 4: Voter participation and results, broken down by age group and sex, 2006), p. 80 et seq.

### 1.3 Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats)

Founded:	1969
Headquarters:	Dresden, Saxony
National chairman:	Stefan ROCHOW
Membership:	350 (2004: 350) (500, according to party figures)
Publication:	regional only

The NPD is the only right-wing extremist party to have a youth organisation with a significant number of members. According to the NPD statutes, the Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) is an “integral part” of the NPD. By virtue of his office, the JN national chairman is an ex officio member of the NPD executive.

In Magdeburg on 25-26 June, the JN’s national executive adopted a position paper in which the JN emphasised that it saw itself as a “youth organisation with a revolutionary orientation”.<sup>36</sup> The paper defined “revolutionary” as “attacking existing conditions”. “Rejecting the system and developing an alternative” is the “central task of a truly, fundamentally oppositional nationalist movement”, the paper stated, adding that the “opportunity for revolutionary reform” was “more auspicious than ever”. The “dissatisfaction among young people” is “leverage for our political activity”, according to the paper.

JN national chairman Stefan ROCHOW criticised the NPD’s “popular front” strategy (see 1.1 and 1.2, above). At the JN national convention in Chemnitz, Saxony, on 26 November, he was nonetheless returned to office with 83% of delegates voting for him. Following his re-election – and apparently mindful of his earlier criticism of the tactics of the “mother party” – ROCHOW stressed that the JN was an “integral part of the NPD”. At the same time, he said, it must offer young people a secure place for their own political activity, so that the JN “is not perceived as a silent appendage of the NPD”.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Published on the JN website.

<sup>37</sup> JN website, 28 November 2005.

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The JN again made an effort to improve its neglected organisation. In May, June and August, it was made public that the *Land* associations in Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Saxony-Anhalt had been re-founded. A number of new regional bases were established, especially in eastern Germany. The JN's success in making the new organisational structure into an effective substructure seems questionable. Despite the figures given by the JN, these organisational efforts are unlikely to have resulted in increased membership.

JN public activities included in particular organising a demonstration in Berlin on 8 May for the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, in which about 3,300 persons took part. The JN and NPD also organised more right-wing extremist concerts. The JN organised a number of concerts in Mücka, Saxony; up to 800 persons attended. The JN also organised a "national camp-out" in Saxony over the Whitsun weekend on 13-16 May.

## 2. Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union)

Founded:	1987 *
Headquarters:	Munich
National chairman:	Dr Gerhard FREY
Membership:	9,000 (2004: 11,000)
Publication: <i>Zeitung (NZ)</i>	<i>National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-</i> Circulation: 40,000, weekly
* founded 1971 as a registered society; constituted 1987 as political party; 1987 – 1991 DVU Liste D	

The DVU has the largest membership of any right-wing extremist party. Since its founding, it has been led in a centralised, autocratic fashion by its national chairman, Dr Gerhard FREY, who also provides most of its funding.<sup>38</sup> FREY owns the DSZ – Druckschriften- und Zeitungsverlag GmbH (DSZ-Verlag) publishing house and is chief editor of the weekly *NZ*, which has the largest circulation of any right-wing extremist publication in Germany.

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<sup>38</sup> For example, FREY largely finances the DVU's deficit dating from 1989. With support from the NPD, the party had hoped to win seats in the European Parliament and ran in the elections under the name "DVU – Liste D", ending up with an enormous deficit. FREY stated that he had spent about €9.2 million on numerous spectacular campaign events. Winning 1.6% of the vote, however, the DVU was entitled to only €1.89 million in public funds to reimburse campaign expenses. Since then, the party has been unable to pay off its debt.

## 2.1 Goals and methods

The party's anti-constitutional orientation rests on a hyper-nationalism in which German interests are absolute. This feeds into xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism and a comprehensive revisionism. The party condemns all foreigners and Jews, who are mainly portrayed in negative stereotypes as anti-German.

There is no official party newspaper, but due to FREY's unlimited authority, the *NZ* can be regarded as the party's press organ, which reflects its programme. Like the DVU and DSZ-Verlag websites, this "free and nationalist" newspaper prefers to focus on political issues and events which it presents in a biased way – often marked by conspiracy theories – to serve as propaganda for the party's right-wing extremist views. Many *NZ* articles are ultimately advertisements for books published by FREY's presses that are recommended as providing more extensive information on the same topic; these publications are often little more than collections of earlier *NZ* articles.<sup>39</sup> Numerous *NZ* articles refer to new editions or books currently in preparation.<sup>40</sup> One of FREY's main interests apart from political agitation is intensive advertising for his publishing business to maximise revenue and profits.

*NZ* devotes a great deal of space to the subject of "foreigners in Germany". Other topics include tendentious and trivialising articles on the National Socialist past, along with articles encouraging animosity towards Jews. Attacks on representatives and institutions of the democratic state are also part of the newspaper's repertoire.

The authors are not interested in presenting issues as part of a democratic debate, but in stereotyping and denigration, as is obvious from the large number and constant repetition of such articles.

### Xenophobia

The DVU's xenophobic attitudes are apparent in the *NZ*'s biased and stereotypical reporting on foreigners, crime by foreigners and asylum fraud. The constant repetition of sensational headlines such as "Will all Germans soon be out of work? The invasion of illegal foreign

<sup>39</sup> As in the case of the following books: *Helden der Wehrmacht – Unsterbliche deutsche Soldaten* (Heroes of the Wehrmacht: Immortal German soldiers), *Schweinejournalismus? Wenn Medien hetzen, türken und linken* (Dirty journalism? When the media incite, manipulate and con), and *Lexikon der antideutschen Fälschungen – 200 Lügen und populäre Irrtümer von A – Z* (Dictionary of anti-German falsifications: 200 lies and popular misconceptions from A - Z).

<sup>40</sup> For example, the following books: *Mit der EU in den Abgrund? – Deutschlands Selbstvernichtung* (With the EU into the abyss? Germany's self-destruction), *Befreiung? – Die Wahrheit über den 8. Mai 1945* (Liberation? The truth about 8 May 1945), and *Schurkenstaat USA – Von der Indianerausrottung bis zu den Untaten im Irak* (Rogue state USA: From the extermination of the Indians to the atrocities in Iraq).

workers”,<sup>41</sup> “How foreigners are plundering the social welfare system – Why there is no money left for Germans”,<sup>42</sup> and “Careworn and hungry – or well-fed job-stealer? What ordinary ‘illegals’ in Germany look like”<sup>43</sup> is intended to stamp all foreigners in Germany as criminals. Statistics and original graphics add to the impact of such articles.

*NZ* articles with dramatic headlines such as “The first school without Germans! Are we becoming a minority in our own country?”,<sup>44</sup> “How the EU is ruining Germany – Romanians and Bulgarians are doing the rest”,<sup>45</sup> and “What will be left of Germany when the Turks arrive?”<sup>46</sup> are intended to fan fears of mass immigration and excessive influence of foreigners (*Überfremdung*).

Intolerance and discrimination are behind the party’s xenophobic agitation. It hopes in this way to limit and undermine the inviolable principles of human dignity and equality as they apply to the foreign-born population.

#### **Anti-Semitism**

The party promotes an anti-Semitism typical of right-wing extremists; it is usually expressed implicitly, although sometimes it is quite obvious. The *NZ* is full of headlines and articles containing subtly anti-Semitic content suggesting that Jews in particular are keeping the German people from putting the Nazi past behind them and thus from gaining equal standing within the international community; such articles also assert that members of the Jewish faith or of Jewish origin are disproportionately represented in politics, the economy and the media. The *NZ* discredits Jewish organisations and comments critically on events in Israel and the occupied territories.

German restitution payments come in for vehement criticism in *NZ* articles containing formulations such as “Pay another 100 billion for Hitler? New bill from Israel for restitutions”<sup>47</sup> and “Gigantic restitution

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<sup>41</sup> *NZ*, No. 15/2005, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> *NZ*, No. 14/2005, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> *NZ*, No. 26/2005, p. 13.

<sup>44</sup> *NZ*, No. 25/2005, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup> *NZ*, No. 17/2005, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup> *NZ*, No. 42/2005, p. 3.

<sup>47</sup> *NZ*, No. 20/2005, p. 1.

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claims ... no end to Jewish demands of Germany, no matter how controversial, is apparently in sight".<sup>48</sup>

The sheer number of articles on this topic with headlines such as "Is Germany becoming a second Israel? The background behind Jewish mass immigration"<sup>49</sup> is intended to suggest the supposedly threatening influence of "anti-German Jews" and a conspiracy directed above all against Germany. Such articles frequently conclude with a recommendation of the anti-Semitic publication *Das Netz – Israels Lobby in Deutschland* (The network: Israel's lobby in Germany) published by the FZ – Freiheitlicher Buch- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH (FZ-Verlag).<sup>50</sup>

### Revisionism and relativising the Holocaust

The party also continued its efforts to relativise the genocide of European Jews and to stress Germany's alleged role as victim in 20th-century politics. To this end, the party often attempts to undermine historical knowledge about the Holocaust by alleging that contemporary documents were falsified. For example, an article on the "Holocaust memorial day" on 27 January with the headline "Cover-up of facts about the liberation of Auschwitz – Historical misrepresentation for the 60th anniversary" stressed that Stalin had "set up a deportation centre to ship masses of people off to the camps of the Gulag Archipelago" and that Germans in the camp later suffered "the terrors of the concentration camp from the communist powers in Warsaw".<sup>51</sup> Here the Holocaust is secondary; the main focus is on comparing numbers of victims.

For example, an article with the headline " 'Nothing but animals!' Dachau: German victims of liberators' excesses 60 years ago" says the following about the liberation of the Dachau concentration camp:<sup>52</sup>

"It is certainly worth commemorating the fact that six decades ago, the doors to freedom opened for the survivors of the dreadful concentration camp near Munich. ... Unfortunately, however – and one will not find this information in the usual portrayals – the liberation of Dachau was accompanied by American war crimes. The excesses resulted in the death of hundreds of Germans who had surrendered." (NZ, No. 17/2005, p. 6)

<sup>48</sup> NZ, No. 2/2005, p. 5.

<sup>49</sup> NZ, No. 2/2005, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> The press is run by FREY's wife.

<sup>51</sup> NZ, No. 5/2005, p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> NZ, No. 17/2005, p. 6.

Another form of relativisation is also frequently used: By describing alleged war crimes of the Allies as a holocaust and repeatedly using the term, the authors hope to reduce the genocide of European Jews to just one incident among many. For example, the indigenous population of North America is described as the “almost entirely holocausted Indians”.<sup>53</sup> The *NZ* repeatedly refers to the dropping of the atom bomb in 1945 as an “atomic holocaust”<sup>54</sup> or “nuclear holocaust”. This practice becomes even more grotesque when the suffering of the German population during and after World War II is described as a holocaust. For example, a new book published by the FZ-Verlag has the title *Der andere Holocaust – Die Vertreibung der Deutschen 1944-1949* (The other holocaust: The expulsion of the Germans 1944-1949). Crimes committed near the end of the war against Germans living in the eastern territories are called an “expulsion holocaust”<sup>55</sup> or even a “sexual holocaust”.<sup>56</sup> The *NZ* describes the devastating bombing of Dresden in February 1945 as a “holocaust strike”.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, the post-war order is described as follows:

“The US ‘world order’ following World War II is characterised to an enormous degree by a holocaust of the defeated...”

(*NZ*, No. 16/2005, p. 3)

**Opposition to  
Holocaust  
memorials**

In the same vein, the *NZ* again printed a large number of articles criticising the planning and building of Holocaust memorials, which it ridicules as “national masochistic memorials”.<sup>58</sup> An article with the headline “Experts clueless ... no one knows how many memorials there are to NS victims”<sup>59</sup> went on to air the following conspiracy theory:

“What is the real aim? It seems unlikely that the inflation in memorials still really has to do with a morally appropriate, historically justified and politically reasonable attempt to mourn and remember innocent victims of totalitarianism. ... Apparently the idea is to make sure the Germans keep their heads bowed for all eternity. The idea is probably

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<sup>53</sup> *NZ*, No. 22/2005, p. 9.

<sup>54</sup> *NZ*, No. 17/2005, p. 5 and No. 21/2005, p. 7.

<sup>55</sup> *NZ*, No. 16/2005, p. 3.

<sup>56</sup> *NZ*, No. 2/2005, p. 10.

<sup>57</sup> *NZ*, No. 7/2005, p. 6.

<sup>58</sup> *NZ*, No. 15/2005, p. 13.

<sup>59</sup> *NZ*, No. 11/2005, p. 11.

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that creeping and kowtowing subjects are easier to govern and bully, and they also put up less resistance to anti-social dismantling of the social welfare system than do citizens of an upright, self-confident nation.”

(*NZ*, No. 11/2005, p. 11)

**Revisionist and positive depiction of prominent Nazis**

The DVU's right-wing extremist orientation is also apparent from its revisionist attitude towards representatives and institutions of the Nazi regime. For example, the *NZ* published an interview with the well-known Holocaust denier David IRVING about “discrepancies in the official account of the death of SS chief” Himmler.<sup>60</sup> A number of articles also wrote favourably about Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess. Under headlines such as “Why are people so afraid of a dead Rudolf Hess?”<sup>61</sup> and “How Rudolf Hess tried to rescue peace”,<sup>62</sup> the *NZ* provides a biased, positive picture of his activities and criticises the ban on the Hess memorial march in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, planned by neo-Nazis. For example, one such article stated:

“The Reich minister and Hitler's deputy in the National Socialist party executive was the only high-ranking political figure in the world who risked his life to try to achieve peace during World War II.”

(*NZ*, No. 32/2005, p. 1)

<sup>60</sup> “Wurde Himmler ermordet?” (Was Himmler murdered?) *NZ*, No. 29/2005, p. 6.

<sup>61</sup> *NZ*, No. 32/2005, p. 11.

<sup>62</sup> *NZ*, No. 33/2005, p. 12.

## 2.2 Organisation and development

### Organisation

The DVU is divided into 16 *Land* party associations; due to the undisputed power of national chairman Dr Gerhard FREY, however, they have little freedom to undertake their own initiatives or independent political work. FREY continues to set the party's ideological positions and goals, oversees important personnel decisions, including those made by the *Land* party associations, and decides whether the party will run in *Land* parliamentary elections. The other members of the national party executive, which comprises only a few persons, play only a minor role. There is an almost complete absence of democracy within the party. FREY's leadership style allows him to keep the party largely closed off from the influence of the REP and neo-Nazis, and to manage contacts and agreements he finds useful, like those currently with the NPD. In the past, however, these circumstances left the DVU more or less isolated within the right-wing extremist camp, nor was the "Pact for Germany" with the NPD able to overcome this isolation. Nor did the party attract a significant number of young right-wing extremists from other parts of the milieu to make up for age-related membership losses.

### DVU activities

The largest event, attended by more than 600 participants, was the national party conference in Munich in January, where Dr FREY and NPD national chairman VOIGT presented and signed the "Pact for Germany" between the DVU and NPD. Eleven DVU *Land* party associations held party conferences, some of them jointly, in six cities. VOIGT was the featured speaker at the conference of the North-Rhine/Westphalia party association in Dortmund in May, where he swore by the alliance between the NPD and DVU. Estimated attendance at the party conferences ranged from 250 to 300 persons.

Organised by the DVU parliamentary group, the summer festival in Seefeld, Brandenburg, on 18 June enjoyed increased popularity. Now taking place on a regular basis and with attendance of about 600, this gathering is the most important event for party members.

### Participation in elections

After winning seats in the *Land* parliaments of Brandenburg and Bremen and on several local councils, the DVU was able to establish itself along with the NPD as a serious right-wing extremist party. The DVU's expensive and material-intensive campaigning (mass quantities of posters, bulk mailings, etc.) coupled with its large debt force FREY to use cost-benefit analysis in order to decide which elections to enter. Thus he is prepared to invest large amounts in a campaign only if he anticipates winning enough of the vote to guarantee at least some

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direct financial returns (through public matching funds) and some indirect returns (through increased sales of his publications due to greater publicity). The “Pact for Germany” is intended to keep the DVU and NPD from campaigning against each other in the same elections. In accordance with the agreement, the NPD ran in the North-Rhine/Westphalia *Land* parliamentary elections and the national parliamentary elections. As agreed on by the two parties, the NPD included DVU and like-minded candidates in its candidate lists. For the Bundestag elections, 15 DVU or associated candidates ran on NPD lists, including FREY as the top candidate in North-Rhine/Westphalia. Apart from this, not very many DVU members actively supported the NPD election campaigns.

**DVU representatives  
in the Brandenburg  
parliament**

The DVU parliamentary group in Brandenburg went to great lengths to present itself as a serious political party. After a brief difference of opinion between individual DVU MPs over the “Pact for Germany”, the DVU parliamentary group again presented a united front to the public. The group regularly produced a publication available in print and on the group’s own website, where one can find MPs’ photos, CVs, areas of concentration and excerpts from their parliamentary speeches in video form.

**Alliances and  
cooperation**

FREY’s political biography and thus also the development of the DVU are strongly marked by changing alliances and cooperation (also with groups abroad). Ahead of the parliamentary elections in Saxony and Brandenburg on 19 September 2004, the DVU kept its distance from the NPD. At the NPD’s suggestion, however, the two parties agreed not to run against each other in Saxony and Brandenburg. Apparently motivated by both parties’ election results, the DVU chairman and the NPD chairman reached further agreements in autumn 2004, culminating in the “Pact for Germany” signed on 15 January at the DVU’s national party conference (see 1.2 above).

**“Pact for Germany”  
with the NPD**

According to the pact, the two parties will not run against each other in *Land*, national or European parliamentary elections through 2009 and will include candidates from the other party on their candidate lists. As agreed, the DVU will campaign in the next European elections as well as the upcoming parliamentary elections in Saxony-Anhalt, Bremen, Hamburg, Thuringia and Brandenburg. Through the end of 2009, the DVU will campaign in the remaining *Land* parliamentary elections only if the NPD is not running any candidates. However, the fate of the alliance between these very different parties is likely to depend greatly on their election results.

Unlike the NPD, the DVU has not seen its popularity increase within the right-wing extremist scene or its membership numbers rise as a

result of the alliance. In fact, in some places DVU activities have attracted fewer participants. In future, growing numbers of those DVU members in particular who are interested in independent political activities may switch to the NPD. Such a trend would further threaten the alliance.

### 3. Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans)

Founded:	1983
Headquarters:	Berlin
National chairman:	Dr Rolf SCHLIERER
Membership:	6,500 (2004: 7,500)
Publication:	<i>Zeit für Protest!</i> (Time for protest) Circulation: 10,000, two to three times a month
Subsidiary organisations:	Republikanische Jugend (RJ, Republican Youth), Republikanischer Bund der öffentlich Bediensteten (RepBB, Republican Union of Public-Sector Workers), Republikanischer Bund der Frauen (RBF, Republican Women's Union), Republikanischer Hochschulverband (RHV, Republican Higher Education Association)

#### 3.1 Objectives

##### Hard evidence of anti-constitutional efforts

Again in 2005, there were concrete indications that the REP was pursuing right-wing extremist activities. Though not every member of the party may pursue anti-constitutional aims, and though there are fewer indications of anti-constitutional activity overall, all parts of the party are engaged in such activity. Such activity can be found in particular beneath the level of the national executive and away from its direct sphere of influence, where a lively debate within the party has been going on for some time.

Overall, the critiques formulated in these circles and directed at the social and political conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany demonstrate varying levels of xenophobia and revisionism.

Nor is party chairman Dr Rolf SCHLIERER able to cover up this fact, despite repeated statements intended to lend the REP a democratic facade.

**Violation of human rights specified in the Basic Law**

The REP justifies its xenophobic activities largely with the argument that growing numbers of immigrants are threatening to wipe out the German people. In this way, the REP blames persons of foreign origin for all of society's problems.

In the same vein, the party programme of the REP organisation for the city-state of Berlin contains the following statement regarding policy on foreigners and asylum:<sup>63</sup>

“The mass immigration that has been going on for years has led not only to unsustainable economic burdens and internal turmoil, but also to the transformation and ultimate dissolution of our people. That is high treason.”

Elsewhere, the party programme says the following about Berlin:

“The capital must remain German! ... Today, the government district and historical city centre are surrounded by a ring of decaying, immigrant ghettos that look like someplace in the Orient. These metastasising ghettos destroy the European character of this metropolis, weaken our economy and make us, settled citizens, aliens in our own city. We want to ensure that this city remains ours, and that our children are not forced to become a minority.”

The author thus represents immigrants exclusively as a threat to German cities and their residents.

An article in the June/July issue of the national party organ *Zeit für Protest!* (Time for protest) entitled “The Germans are being replaced” stated that, under the governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, “the replacement of the German citizenry by a mixed, ‘multi-cultural’ population” had progressed by leaps and bounds. The article posed the question

“How can we make sure that we do not become strangers in our own country – and above all: How can we keep the social welfare state from collapsing?”

With statements like these, the REP reveals its strategy of arousing xenophobic resentment while fanning vague fears, hate and envy among Germans. The term “mixed population” (*Mischbevölkerung*) is also reminiscent of terms used by the Nazis during the Third Reich.

In a fax sent to the Federal Chancellery on 18 February, the REP association for the district of Hochtaunus described the Anti-

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<sup>63</sup> Posted on the Internet since late August 2005.

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Discrimination Act as an “Act of Discrimination against Germans”. The group claimed that the law would result in foreigners overwhelming the country and criticised what it regards as wrong-headed equal treatment for Germans and citizens of foreign origin. This position clearly violates Article 3 of the Basic Law, which guarantees all persons equality before the law:

“After already having been flooded against our will by millions of foreigners, now they want to use two arbitrary laws to criminalise us when we, as German citizens, oppose this multi-cultural levelling and try to protest the fact that our traditional homeland is to be taken away from us and that every foreigner who has forced his way into this country ... is not only to have the same rights as us Germans who were born and raised here, but will even get preferential treatment.”

As part of its xenophobic propaganda, the REP also does not hesitate to disparage Islam. In a press release put out on 16 March by the *Land* association of Baden-Württemberg, association chairman Ulrich DEUSCHLE stated:

“Whoever gives a religion that is hostile to democracy and contemptuous of humanity the blessing of state instruction endangers domestic peace ... Whoever tries to make Islam socially acceptable is playing with fire.”

The party organ *Zeit für Protest!* used a similar argument. By referring to *Islamic* rather than *Islamist* terrorism, such statements place all Muslims under suspicion of terrorism:

“A Muslim who takes his faith seriously cannot become ‘integrated’ in Europe. This is why only the REP programme can prevent Islamic terror.”

(*Zeit für Protest!* No. 8-9/2005, p. 1)

The REP uses such statements to carry out a systematic and undifferentiated campaign of incitement that violates the right of foreigners and persons with dissenting opinions to human dignity, based on Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law – even in view of the freedom of expression (Article 5 (1) of the Basic Law).

### Revisionism

The party’s revisionist efforts centred on relativising the crimes of National Socialism - sometimes stepping over the line into historical misrepresentation.

In order to relativise National Socialist crimes, the REP questions the uniqueness of the Nazi policy of extermination. The REP also uses

comparisons between actual or alleged war crimes committed during World War II by the Allies against Germans.

A current example of this strategy is national party chairman SCHLIERER's demand that the Germans be " 'intellectually liberated' from the situation of a defeated country". In a speech at the REP's annual Ash Wednesday event, held in Geisenhausen, Bavaria, on 9 February, SCHLIERER called the "dogma of the unique nature of German crimes" a "historical lie" used

„... „... to maintain emotional and moral pressure on the Germans ... The victors' crimes could not be justified by the crimes that preceded them ... Germans must no longer allow their entire history to be turned into a rogues' gallery.”

Press release No. 8/05 of the REP national office, dated 9 February 2005)

An article published in the party organ under the headline "Germans being led around by the nose" contained the statement:

"The Nazi crimes were dreadful, but they were not unique."  
(*Zeit für Protest!* No. 1-2/2005, p. 1)

### 3.2 Organisation and development

**Continued decline in membership** In 2005, the REP again suffered a decline in membership, which now stands at about 6,500 (2004: 7,500; 2003: 8,000; 2002: 9,000). As in previous years, the party kept a low public profile apart from its election campaigning. Nonetheless, about 250 persons took part in the annual Ash Wednesday meeting in Geisenhausen, Bavaria on 9 March (2004: about 200).

**Continuing decline** The REP also suffered some painful election defeats. In view of the NPD's election results, which in some cases were significantly better than those of the REP, party-internal conflicts flared up again over national party chairman SCHLIERER's policy of isolation from other right-wing parties. The attempt by the national party leadership to gain general party support for a more moderate position frustrated the grass-roots in particular, who were interested in collaborating with other right-wing extremist groups, and led to further membership losses.

**REP national leadership sticks to isolation** Ahead of the national parliamentary elections, the NPD and DVU repeatedly tried to persuade the REP to join its "popular front" strategy. However, the REP national leadership categorically refused

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to participate in the NPD-dominated campaign alliance (see also 1.2, above).

**Cooperation with other right-wing extremists**

Regardless of the policy of isolation advocated by the party leadership, large segments of the party have not given up the strategic option of collaborating with other right-wing extremist organisations, thus “circumventing” the national executive’s official party line.

As a result of this conflict, the REP has lost a number of functionaries over the years, including some in prominent positions, who did not want to be bound by the national executive’s strategy of isolation.

For example, the REP association in Hamburg disbanded, according to a statement published on the Störtebeker-Netz website on 8 January. The association’s executive and many of its members joined the NPD, the statement said.

On 7 January, a declaration appeared on the NPD website entitled “Hamburg signal: Calling independent REP members to take part in the Schleswig-Holstein parliamentary elections”. The declaration described the alliance between the DVU and NPD, founded in 2004, as extremely successful. Among the first 100 signers of the declaration were the former chairman of the Hamburg REP association, Thomas NISSEN; then-member of the Baden-Württemberg party executive, Bernd BECK; then-deputy chairman of the Saxony REP association, Dirk ABRAHAM; and former functionaries of the Saxony REP association. The declaration stated that the two parties had proved that they were able to set aside egoistic partisan aims when the Fatherland was threatened. The declaration also stated that the signers, as discerning REP members and supporters, had hoped up to the national party conference in November 2004 to be able to officially join the new alliance between the DVU and NPD. Saying that it made no sense to get in each other’s way in future elections, the declaration called on supporters to vote for the NPD in the Schleswig-Holstein elections on 20 February. The signers stated that they did not see themselves as opposing the REP, but as reacting to the position of the party executive, which they saw as having missed a historic opportunity to join the common struggle of all patriots for the Fatherland.

The REP initiated disciplinary measures against then-chairman of the Lower Saxony association, Hans-Gerd WIECHMANN, among others, for having advocated cooperation with right-wing extremist organisations. After that, roughly 70 REP members, including

WIECHMANN, left the party on 13 March, according to a post to the Patriotisches Forum Internet forum.

Then-deputy chairman of the Saxony REP association, Dirk ABRAHAM (also an original signer of the “Hamburg Signal” and private secretary to NPD MP in Saxony’s parliament Uwe LEICHSENRING) resigned from the REP on 30 April after the party continued to hold fast to its policy of isolation; ABRAHAM ultimately joined the NPD. In explaining this move, ABRAHAM wrote:

“In my opinion, the REP’s [sic] are only worried about financing the party executive with public matching funds and not about the interests of our homeland and our people. The offers by the NPD and DVU to cooperate on elections and in campaign alliances were rejected. Advocates of these offers were defamed, slandered and cast out.”  
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 6/2005, p. 7)

Additional examples demonstrate the continuing lack of distance between numerous REP members/functionaries and other right-wing extremists:

- The January issue of the right-wing extremist monthly *Nation & Europa - Deutsche Monatshefte* reports on the New Year’s reception of the NPD parliamentary group in Dresden, where “current and former REP MPs” were allegedly spotted.<sup>64</sup>
- According to a post to the Patriotisches Forum website dated 21 March, REP members also took part in the “Freedom Congress” organised by the NPD-owned *Deutsche Stimme* publishing house and held in Bayreuth, Bavaria, on 19-20 March.
- A press release from the Rhineland-Palatinate REP association dated 10 January stated that a representative of the right-wing extremist organisation Vlaams Belang was the guest of honour at the New Year’s reception of the REP members on the Mainz city council.
- An NPD Internet report dated 17 February said that the REP deputy national chairman, Björn CLEMENS, took part in a memorial march in Dresden on 13 February organised by the Junge Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen (JLO, Young *Landsmannschaft* of East Prussia).
- An Internet report by the NPD of Baden-Württemberg dated 2 March stated that Jürgen SCHÜTZINGER, general manager of the Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat (DLVH, German League for

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<sup>64</sup> *Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte* (Nation & Europe – German monthly), No. 1/2005, p. 31.

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Nation and Homeland) and then-deputy chairman of the NPD association of Baden-Württemberg, invited representatives from the DVU, NPD, REP and unaffiliated associations to a meeting in Stuttgart on 26 February. There they adopted what they called the Stuttgart Declaration, in which they agreed “to pull together politically in future”.<sup>65</sup>

- According to a press release of 28 June, Thomas JÄCKEL, then ex-officio member of the Saxony REP party executive, said that he intended to support the NPD’s direct candidate in the district of Weisseritz, Uwe LEICHSENRING, in the Bundestag elections.<sup>66</sup>

These examples offer evidence of the conflict between the policy of isolation officially set by the party executive and the widespread practice at other levels of the organisation of cooperating with other right-wing extremists. They also demonstrate the difficulty the party executive has in enforcing its own policy throughout the party.

#### Participation in elections

Due to a lack of the necessary organisation and a shortage of funds, during the national parliamentary elections the REP campaigned only in nine *Länder*. It received 0.6% of the second votes (2002: 0.6%), thereby achieving its chief goal of exceeding the minimum of 0.5% necessary to qualify for federal matching funds. But the party did not do as well as the NPD nation-wide and in *Länder* where REP candidates ran against those of the NPD.

In the North-Rhine/Westphalia parliamentary elections on 22 May, the REP received only 0.8% of the second votes (2001: 1.1%), slightly behind the NPD. By receiving less than the necessary 1%, the REP also failed to qualify for state matching funds.

<sup>65</sup> The “Stuttgart Declaration”, published on 1 March 2005 on the website of the NPD association of Baden-Württemberg.

<sup>66</sup> See the *Sächsische Zeitung* newspaper (Pirna edition) of 28 June 2005.

## V. Efforts to foster intellectual right-wing extremism

Over the past years, advocates of right-wing extremism have repeatedly tried to provide an ideological underpinning for their political activities. But efforts to make right-wing extremism more intellectual continued to falter in 2005. They thus remain far from achieving the goal of “cultural hegemony” they set in the early 1980s. In only a few cases did they succeed in initiating debates that attracted attention beyond the right-wing extremist milieu. Announcements of ambitious plans for intellectual projects have not been followed by any results of note.

**NPD’s political and ideological efforts lack energy**

The fact that the “National-Democratic Training Centre” located on the grounds of the NPD’s national office in Berlin has still not started operations two years after it was announced is indicative of this situation. The NPD parliamentary group in Saxony founded a “Dresden School”<sup>67</sup> on the model of the Frankfurt School,<sup>68</sup> but it has not been able to get it off the ground, apparently for lack of appropriate personnel. The same is true of the Bildungswerk für Heimat und nationale Identität e.V. (Educational association for the homeland and national identity, reg’d society) founded in Saxony in April 2005; although it plans to offer “civic education” and disseminate “intellectual approaches of the ‘Dresden School’ in public discourse”, it has not yet had a practical impact.

The chairman of the association is Peter DEHOUST, co-editor of the right-wing extremist journal *Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte* (Nation & Europe: German monthly); the deputy chairman is Karl RICHTER, considered one of the leading intellectuals in German right-wing extremism. In this way, RICHTER demonstrates once again that he is a true “all-rounder” in the right-wing extremist scene; at the same time, this is indicative of the general lack of intellectuals in the scene. In addition to writing for a number of periodicals, RICHTER serves as the head of the parliamentary advisory service for the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony; he is also on the editorial staff of *Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte*, a member of the editorial advisory board of the journal *Deutsche Geschichte. Europa und die Welt* (German history: Europe and the world) published by the Verlagsgesellschaft Berg (VGB), and a member of the editorial staff of

<sup>67</sup> See footnote 15.

<sup>68</sup> The Frankfurt School was a school of thought in which a group of social scientists from the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt developed something they called “critical theory”. Critical theory was based on the idea that science must be oriented on political action and is linked to Marxist theory.

the journal *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (DGG, Germany past and present) and of *Euro-Kurier* (Euro courier), both published by the Grabert-Verlag publishing house.

**NPD sets off debate over “bombing holocaust”**

Only in one instance did the NPD manage for a time to present its own slant on a topic of interest to the general public. In a speech during the eighth session of Saxony’s parliament on 21 January, Jürgen GANSEL, an NPD MP, gained nation-wide attention when he called the Allies’ aerial bombing of Dresden in February 1945 a “bombing holocaust”. By comparing the bombing of Dresden to the extermination of the Jews during the Third Reich, the NPD publicly relativised the Holocaust without actually violating the law.

**Nationalist revolutionary current**

Earlier advocates of a more intellectual orientation, like Jürgen SCHWAB, right-wing extremist writer and former NPD theoretician, have almost entirely rejected the NPD’s current course. Schwab, who has left the NPD, explained his reasons for doing so in an exchange of open letters with Stefan ROCHOW, national chairman of the NPD’s youth organisation Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats):

“Because – for reasons of self-preservation – the NPD wants to maintain the FRG party state, the system alternative is not exactly plausible.”<sup>69</sup>

Instead, SCHWAB advocates a nationalist revolutionary strategy, according to which “a state oriented on the common good could not be based on a capitalist system”. He accused the NPD and its chairman, VOIGT of having

“failed for years to move beyond the critique of capitalism to offer a real alternative to capitalism in terms of the state and economic policy.”<sup>70</sup>

Instead, SCHWAB wrote, “the intellectual shortcomings of the NPD leadership [are becoming] increasingly obvious.”<sup>71</sup>

**Deutsches Kolleg**

The Deutsches Kolleg – Schwert und Schild des Deutschen Geistes (DK, German seminar: Sword and shield of the German spirit), long headed by Dr Reinhold OBERLERCHER, Horst MAHLER and Uwe

<sup>69</sup> An open letter from SCHWAB dated 1 August 2005, published on the right-wing extremist Störtebeker-Netz website. FRG is the abbreviation of the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD in German), used here as a pejorative (translator’s note).

<sup>70</sup> An open letter from SCHWAB dated 20 August 2005, published on the right-wing extremist Störtebeker-Netz website.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

MEENEN, sees its chief task as training a “nationalist intelligentsia”. However, due to personal conflicts, MAHLER and OBERLERCHER (both of whom had been theoreticians of the extremist Neue Linke, or New Left, in the 1970s) ended their collaboration on the seminar in late 2004. Since then, OBERLERCHER has headed the DK with assistance from MEENEN. In 2005, OBERLERCHER led DK training courses in Mosbach, Thuringia, while MAHLER conducted his own seminars, some of them under the heading “Reich popular movement” and mostly held in the premises of the right-wing extremist Collegium Humanum (CH, Humanist seminar) in Vlotho, North-Rhine/Westphalia.<sup>72</sup> Overall, however, the number of courses and participants was lower than in previous years. The DK’s other activities largely centre on publishing material on the Internet. There it recommends MAHLER’s and OBERLERCHER’s “homeland pages” for further reading. The texts regularly contain defamatory statements about the democratic state under the rule of law and its representatives, but mainly anti-Semitic content. For example, a statement entitled “Dresden on 13 February 2005” published on the Internet on that date noted:

“The Jew Adorno, who was cultivated in Germany, noted with satisfaction on 1 May 1945: Everything we have desired for years has happened: The country is trashed and millions of Hansjürgens and Utes are dead. ... Thanks to the destruction of core Europe, the Jewish-nomadic triumphs of 1945 and 1948 were able to expand into today’s global control.”

The DK blatantly glorifies National Socialism in a text published on the Internet on 3 January, entitled “Dutschke and Hitler”:

“Hitler and Dutschke were the two charismatic leaders [*Führer*] that the Germans produced in the 20th century... .“

The DK’s influence on the right-wing extremist scene remained limited.

**Deutsche Akademie  
undergoes  
reorientation phase**

Largely inspired by SCHWAB, the Deutsche Akademie (German academy) continues to see itself as a forum for “nationalist opposition” in Germany, unaffiliated with a particular party or organisation; it says

<sup>72</sup> On 18 June 2004, the director of the Collegium Humanum e.V. (reg’d society), Ursula HAVERBECK-WETZEL, and the editor of its publication *Lebensschutz-Information – LSI – Stimme des Gewissens* (Information to protect life - Voice of conscience), Ernst Otto COHRS, were found guilty by the Bad Oeynhausen municipal court of incitement and ordered to pay fines of €5,400 and €3,600, respectively. The judgement is not yet final.

it has dedicated itself to “educating an intellectual elite in opposition to the pseudo-democratic system of vassalage on German soil”.<sup>73</sup> Following SCHWAB’s “highly critical” stance towards the course taken by the NPD, in 2005 the Deutsche Akademie also showed signs of undergoing a process of ideological reorientation.<sup>74</sup> One such sign was a conference in October which was largely organised by SCHWAB and was devoted to the theme of “nationalist revolution today”; it proposed to explore

“the extent to which nationalist-revolutionary forces currently exist within the NPD and how to strengthen the influence of such persons within the party.”<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Quoted from the statement “Wer wir sind und was wir wollen” (Who we are and what we want) on the Deutsche Akademie website, as of 20 October 2005.

<sup>74</sup> Quoted from SCHWAB’s announcement of an event, “Nationalrevolutionär heute!” (Nationalist and revolutionary today!), published on the right-wing extremist website Störtebeker-Netz on 27 September 2005.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

## VI. Anti-Semitism

In 2005, anti-Semitic activity remained widespread throughout the entire spectrum of right-wing extremism. The scene again used current and commemorative events to gain as much publicity for its anti-Jewish views as possible. Anti-Semitism is the least common denominator within the diverse right-wing extremist scene and is expressed in publications, parliamentary debate and in a wide variety of right-wing extremist activities.

Again in 2005, numerous anti-Semitic criminal offences were reported, along with vandalism of cemeteries, synagogues and memorials (see also Section III, "Politically Motivated Crime", 1.2.2 and 1.2.4).

### Anti-Zionist and secondary anti-Semitism

Few in the right-wing extremist scene subscribe to religiously motivated anti-Semitism, which accuses Jews of being the children of Satan and enemies of Christians. Anti-Jewish sentiment on the basis of racist, social or political motives is more widespread. Anti-Zionist and "secondary anti-Semitism" are especially strong at the moment.

The escalation of the Middle East conflict against the backdrop of the second intifada which started in 2000 contributed to the importance of anti-Zionist anti-Semitism. Right-wing extremists take advantage of mainstream political and social criticism, some of it harshly worded but nonetheless legitimate, of the Israeli government's individual policy decisions to make blanket denunciations and question Israel's right to exist. They often attempt to blame "Jewry", as an imagined unitary entity, for political actions taken by the State of Israel.<sup>76</sup> Another popular strategy is equating Israeli policy on the Palestinians with Nazi crimes against the Jews, in order to relativise the crimes of the Third Reich through a rhetorical reversal of the roles of victim and perpetrator.

"Secondary anti-Semitism" is also based on this strategy. Its practitioners accuse the Jews of exploiting Germany's responsibility for Nazi crimes and the constant remembrance of this responsibility to blackmail Germany financially and politically and ultimately to make sure it remains weak. This accusation is frequently combined with attempts to relativise the number of Holocaust victims, or to deny the Holocaust entirely.

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<sup>76</sup> On distinguishing between anti-Zionist anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel, see Aribert Heyder, Julia Iser and Peter Schmidt, "Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus" (Criticism of Israel or anti-Semitism? Opinion-formation between the public discourse, media and taboos), in W. Heitmeyer, ed.: *Deutsche Zustände* (German circumstances), third series, Frankfurt (Main) 2005, pp. 144-165.

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All forms of anti-Semitism attribute negative characteristics to Jews in general in an attempt to “justify” isolating them, discriminating against them, persecuting them and even murdering them.<sup>77</sup>

**Open anti-Semitism** Because anti-Semitism is generally condemned in public discourse, and as a result of vigilance by law enforcement authorities, many right-wing extremists limit themselves to innuendo in their anti-Semitic agitation. Open anti-Semitism is still rampant in the skinhead scene in particular, and skinhead bands disseminate extremely aggressive texts. Such recordings are often produced abroad and imported into Germany.

Equating the State of Israel with all of Jewry, the song *Panzer rollen in Israel vor* (Tanks are advancing on Israel) by the skinhead band Murder Squad on its CD *The Hateshow* is motivated by anti-Zionism.<sup>78</sup> The band sings about destroying the Israeli state:

“The Germans are coming, you Jews watch out, because our objective is to destroy you. We’re not afraid of death nor the devil, and we’ll break up the Jewish stronghold. The chains are rattling, the engine roars, tanks are advancing on Israel. ... The sun is burning hot over Israel, our tank engines are singing their song. German tanks in the hot sun are ready to do battle against Zion’s land.”

But songs deal with attacking Jews in Germany too; for example, on the same CD, the song *Kameraden steht auf* (Stand up, comrades) contains the lyrics:

“With tanks and grenades and heavy machine guns, with mortars, rockets and TNT, the wave of terror is washing over the country, we’ll set the Central Council of Jews on fire.”

Fearful of police measures and possible bans, very few bands in Germany express themselves so directly. It is mainly foreign bands who use such explicit lyrics, which makes their CDs popular in the

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<sup>77</sup> For definitions and descriptions of the various forms of anti-Semitism, see Armin Pfahl-Traughber, *Antisemitismus in der deutschen Geschichte* (Anti-Semitism in German history), Opladen 2002. See also the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (ed.), *Argumentationsmuster im rechtsextremistischen Antisemitismus. Aktuelle Entwicklungen* (Patterns of argumentation in right-wing extremist anti-Semitism: Current developments), Cologne 2005.

<sup>78</sup> The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed Murder Squad’s CD *The Hateshow* on its restricted list (A-List); see the Federal Gazette No. 89 of 30 April 2005. The band referred to here is not the Swedish death metal band of the same name.

German skinhead scene. For example, the 2005 CD *Nor Cal Hate Core*, by the US band Frontline<sup>79</sup> includes the song *Final Solution* which openly invokes the Holocaust:

“I think that it is finally time for the jews to pay for all their crimes. Prepare for war, A White Revolution. The time is near for jewish execution. Cleansing begins, we get our retribution. Lets wipe ‘em out, Final Solution ... They’ve gone too far and now they will show their regret, ‘cause Six Million ain’t nothing yet.” [original English text]

In the song *Frontline*, the band explains how this “Final Solution” is to take place:

“For the red white and blue we shed our blood, cleaning up the streets, taking out the muds, this is our war.” [original English text]

Starting in early June, numerous searches were conducted of the homes of persons suspected of distributing an anti-Semitic text written by Wieland KÖRNER, “Die neue Sicht von Auschwitz” (The new view of Auschwitz). Referring to these searches, former NPD functionary Horst MAHLER posted the following to the website of the Adelaide-Institut on 30 June:

“The despotism of the OMF-BRD<sup>80</sup> is bursting all bounds - now anything that might displease the Jews is considered incitement ... Vassal justice is now trying to rebel against the rule of law and against logical thinking. The plan is to prepare the ground for accepting extra-legal orders; every expression of opinion that displeases the foreign rulers is forbidden and punishable.”

### Implicit anti-Semitism

While bands that produce and distribute their CDs abroad erroneously feel safe from German prosecution and openly proclaim their hatred of Jews, right-wing extremists who produce CDs and publications in Germany limit themselves to insinuations that are not directly punishable by law.

Anti-Semitic efforts often rely on quoting well-known Jewish figures; such quotes are intended to serve as proof of right-wing extremist conspiracy theories or to legitimate an anti-Jewish message. At the same time, the method of quotation appears to create a distance from

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<sup>79</sup> The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons has placed the CD *Nor Cal Hate Core* by the band Frontline on its restricted list (A-List); see the Federal Gazette No. 186 of 30 September 2005. “Nor Cal” stands for “Northern California”.

<sup>80</sup> OMF stands for “organisational form of a modality of foreign rule” (*Organisationsform einer Modalität der Fremdherrschaft*), a term originally coined by Carlo Schmid. MAHLER uses it to refer to the Federal Republic of Germany (abbreviated BRD in German) supposedly controlled by a Jewish superpower.

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the contents of the message. For example, the *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ, National newspaper/German weekly) asked: “Pay another 100 billion for Hitler? New bill from Israel for restitutions”. This conveys an image of Israel and Holocaust survivors as money-hungry Jews who are taking financial advantage of Germany. Referring to Norman Finkelstein’s book “The Holocaust Industry” is intended to reinforce this impression. “Finkelstein ... is one of the most prominent Jewish critics of the methods of leading Zionist circles with regard to ‘coming to terms with the past’ and ‘reparations’”. According to the newspaper, the book claims that “Jewish suffering under Hitler is being exploited for purposes of ‘usury’.”<sup>81</sup>

In its budget proposals, the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony displayed its anti-Semitic attitudes by specifically cutting funds for Jewish institutions and for cooperation with Israel, while not touching funding for other religious groups:

“The following items should be cut from the budget of the state ministry for education and cultural affairs: funding in the amount of €81,800 for the state rabbi; €810,000 or €500,000 for the construction of a community centre for the Leipzig synagogue; funding of €242,000 for the construction of a synagogue in Chemnitz ... In Individual Plan 01 (Parliament of Saxony) the NPD parliamentary group proposed several budget cuts. ... The NPD proposal cut all funding for international cooperation, in particular cooperation with Israel (€12,500).”<sup>82</sup>

#### **Debate over the Holocaust Memorial**

A major focus of anti-Semitic activity in 2005 was the debate over the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe, located in Berlin. This activity was motivated primarily by the desire to relativise the Holocaust. Characteristically, right-wing extremists claim that, in view of the memorial’s central location and the high level of media attention it receives, it is the focus of a “cult of guilt”, which runs counter to their desire to “cleanse” German history.

Since the memorial was inaugurated on 10 May, it has been directly attacked two times:

On the occasion of the state visit by Israel’s President Moshe Katsav on 1 June, a swastika was found painted at the memorial; and on 18 November, Star of David graffiti was found on six of the memorial’s slabs.

<sup>81</sup> NZ, No. 20/2005, p. 1.

<sup>82</sup> Press release of the parliamentary group, 13 April 2005.

Right-wing extremist publications above all targeted the memorial. Whereas some right-wing extremist publications contented themselves with one-sidedly citing negative comments from other media, other publications repeatedly referred to the high cost of the memorial and – with the intent of relativising the Holocaust – demanded memorials for German victims of the war:

“Despite the economic decline of the Federal Republic, the financial bankruptcy of the federal, state and local governments, mass unemployment and growing poverty among large segments of the population, the ruling politicians apparently believe that spending enormous amounts of money to maintain nearly 6,000 Holocaust monuments and to build yet more anti-German memorials is what Germany needs most urgently today. But one looks in vain for central memorials or documentation centres dedicated to the German victims of expulsion or Allied air terrorism, for example, or to the countless who died in the victors’ camps.”  
(*NZ*, No. 29/2005, p. 5)

The right-wing extremist website *Störtebeker-Netz* went further; using a play on words meaning “to disabuse someone of a certain notion”, on 11 May, its “editorial executive” commented as follows on the controversy surrounding Holocaust Memorial campaigner Lea Rosh, who wanted to preserve the tooth of a Jewish Holocaust victim in one of the slabs:

“Maybe this tooth is the same tooth of Jewry that Hitler pulled back then.”

The authors added that it was “not possible to promise that the tooth would guarantee that this process would be carried out all over again from the beginning” and that if one considered the “conduct of those who benefited from the memorials in Germany over the past decades, this possibility cannot be ruled out.” Referring to an earlier comment by NPD party chairman VOIGT that the Holocaust Memorial would make a good foundation for the new Reich Chancellery, the authors concluded by proposing that, “in view of its construction and the fact that it is protected by NATO wire”, the memorial be used “as a kind of open-air enclosure for a certain species”.

**Anti-Semitic  
conspiracy theories**

Even a century after its publication and despite being revealed as a forgery in 1921, “The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion” continues to fascinate anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> “The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion” is an anti-Semitic forgery created by the Russian Okhrana, or czarist secret police; it was first published in Russia in 1903. Right-wing – and Islamist – extremists continue to use it today as “proof” of the existence of a world-wide Jewish-Masonic conspiracy (cf. Ernst

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These circles assume that “the Jews” have the financial power to control the media, governments and banks world-wide. Conspiracy theorists use supposed evidence, which they find confirmed by the “Protocols”, in their attempt to prove the existence of a conspiracy by power-hungry world Jewry to control the world and erect a “new world order”. These conspiracy theorists dismiss the fact that the “Protocols” is a forgery by claiming this is a lie put about by interested parties.

In order to hide their animosity, right-wing extremist conspiracy theorists often use the terms “East Coast” (of the US), “international high finance” and “ZOG” (for “Zionist Occupied Government”) to refer to the Jewish bankers they claim rule the US and for governments which in their eyes are controlled by Jewish influence. In right-wing extremist circles, these code words are enough to invoke the image of a Jewish world conspiracy without violating the law.

For example, an article published on the NPD website on 18 February, entitled “US East Coast and Israel working on world-wide surveillance to ‘protect’ Jews” referred to special legislation signed on 16 October 2004, claiming that its purpose was the “world-wide surveillance of tendencies critical of the Jews” and that it was likely to have been “welcomed” by the “financially powerful and media-dominating Jewish forces in the USA”:

“Israel recently passed a similar law that applies world-wide, thus continuing its current policy. ... The creating of a world-wide ‘Jewish nature conservancy park’ is in full swing.”

More subtle, though equally clear for right-wing extremists, was the *NZ* headline “The Israel lobby within German television” to an article about “US-Jewish media mogul” Haim Saban’s sale of the KirchMedia company to the publisher Axel-Springer-Verlag. The article criticised the concentration of the media and the supposed control by Jewish media magnates, as well as the company’s supposedly one-sided pro-Israel orientation:

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Piper, “Die jüdische Weltverschwörung” (The Jewish world conspiracy), in Julius H. Schoeps and Joachim Schlör, eds. *Antisemitismus: Vorurteile und Mythen* (Anti-Semitism: Prejudices and myths), Munich and Zurich, 1995).

On the history of the document, see Hadassa Ben-Itto: “*Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion*” - *Anatomie einer Fälschung* (“The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion”: Anatomy of a Forgery), Berlin 1998, and Norman Cohn: “*Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion*”. *Der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (“The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion”: The myth of a Jewish world conspiracy), Zurich 1998. On the influence of the “Protocols” on Nazi policy, see Wolfram Meyer zu Utrup: “*Kampf gegen die jüdische Weltverschwörung*”. *Propaganda und Antisemitismus der Nationalsozialisten 1919-1945* (“Fighting the ‘Jewish world conspiracy’”: Nazi propaganda and anti-Semitism 1919-1945), Berlin 2003.

“Haim Saban (‘Israel is my main concern’) can be sure that ProSieben/Sat.1 won’t change its direction. This is guaranteed by the Springer-Verlag, whose editorial staff sign a contract agreeing to ‘constantly protect Israeli interests’. Further, Saban will become the chairman of the TV advisory board for the merged company, in which he also plans to buy some shares.”  
(*NZ*, No. 33/2005, p. 1)

A similar article in the same issue even contained an advertisement praising the *NZ* as a “counterweight to the opinion industry”.<sup>84</sup>

**Anti-Semitism and  
esoterica**

Conspiracy theories constitute the bridge to anti-Semitic activity within esoteric circles; although such circles tend towards conspiracy thinking, they are otherwise apolitical.<sup>85</sup> Here too, “The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion” often provides the foundation for anti-Semitic expression.

A pioneer in this area was the book *Geheimgesellschaften und ihre Macht im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert* (Secret societies and their power in the 20th century) by Jan van HELSING (a pseudonym), which was published in the early 1990s and has sold a great number of copies since then. Many authors seek to duplicate the book’s success by producing almost identical works.

In his book *Wahrheit ans Licht* (Bringing the truth to light), Julius H. BARKAS takes up the ideas of van HELSING along with other right-wing extremist authors.<sup>86</sup> For example, the book presents the revisionist argument that World War II was started in the interest of large Jewish banks:

“So Adolf Hitler was the great-grandson of M.A. Rothschild. Now everything makes sense. ... The mad war-mongering, supported by a naïve and apathetic population which put up no resistance to the murderous activity and even gladly marched in step with it. The financing of a major war, World War II, which left only losers among those affected. And again, as in the English-French war and the American Civil War, the Rothschilds financed both sides.”

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<sup>84</sup> *NZ*, No. 33/2005, p. 14, “Israel als Anliegen” (Concern for Israel).

<sup>85</sup> The term “esoterica” originally referred to knowledge or thought that was accessible only to a select group and not written down, such as Plato’s philosophy. In modern times, esoterica refers to secretive teachings intended to be restricted to a certain group; it may include various elements from astrology, religion and the occult (*Brockhaus-Enzyklopädie*, 19th ed., Mannheim 1998, vol. 6, p. 584).

<sup>86</sup> Julius H. BARKAS: *Wahrheit ans Licht. Geld-Macht-Politik-Gesundheit-Natur*. (Bringing the truth to light: Money, power, politics, health, nature), Argo-Verlag, Marktoberdorf, 2004, p. 189 f.

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BARKAS also views the commemoration of the Holocaust as an intentional oppression of the German people:

“The whole issue of anti-Semitism and the constant activities to keep things alive serve a specific purpose, because nothing here happens by chance. Someone with a bad conscience, with grafted-on feelings of guilt, constantly in fear of illness or terrorism - such a person is paralysed and stands on the sidelines rather than being able to stand up for what is right. The German people were really stuck with a bastard (Hitler), in both senses of the word.”

Anti-Semitic propaganda within right-wing extremism today is not a new development, in terms of neither its content nor its intensity. As on earlier occasions, current political events are used as an opportunity to articulate anti-Jewish attitudes. Such propaganda primarily targets an audience with latent anti-Semitic attitudes. According to various sociological studies, over the long term up to 20% of the population has such attitudes.<sup>87</sup> Whether anti-Semitic propaganda has an effect on such persons, and if so, what kind, has not yet been studied. In any case, it is impossible to prove a causal relationship between the development of anti-Semitic agitation, latent anti-Semitic attitudes and anti-Semitic crimes.

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<sup>87</sup> For a summary of the results of individual studies, see Werner Bergmann, “Wie viele Deutsche sind rechtsextrem, fremdenfeindlich und antisemitisch? Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1990 to 2000” (How many Germans are right-wing extremist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic? Results of empirical research from 1990 to 2000) in Wolfgang Benz, ed. *Auf dem Weg zum Bürgerkrieg? Rechtsextremismus und Gewalt gegen Fremde in Deutschland* (On the way to civil war? Right-wing extremism and violence against foreigners in Germany), Frankfurt/Main 2001, pp. 41-62.

See also Oliver Decker and Elmar Brähler: “Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland” (Right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany), *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Politics and contemporary history), No. 42/2005 of 17 October 2005, pp. 8-17.

## **VII. International connections**

For decades, German right-wing extremists have maintained a variety of contacts with like-minded people in other countries. To cement international relations, to share information and to coordinate joint activities, they participate on a more or less regular basis at meetings in Germany and abroad. Long-held political positions, such as rejecting the process of European unification and opposing “acts of state repression” and a supposed “cultural alienation” serve as a shared foundation and starting point for cross-border alliances. While the number of smaller right-wing extremist events with an international audience has grown all across Europe, few right-wing extremists from abroad attended traditional right-wing extremist events held in connection with the Ulrichsberg memorial ceremony near Klagenfurt, Austria, and the *Ijzerbedevaart* commemoration in Belgium.

### **1. Events with international participation**

The following are examples of events with international attendance:

- Nearly 600 persons gathered at Heroes’ Square in Budapest on 12 February to commemorate members of the Waffen-SS killed in World War II. Several German right-wing extremists also took part in this “Day of Honour”. Berlin right-wing extremist Eckart BRÄUNIGER spoke at the event, as he did in 1999 and 2004.
  - Spanish right-wing extremists organised a demonstration in Madrid on 18 February protesting the EU constitutional treaty and Turkey’s EU candidacy. NPD chairman VOIGT spoke, as did representatives of right-wing extremist parties in Italy, Greece and Romania.
  - About 3,300 persons took part in an event organised by the Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) in Berlin on 8 May. Representatives of right-wing extremist organisations in Romania, Greece, Austria, Spain, Belgium, Sweden and Norway briefly addressed the gathering; there were also delegations from Finland and South Africa.
  - About 60 persons from the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany took part in a demonstration of the right-wing extremist party Nederlandse Volks Unie (NVU, Dutch People’s Union) in Arnhem, Netherlands, on 14 May. In addition to the NVU chairman, Constantijn KUSTERS, NPD chairman VOIGT spoke on the
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demonstration's motto, "No EU candidacy for Turkey – No to a European constitution".

- NVU chairman KUSTERS also spoke at a demonstration in Marienfels, Rhineland-Palatinate, on 28 May, the motto of which was "Rebuild the memorial to the 1st SS Tank Corps now!" Of the approximately 150 protesters in attendance, 10 were sympathisers from the Netherlands.
- The NPD organised an event in Jena, Thuringia, on 11 June, with the motto "Festival of peoples – For a Europe made up of fatherlands". Among the total of 14 speakers were representatives of right-wing extremist organisations from Romania, the Netherlands and Hungary. The seven bands that performed included the right-wing extremist groups Indiziert (On the restricted list) from Switzerland, Brigade 11 from the Netherlands, Nothung from Sweden and Before the War from Slovakia.
- After the main "Rudolf Hess Memorial March" in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, was banned, a number of smaller demonstrations took place in Germany on 20 August. Two "Hess events" were held elsewhere in Europe. About 100 neo-Nazis from Denmark, Germany and Sweden demonstrated in Kolding, Denmark, and about 50 Swedish right-wing extremists gathered in front of the German embassy in Stockholm.
- Roughly 60 right-wing extremists of various nationalities, including 35 Germans, met on the fringes of the traditional Ulrichsberg memorial celebration, held near Klagenfurt, Austria, on 17-18 September to commemorate soldiers killed in the two world wars (total attendance in 2004: approx. 50; German attendance in 2004: approx. 30).
- The right-wing extremist Freundeskreis Ulrich von Hutten e.V. (Friends of Ulrich von Hutten, reg'd society) and right-wing extremist Deutsche Kulturgemeinschaft Österreich (German Cultural Society of Austria ) held their "29th Guests' Week" in Rosenheim on 14-19 October. About 110 persons from Austria and Germany took part in the event. Speakers included Elisabeth GROLITSCH and Herbert SCHWEIGER from Austria and Gerd ZIKELI from Switzerland.
- About 130 German and Dutch right-wing extremists demonstrated in The Hague on 22 October against "further restrictions on free speech in the Netherlands". The protesters marched to the Dutch foreign ministry, where German right-wing extremist Christian WORCH gave a speech.

- About 20 representatives of the NPD as well as several “Free Nationalists” attended memorial ceremonies in Madrid on 19-20 November in honour of General Francisco Franco and Falangist leader Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera. For the first time, NPD chairman VOIGT was given the opportunity in the context of a public rally to speak briefly to the approx. 1,000 Spanish attendees.
- On 10 December, around 1,200 (2004: approx. 1,600) right-wing extremists marched in the Stockholm suburb of Salem in memory of a skinhead who was killed five years earlier in a fight with a group of foreign youths. Although most of those attending were from Sweden and neighbouring countries, a large number of Germans also took part. Neo-Nazi Lutz GIESEN, from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, gave a short speech mainly dealing with the topic of “race war”.

## **2. Attempts to form extra-parliamentary alliances with European organisations**

Only a few European right-wing parties won enough votes in the 2004 elections to send representatives to the European Parliament. Most parties are still limited to exerting their often minimal political influence at the national level. Some attempt to create a public impression of foreign policy significance by seeking contact to right-wing extremist organisations in neighbouring countries.

As a result, some international interest groups are formed; however, they regularly fail due to the strict nationalist orientation of the cooperating partners. The structural differences between the partners and their different ideological orientations also constitute barriers to lasting alliances. For example, an umbrella organisation called Front Européen de Libération (FEL) was founded in 1993 and disbanded already by the late 1990s. The members – some neo-Nazi and some national-revolutionary organisations from nine countries – failed both to adopt a viable concept and to win influential partners.

### **European National Front (ENF)**

A new cooperation initiative calling itself European National Front (ENF) first presented itself on the Internet in September 2004. The association claims membership of 16 parties from western and eastern Europe, including the NPD. The ENF’s declared aim is to unite the European nationalist forces and stand up for “elementary principles”.<sup>88</sup> These principles include:

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<sup>88</sup> ENF website (26 September 2005).

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- creating a Europe of fatherlands,
- defending culture, tradition and Christian roots,
- fighting globalisation and separatism,
- preventing illegal immigration and Turkey's accession to the EU,
- and defending the existing world order against imperialist ambitions.

The ENF's main goal is to encourage its members to take action on behalf of these principles, while providing them a forum to present themselves. Another priority for the ENF seems to be preventing the "Islamisation of Europe". All "national organisations" are invited to join this initiative. In addition to organisations from Italy, Spain, Greece and the Netherlands, the NPD is expressly noted as a contact organisation.

The ENF website – available in ten languages – reports on various activities by its member organisations. But many of the events listed for January to September have little apparent relation to the ENF, nor are they the result of international cooperation on the basis of a shared ideology. Instead, the list is simply a compilation of local activities with little broader impact. In only a few cases did representatives from member organisations actually take part in other member organisations' events.

### **3. International revisionism**

German history, especially the Nazi era, is extremely important for right-wing extremists. They know very well that the constant public awareness of Nazi crimes hinders them in their aim of introducing their ideology, which is more or less related to National Socialism, into democratic, mainstream public discourse. As a result, right-wing extremists are primarily interested in discrediting reputable historical research on the Third Reich and its depiction of history, hoping in this way to present the Nazi regime in a somewhat more favourable light. Right-wing extremists active in this area usually deny their real motivation and pretend to be engaged in objective research into historical facts. They claim they are following the usual practice of historians by revisiting and revising existing knowledge following the discovery of new information sources, in order to provide a more precise picture of the past. Whereas scientific re-evaluation relies on unbiased research to clarify existing knowledge more precisely, right-

wing extremists call themselves “revisionists” when they operate under the cover of reputable research to re-interpret historical facts for their own ends.

**Methods**

To this end, they

- fake documents,
- fail to reference sources that provide evidence of Nazi wrongdoing,
- report in a biased manner on supposedly positive aspects of the Third Reich, such as staged sport festivals or the building of the autobahn,
- and compare the extermination of European Jews to acts of war by the Allies, for example by mentioning the atomic bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or German suffering caused by Allied bombing.

**Two areas of revisionism**

In this context, we may draw a distinction between revisionism in the narrower and in the larger sense. Revisionism in the narrow sense refers to specifically denying that the Holocaust took place, while revisionism in the larger sense refers to all arguments, such as those disputing Germany’s guilt in starting World War II or the criminal nature of the Nazi dictatorship. But because only denying the Holocaust constitutes a criminal offence under Section 130 of the Criminal Code (StGB), most revisionists seek to avoid possible criminal charges and express themselves in terms that fall under revisionism in the larger sense.

**Misrepresenting history in Germany**

Misrepresentations of the Nazi past can be found particularly in right-wing extremist periodicals such as *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (DGG, Germany past and present; see Section VIII), *Deutsche Geschichte. Europa und die Welt* (German history: Europe and the world; see Section V) and in the *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ, National newspaper/German weekly; see Section IV, 2), with ties to the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union).

An NPD MP in Saxony’s state parliament, GANSEL, caused an uproar when in an address to the parliament he described the bombing of Dresden in February 1945 as a “bombing holocaust” (see Section V), thus relativising the Holocaust by comparing the genocide of European Jews to the Allied air war.

A right-wing extremist organisation, the Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocaust Verfolgten (VRBHV, Society for the rehabilitation of those persecuted for denying the Holocaust), was founded in 2003 with the aim of supporting activists in legal disputes,

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though the society itself does not engage in Holocaust denial. However, the VRBHV has not been able to advance the cause of Holocaust deniers in any noticeable way, although it has indirectly supported their claims.

**Activities based abroad**

In many cases, texts denying the Holocaust are sent to Germany or disseminated via the Internet from abroad. In this way, distributors of such texts hope to make it more difficult for the German authorities to prosecute. Two German citizens living abroad played a central role in such activities: Ernst ZÜNDEL and Germar RUDOLF. However, the activities of the international community of Holocaust deniers suffered a serious setback when the Canadian authorities turned ZÜNDEL over to German law enforcement authorities in spring 2005.<sup>89</sup> ZÜNDEL had been living in Canada for several decades and distributed his revisionist propaganda from there.

Trained as a chemist, RUDOLF has disputed the Shoa since the early 1990s under the pretext of a scientific approach. After being sentenced in 1995 on charges of incitement, he fled the country to escape imprisonment and was last living in the US. From there he oversaw his publishing company Castle Hill Publishers (CHP), which is located in the UK and puts out the journal *Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung* (*VffG*, Quarterly journal for independent historical research). In 2005, the press published a collection with the title *Vorlesungen über den Holocaust* (Lectures on the Holocaust) in which RUDOLF once again denied the genocide.<sup>90</sup> However, in November the US extradited him to Germany, dealing another serious blow to the community of Holocaust deniers.<sup>91</sup>

**Executive measures** Other executive measures in late 2005 involved the Briton David IRVING, who was arrested in Austria, and the Belgian Siegfried VERBEKE, whom the Dutch authorities handed over to their German counterparts.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>89</sup> Proceedings against ZÜNDEL have been under way at the Mannheim Regional Court since 8 November 2005. The Higher Regional Court in Karlsruhe ruled on 31 March 2006 to bar the defendant's solicitor Sylvia STOLZ from the proceedings.

<sup>90</sup> Germar RUDOLF, *Vorlesungen über den Holocaust. Strittige Fragen im Kreuzverhör* (Lectures on the Holocaust: Controversial issues in cross-examination), Hastings 2005.

<sup>91</sup> RUDOLF is currently serving a sentence of 14 months in the penitentiary in Stuttgart-Stammheim that was originally imposed in 1995 on charges of incitement.

<sup>92</sup> The Vienna Regional Court sentenced IRVING on 20 February 2006 to three years in prison without parole on charges of Holocaust denial. Both the prosecution and the defence appealed the sentence. The proceedings against VERBEKE have not yet started. VERBEKE remains in pre-trial detention.

**Declining  
significance**

In general, the situation for right-wing extremist revisionists has worsened in recent years. This is likely due to increased pressure by the prosecuting authorities, inadequate support from like-minded right-wing extremists, and a shrinking pool from which the next generation of revisionist authors could be recruited.

### VIII. Unaffiliated publishing houses and distributors

In 2005, there were 34 right-wing extremist publishing houses and distributors that were not affiliated with any political party or organisations. These businesses, of widely varying size and significance, mainly distribute books and periodicals to convey their own political convictions, values and a right-wing extremist view of German history. Often, they also sell CDs, DVDs and videocassettes dealing with related topics.

Their publications, some of which they produce themselves, concentrate on portraying the Federal Republic of Germany as a downtrodden society lacking national pride and political autonomy. This line of argument is often combined with the assertion that the official representation of the Third Reich in history is based on falsified historical facts and is the result of re-education by the Allies. Thus some authors denigrate the Federal Republic of Germany as a lackey or vassal of the US.

In this context, they occasionally spread the myth of a global Jewish conspiracy to rule the world and subjugate Germany. And sixty years after the end of World War II, several publications continue to focus on Germany's defeat and liberation from the Nazi regime. Right-wing extremists find it especially important to emphasise war crimes suffered by the Germans; by doing so they hope to relativise Nazi atrocities. Many businesses rely on the sale of calendars, posters and jewellery with folkloric or Germanic-mythological motifs.

#### Nation Europa Verlag

Nation Europa Verlag is especially important in the right-wing extremist publishing world thanks to its journal *Nation & Europa - Deutsche Monatshefte* (Nation & Europe: German monthly), now in its 55th year. With circulation of about 18,000, the journal is one of the most influential media for the right-wing extremist scene. This is all the more significant since the editorial team led by Harald NEUBAUER gave up its neutral stance on party politics in 2005 and now seems to serve increasingly as the mouthpiece of the NPD and its "right-wing popular front". For example, the March issue contained the following comment on the speech by NPD member GANSEL in the parliament of Saxony which relativised the Holocaust (see Section V):

"Thanks to the NPD speaking out in Saxony's *Land* parliament, the spectrum of opinion and positions in the public discourse has been enriched by interesting facets. If there is a historical service which the MPs Holger Apfel and Jürgen Gansel have already rendered with their

remarks on the ‘bombing holocaust’ of Dresden, then it is a democratic one: They have, at least to a certain extent, paved the way for true pluralism and won back a good measure of freedom of opinion for all Germans ...”

(*Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte*, No. 3/2005, pp. 19-20)

In the same vein, the journal printed numerous articles stating that German war victims had been overlooked in favour of Jewish accounts of persecution.

Other articles regularly denigrate the democratic system in the Federal Republic of Germany and representatives of the state. In an article entitled “Party corruption in place of community spirit”, Karl RICHTER, a writer and researcher for the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony, advocated using democratic means to destroy democracy. His cynical attitude towards exercising basic democratic rights of participation is especially obvious in the following statement:

“The democratic parliamentary system has one undisputed advantage: Worn-out, obsolete regimes can be disposed of much faster and usually ‘with less bloodshed’ than in a totalitarian system.”

(*Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte*, No. 2/2005, p. 9)

RICHTER is also an editor for *Nation & Europa*. He was referred to in public as the intellectual force behind the NPD’s “Dresden School” which however has not initiated any apparent activities outside the party.<sup>93</sup>

After the Bundestag elections in September, NEUBAUER wrote about the NPD’s results in glowing terms:

“Now we need to concentrate our forces further ... With a total of about 1,000 activists, there is no way to close up the Republic ... The results in the new *Länder* are encouraging.”

(*Nation & Europa – Deutsche Monatshefte*, No. 10/2005, p. 4)

At the NPD’s extraordinary party congress in Grüna, near Chemnitz, Saxony, on 25 June, NEUBAUER also agreed to be included as an independent candidate on the NPD’s list of candidates in Saxony for the national elections. He also gave speeches at numerous party functions during the year.

Another connection between *Nation & Europa* and the NPD was a regular column by former REP chairman Franz Schönhuber. Until his death in late November, Schönhuber acted as the “adviser on media

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<sup>93</sup> See footnote 15.

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policy” for the NPD party organisation in Saxony and was the party’s top candidate in the Dresden constituency for the national parliamentary elections in 2005.

#### Grabert-Verlag

Books published in 2005 by the Grabert-Verlag and its sister operation Hohenrain-Verlag concentrated on current political events (in 2004, the focus was on anti-American literature). For example, Austrian right-wing extremist Gerhoch REISEGGER published the book *Die Türken kommen!* (The Turks are coming!). Historical revisionism remained a cornerstone of the Grabert-Verlag, which published several works minimising the crimes of the Third Reich, including *Das Tribunal. Der größte Justiz-Skandal der Weltgeschichte* (The tribunal: The biggest justice scandal in world history) by Hans MEISER. In discussing the Nuremberg Trials, the author attempts to relativise the crimes of the Nazi regime by overemphasising the wrongs done to Germans, for example:

“Everything that the Third Reich is rightly accused of was practised by the Allies with even greater perfection and on a scale never before seen.”<sup>94</sup>

In general, the Grabert-Verlag has continued the trend noted in recent years of putting out books with less “hard-core” contents. Obviously right-wing extremist statements remained below the level punishable by law while using codes and stereotypes familiar within right-wing extremist circles.

It is thus all the more surprising that an article in the press’s bi-monthly publication *Euro-Kurier* (Euro courier) portrayed Adolf Hitler as a kind of hero in a fairy tale,

“[who led] the unhappy, impoverished people, who broke the chains of slavery and made sure that everyone could feed himself and his family with the work of his hands and that all could live in peace.”<sup>95</sup>

After glorifying Hitler, the article plays down the Nazi regime and denies Germany’s responsibility for starting World War II. It is not clear whether the article is a one-off or whether it signals a new editorial orientation.

<sup>94</sup> MEISER, Hans: *Das Tribunal. Der größte Justiz-Skandal der Weltgeschichte* (The tribunal: The biggest justice scandal in world history), Tübingen 2005, p. 195.

<sup>95</sup> “Das dreifache Märchenland - Unglaubliches aus sagenhaften Zeiten/Hans im Glück” (Fairy-tale land three times over: Unbelievable things from mythical times/Hans in Luck), in: *Euro-Kurier. Aktuelle Buch- und Verlagsnachrichten* (The latest book and press news), No. 4/2005, Tübingen 2005.

In addition to publishing and distributing books, the Grabert-Verlag also publishes the quarterly journal *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (DGG, Germany past and present).

#### Arndt-Verlag

The Arndt-Verlag press, led by Dietmar MUNIER, published very little again in 2005. With only a few new publications, the press tried to keep up with the public discourse by producing documentary videos, for example about former Bundeswehr general Reinhard Günzel and about a speech by Martin Hohmann, a former member of the Bundestag, which was criticised as anti-Semitic.<sup>96</sup> As well as the press's usual mail-order selection of books, calendars and videos, MUNIER also offers items related to the former German territories of Silesia and East Prussia. The press has also extended its series of large-format photographic collections, *Zeitgeschichte in Bildern/Zeitgeschichte in Farbe* (Recent history in pictures/Recent history in colour); the individual volumes take an uncritical look at supposedly impressive aspects of National Socialism and its alleged achievements.

#### Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik e.V.

With around 500 members, the Gesellschaft für freie Publizistik e.V. (GFP, Society for free journalism, reg'd society) continues to be the largest right-wing extremist cultural association. In 2005, it ended its long-heralded independence of political parties and currents. The replacement of board chairman Rolf KOSIEK by Andreas MOLAU, deputy editor-in-chief of the NPD party organ *Deutsche Stimme* (German voice) and staff member of the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony, moved the GFP closer to the NPD's "right-wing popular front", as did the choice of speakers at its annual convention. The slogan of the convention, held in Bayreuth on 8-10 April, was "60 years since the end of World War II: Liberation from the 'liberation'". Speakers included DVU spokesman Bernd DRÖSE and Holger APFEL, chairman of the NPD parliamentary group in Saxony, whose topic was the "undemocratic treatment of a parliamentary group in the Saxony *Land* parliament".

The GFP's members are predominantly publishers, editors, writers and booksellers. In addition to publishing the 2005 convention proceedings in printed form, the GFP also puts out a quarterly publication called *Das Freie Forum* (The free forum). The

<sup>96</sup> Advertised as "speeches on politics and contemporary history", the video titles are as follows: *M.d.B Martin Hohmann. Der Fall Hohmann. Denkverbote in der BRD* (MP Martin Hohmann: The Hohmann case – Bans on freedom of opinion in the FRG); and *Brigadegeneral a. D. Reinhard Günzel. Armee ohne Rückgrat. Betrachtungen eines Elite-Generals* (Brigadier General (ret.) Reinhard Günzel: Army without a backbone – Observations of an elite general).

organisation's website was completely overhauled under the new board chairman.

**Verlagsgesellschaft  
Berg**

Headed by Dr Gert SUDHOLT, Verlagsgesellschaft Berg mbH was formed by the merger of three independent presses: Druffel, Türmer and Vowinckel. Following the success of its German edition of a book by UK author Martin ALLEN, *The Hitler/Hess Deception* (HarperCollins, 2003; in German as *Churchills Friedensfalle – Das Geheimnis des Heiß-Fluges 1941*), the press translated and published ALLEN's latest book, *Himmler's Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler* (Carroll & Graf, 2006; in German as *Das Himmler-Komplott. Wie der Reichsführer SS den 2. Weltkrieg beenden wollte und warum er von den Briten beseitigt wurde*).

The Druffel-Verlag again attracted large numbers of visitors to its fifth weekend seminar on "experiencing history"; SUDHOLT thus appears to have successfully established the event on the right-wing extremist calendar. Speakers, most of them revisionists, read papers on the topic "From the invasion to capitulation: How Europe surrendered its power in 1945" at the seminar, which was held in Leipzig on 2-4 September.

## **IX. Right-Wing Extremism on the Internet**

### **High level of fluctuation among right-wing extremist websites**

In contrast to other areas of extremism, on the Internet one can find websites affiliated to right-wing organisations as well as websites that are independently operated. The overall number of websites was about 1,000 in 2005, up from 950 in 2004 and 2003. Although this figure seems to indicate a certain stability, in view of the development of right-wing extremist websites, it is representative only to a certain extent: For example, although 290 new right-wing extremist websites were noted, roughly the same number shut down.

Reasons for the often brief lifespans of many websites are likely to include operators' fear of police measures and the shutting down by commercial Internet providers of right-wing extremist websites. And homepages that are often amateurish fail to gain the attention hoped for within the scene, leading their operators to remove them from the Internet after a short time.

### **Special, event-related sites**

Right-wing extremists are increasingly using websites intended to motivate participation in specific campaigns. Such event websites may provide contact telephone numbers where interested persons can find out more about a planned activity, directions for finding the event site, or information about ride-sharing opportunities. Information is usually offered in connection with directions to download, photocopy and distribute flyers available on the website.

Events, especially skinhead concerts, are also advertised via SMS; messages are sent nation-wide via the Internet and without revealing the senders' identity.

### **"Anti-anti-fascist" activities**

Whereas the number of websites related to "anti-anti-fascist" activities dropped in 2004, activists seem to have rediscovered the Internet as a medium. One example was a website of group calling itself Anti-Antifa-Nürnberg, which briefly appeared in early April on the neo-Nazi website Die Kommenden (The coming ones). The website Anti-Antifa - Gegen Lügen & Hetze (Anti-anti-fascism: Against lies & incitement), which focused on coordinating regional "anti-anti-fascist" organisations, was briefly accessible in May. This website published names and addresses of political opponents and left-wing extremist organisations in Berlin, Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Hamburg and Nuremberg (see Section III).

### **Unlawful websites operated anonymously from abroad**

Websites with punishable content (including Nazi symbols and music with inflammatory texts) continue to be operated anonymously from servers located outside Germany, mainly in the US. Right-wing

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extremists take advantage of the fact that in many cases, local laws allow the dissemination of such content. However, the proportion of such websites has decreased slightly.

**Discussion forums  
very popular**

Discussion forums, some of them with several hundred participants, continue to be popular among right-wing extremists. Both the growing number of registered participants and the volume of comments offer evidence that this area of the Internet has become an important channel of communication for right-wing extremists. There is an increasing trend to restrict access to entire forums or specific areas in order to keep out unwanted visitors.

Right-wing extremists also increasingly participate in non-extremist discussion forums, attempting to disrupt them using provocative comments and ultimately to dominate them. For example, in March an anonymous contributor to a largely right-wing extremist discussion forum called on participants to “move out of the ghetto and infiltrate other political forums”. As a target, he mentioned a forum in which he said he had been active for some time and had “stirred up the leftist mob”. He said the point was to take action against the “insolent advocates of multi-culturalism”.

For some time now, right-wing extremists have been sending spam with right-wing extremist contents to a wide variety of recipients.<sup>97</sup> As in June 2004, for example, on 15 May 2005 unknown persons used malicious software to send mass mailings with right-wing extremist content.

**Spam attacks**

The spam messages included xenophobic statements in German and English and links to right-wing extremist websites, such as that of the NPD.

**Websites of political  
opponents hacked  
for the first time**

In 2005, right-wing extremists carried out their threat to attack websites of the political opponents. They successfully hacked the left-wing extremist mail-order site antifa-versand.de and published customers' personal data on the Internet on 5 October. The attack came after left-wing extremists hacked into right-wing extremist discussion forums, publishing comments and personal e-mails of right-wing extremists.

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<sup>97</sup> Spam is the colloquial term for unsolicited bulk e-mail usually used for advertising purposes.

## **Left-Wing Extremist Activities**

### **I. Overview**

#### **1. Left-wing extremist developments**

In 2005, the structures and manifestations of organised left-wing extremism hardly changed compared to those of the previous year. The overall number of supporters and active members dropped slightly, but the dedication and resistance of left-wing extremists still aim at overcoming the prevailing system.

Left-wing extremists use overt activities such as flyers, posters, Internet calls to action and left-wing extremist publications. In addition, some of them engage in a wide range of militant activities. Almost all left-wing extremist crimes (cf. Politically Motivated Crime, Section III, 2) are committed by autonomist groups. A typical form of autonomist violence is the so-called mass militancy including street riots which are triggered during or after demonstrations. In contrast to mass militancy, clandestine militant actions, which may cause much greater damage, are more carefully planned and targeted. They include various forms of damage to property in varying intensities, arson, dangerous disruption of road and rail traffic and numerous crimes during demonstrations.

At the centre of autonomist thinking is the idea of an independent, self-determined life within “areas without rulers”. In 2005, the autonomist scene continued to use violence at specific occasions, in particular in connection with its “anti-fascist struggle”. With their attacks, individual autonomist structures have again crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence. During the period under review, networking efforts could again be noticed.

A key political concern of violent left-wing extremists is the strict rejection of the German nation’s right to exist and hence the struggle to abolish the German state. In recent years, the supporters of this idea, the so-called Anti-Germans, have been better able to take up a well-defined position at various ideological levels and to contribute to a significant polarisation of the left-wing extremist scene. Among left-

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wing extremists, the “anti-German” positions provoked an exceptionally sharp ideological confrontation.

Programmatic statements and the political work of the Linkspartei.PDS provide concrete evidence of left-wing extremist activities according to the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution. In 2005, the party’s activities, its appearance and public image were influenced by the preparations for the federal general elections on 18 September. In this context, the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic socialism) was renamed Die Linkspartei.PDS (The Left Party.PDS) in July. However, this was not the beginning of a new political approach. The party changed its name at the demand of the non-extremist party Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative (WASG, Labour & Social Justice – The Election Alternative) with which the PDS wanted to cooperate for the federal general elections. Openly extremist elements continue to be active within the party on the basis of the party programme and statutes. It also continues to cooperate with left-wing extremists in Germany and abroad.

The Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) maintained its ideological/political orientation, which it has followed for decades. It still describes itself as a revolutionary Marxist party of the working class, which aims at fundamentally overthrowing the capitalist system of power and property. The activities of the party with its predominantly elderly membership focus on “anti-imperialist” work, resistance against cuts in social benefits and the rejection of the EU Constitution.

The Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany) is increasingly influenced by high-Stalinist patterns of thought and action. The party leadership claims total control of the members’ and leading functionaries’ thinking.

Seventeen international Trotskyist umbrella organisations with 21 sections and splinter groups are currently active in Germany. They can be divided into two major types: Ideologically paralysed groups which focus on fighting rival Trotskyist associations remain isolated. On the other hand, active Trotskyist currents seek participation in social protests and get involved with typical left-wing extremist activities.

In particular after the success of right-wing extremist parties in the 2004 state elections, violent left-wing extremists increasingly focused on campaigns and actions which aim at fighting “fascism”. However, the “anti-fascist struggle” or “anti-fascism”, as a traditional focus of

activity and discussion among left-wing extremist groups, is directed only superficially against right-wing extremism: Their ultimate goal is to overthrow the free democratic society.

At the beginning of the year, left-wing extremists with different ideological backgrounds tried to exploit the public dissatisfaction with the labour and social welfare reforms of the German government, and joined the Monday demonstrations in late summer 2004 with their own actions.

In 2005 left-wing extremists continued to support protests against the civil use of nuclear energy. Despite their activism their influence on the anti-nuclear movement, most of whose followers are not extremists, remained minor.

With regard to the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, scheduled for early summer 2007, left-wing extremists took an increasing interest in the anti-globalisation movement. Militant left-wing extremists already expressed their hope that they would again be able to jointly block, protest and sabotage. Left-wing extremists operating covertly attributed responsibility for the first arson attacks to the resistance forming against the G8 meeting.

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## 2. Organisations and following

### Slight decrease in left-wing extremist following

In 2005, the structures and forms of organised left-wing extremism showed little change from 2004. The overall number of supporters and active members dropped slightly.

At the end of 2005, after deducting cases of multiple membership, around 30,600 persons (2004: 30,800) were found to be members of organisations and other associations for which evidence exists that they are pursuing left-wing extremist objectives. This figure also includes supporters of the Kommunistische Plattform der Linkspartei.PDS (KPF, Communist Faction of the Linkspartei.PDS), which is thought to have about 1,000 members.

In late 2005, the spectrum of left-wing extremists prepared to use violence comprised about 5,500 people (2004: about 5,500; mainly organised in anarchist groups); as in the previous year, this included around 5,000 persons who described themselves as autonomists.

The membership of Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist and other revolutionary Marxist associations again declined slightly to 25,400 (2004: 25,700). Some of these are supported by organisations influenced by left-wing extremism. In late 2005, such organisations had a total membership of about 10,500 (2004: about 18,000).

Left-wing extremist following <sup>1</sup>									
	2003			2004			2005		
	Groups	Persons		Groups	Persons		Groups	Persons	
Left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence <sup>2</sup>	55	5,400 <sup>3</sup>		61	5,500 <sup>3</sup>		67	5,500 <sup>3</sup>	
Marxist-Leninists and other revolutionary Marxists <sup>4</sup>									
– Core and subsidiary organisations	49	26,300		49	25,700		43	25,400	
– Organisations influenced by left-wing extremism	33		19,000	30		18,000	19		10,500
<b>Total</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>31,700</b>	<b>19,000</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>31,200</b>	<b>18,000</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>30,900</b>	<b>10,500</b>
<b>After deducting multiple memberships</b>		<b>approx. 31,300</b>	<b>approx. 14,500</b>		<b>approx. 30,800</b>	<b>approx. 13,500</b>		<b>approx. 30,600</b>	<b>approx. 8,500</b>
Die Linkspartei.PDS <sup>5</sup>		approx. 65,800			approx. 61,400				approx. 61,500
<p><sup>1</sup> Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.</p> <p><sup>2</sup> The statistics include not only those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those left-wing extremists presumed, on the basis of pertinent indicators, to be prepared to use violence. Only groups which have established structures and have been active for some time have been included.</p> <p><sup>3</sup> The scene can potentially mobilise an additional several thousand people.</p> <p><sup>4</sup> Including the KPF as well as members of other left-wing extremist groups in the PDS.</p> <p><sup>5</sup> Until its re-naming on 17 July 2005: Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism). The party is listed separately in the table due to its ambivalent status.</p>									

### 3. Publishers, distributors and periodicals

In 2005 about 30 publishers and distributors disseminated newspapers, journals and books with left-wing extremist content. There was no significant change from the previous year in the total number of publications they produced (nearly 220) nor in their volume (about seven million copies).

#### Evidence of left-wing extremist activity at *junge Welt* (jW)

The Berlin-based publishing house 8. Mai GmbH (8 May Ltd.) deserves mention due to its influence. It is majority owned by the Linke Presse Verlagsförderungs- und Beteiligungsgenossenschaft *junge Welt* e.G. The publishing house produces the national daily newspaper *junge Welt* (jW, young world) which offers evidence of left-wing extremist activity. With a circulation of 12,000 it is a significant printed publication in the left-wing extremist camp. Members of the editorial staff and a large proportion of the regular and guest authors belong to the left-wing extremist spectrum. The newspaper adheres to a traditional communist orientation and advocates a socialist society. Reporting and commentary on current political events, articles on policy issues and the selection of topics follow strict ideological, anti-capitalist lines. In this context, the editor-in-chief writes:

“This includes – and here we may draw a comparison to 1989 – the widespread illusion that economic and social problems of capitalism could be solved within capitalism.”

(*junge Welt*, 18 July 2005, p. 8)

There are various indications that articles in *junge Welt* accept the use of violence in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Movements such as the Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel; cf. Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State (excluding Islamism), Section II, 2.2), the Spanish separatist terror organisation ETA<sup>98</sup> and the Colombian terrorist guerrilla organisation FARC-EP (cf. Section III, 1.5) are reinterpreted as “liberation organisations”. The newspaper fails to criticise or distance itself from their acts of violence. This is most obvious in its reporting on terrorist activities in Iraq. In an interview conducted by one of the newspaper’s regular contributors, a functionary of the Iraqi National Foundation Congress (INFC) justifies violence in his country by claiming:

“The Iraqi population must send a signal that the occupying forces are not wanted. ... There are different ways of saying no to occupation.

<sup>98</sup> Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom).

Any form of rejection by the people is legitimate, including the use of armed force.”

(Supplement to *junge Welt*, 19-20 March 2005, p. 2)

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## II. Violent left-wing extremism

In 2005, violent left-wing extremists, especially autonomists, continued to use violence and break laws to enforce their political goals, which affected the internal security in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, they continued to demonstrate conceptual and strategic weakness as in previous years. Nevertheless, they intensively tried to better organise and combine their forces, in particular with regard to the G8 summit which will take place in Heiligendamm, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, in 2007. In their “anti-fascist struggle” militant autonomists continued seeking direct confrontation in the street, including a high level of willingness to use violence and in some cases temporary networking.

The activities of some individual autonomist groupings occasionally crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence. However, Germany has no established terrorist organisations prepared to carry out serious attacks or murders comparable to the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF, Red Army Faction) or the Revolutionäre Zellen (RZ, revolutionary cells).

Structure:	Groups exist in almost all major cities, above all in large conurbations such as Berlin, Hamburg and the Rhine-Main area, the Dresden/Leipzig region, but also in smaller university towns such as Göttingen and Freiburg.
Supporters:	roughly 5,500 (2004: roughly 5,500)
Publications:	more than 50 relevant publications, whereof the Berlin-based <i>INTERIM</i> and a new edition of the underground publication <i>radikal</i> in 2005 are significant at national level.

## 1. Autonomists

### 1.1 Following and self-definition

**Autonomists:  
largest share of left-  
wing extremists with  
a propensity to  
violence**

Autonomists constitute the majority of the left-wing extremist following prepared to use violence. In late 2005, they had a following of up to 5,000 persons.

At the centre of autonomist thinking is “autonomy” – the idea of a free and independent life within “areas without rulers”. Thus autonomists reject any kind of state or social norms. The fight against authorities and wage labour and their refusal to take part in the “capitalist exploitation process” are characteristic. An appeal to “preserve left-wing projects” made in Berlin on 26 March commented on this issue as follows:

“Left-wing spaces are therefore the basis and fundamental structure of our political struggles for emancipation and a better world for everyone. ... We won't beg for our right to have our own space – we will just take it – actively and offensively”. We will fight everywhere over and over again for our spaces as necessary structures for resistance, and we will preserve what we have fought for with might and main. If they take the air we breathe, their air shall burn!”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 613, 24 March 2005, p. 4f.)

The autonomist movement is heterogeneous. It consists of rather small, more or less consolidated and independent groupings all over the country. Hence, it lacks a uniform ideological strategy, leaders and hierarchical structures. There are only isolated attempts to take a firm stand. The autonomists' self-definition is based on anti-capitalist, anti-fascist and anti-sexist concepts. Diffuse fragments of anarchist and communist ideologies (class struggle, revolution or imperialism) form the basis of their often spontaneous activities.

**Aim: to overthrow  
the system**

Like all left-wing extremists, autonomists always strive to overthrow what they see as the “ruling system”.

For example, the organisierte autonomie (oa, organised autonomy) stressed in an interview under the motto “1 May will be hot!”:

“With the demonstration we want to show that we can bring about changes only through a strong and united resistance on behalf of the

class struggle, and that we can put an end to injustice, exploitation and oppression only by overthrowing capitalism.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 614, 21 April 2005, p. 22)

**United in their  
readiness to use  
violence**

Autonomists regard violence – also against persons – as a legitimate way of achieving their goals. They justify violence as a supposedly necessary means of fighting the “organised violence” of a “system of coercion, exploitation and oppression”. They reject the state’s monopoly on power.

In a letter claiming responsibility for setting fire to vehicles of an energy company and Deutsche Bahn AG in Berlin in early February, autonome gruppen (autonomist groups) commented on the significance of militancy within the wide range of left-wing extremist resistance:

“We will continue to interfere using the means we deem appropriate. ... This may be achieved by militant actions, among other things. We would be pleased if more groups would join militant actions or actively carry out their own actions.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 611, 10 February 2005, p. 4)

**Attempts at  
networking**

Overall, the group of those willing to use violence became more diverse. For example, despite general resistance to organisation and hierarchy, various autonomist groups pushed for more structure and networking, on both the regional and national levels.

Their aim is to combine forces and coordinate activities, for example activities against right-wing extremist rallies and facilities or for uncovering right-wing extremist structures. These attempts to strengthen networks go hand in hand with a greater focus on theory to reinforce the ideological foundations of their efforts, and they clearly go beyond those of “traditional” autonomists, which tend to be more spontaneous. For example, an autonomist anti-fascist group from Hanover described its ideas as follows:

“Organisation: We are convinced that firm structures are needed to overthrow the state and capitalism. Only together are we strong because a well-structured organisation is more capable of the political battle. ... We want to establish binding and working organisational structures based on individual abilities and needs. We want to provide the necessary structures to people who want to be politically active. ... We offer various ‘starter options’, one of them being anti-fascism! ... We want class struggle today, tomorrow, until we reach our goal!  
Practice: We want to change this world together with other left-wing groups as part of a broad anti-capitalist, anti-racist and anti-sexist movement. ... We advocate irreconcilable, radical content which we

want to make public in a practical way. ... We choose the actions which are necessary to trigger a process of politicisation and education in society. We seek a classless society. ...

For a social revolution! For communism!"

("A new Star in Hannover!", Manifesto of the group Politik.Organisation.Praxis. [P.O.P., Politics.Organisation.Practice]; published on the Internet, October 2005)

**"Anti-German"  
positions**

Within violent left-wing extremism, positions favouring a strict rejection of the German nation's right to exist and hence the struggle to abolish the German state play a special role. In recent years, the supporters of this ideology, the so-called Anti-Germans, have been better able to take up a well-defined position and to contribute to a significant polarisation among left-wing extremists. The fundamental dispute over the general direction came to the fore in connection with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the intervention of the US and its allies in Iraq.

The Antifaschistischer Frauenblock Leipzig (AFBL, anti-fascist women's block Leipzig) presented the opposing positions in an article entitled "Against Germany", which was published in the journal *Phase 2*:

"In the dispute between anti-German and other left-wing groups, their attitude toward the state we live in and its history and society are the basic difference. ... 'Anti-German' implies a genuine rejection of the German society, which is the basis for political action."

(*Phase 2 - Zeitschrift gegen die Realität* [Phase 2 - Journal against reality], No. 16, June 2005, p. 33)

"Anti-Germans" regard Germans as having an inherent tendency to nationalism automatically leading to the destruction of other ethnic groups. Such "anti-Germans" believe that the Federal Republic has neither overcome its National Socialist past nor adequately dealt with it, but merely suppressed it and is now conjuring up a new edition of the Third Reich under the guise of democracy.

In their view, in order to prevent a new Holocaust, it is absolutely necessary for the German people to dissolve and become part of a multi-cultural society. "Anti-Germans" demand absolute solidarity with the state of Israel and support all measures guaranteeing its existence as a refuge for survivors of the Nazi Holocaust and preserving it from threat. This includes the US-led war against Iraq, which is viewed by more traditional left-wing extremists as imperialist aggression.

Demonstrations by "anti-German" groups typically include

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Israeli, US and British flags and banners and slogans such as “USA – anti-fascism” “Stalingrad ‘43 – Thank you, Red Army!” and “Bomber Harris – do it again!”

“Anti-German” positions provoked serious ideological confrontations among left-wing extremists. These confrontations are often hateful, especially on the relevant Internet websites. In practice, this conflict has already led to the break-up of long-standing associations and even physical attacks at demonstrations and other events.



## 1.2 Forms of action

In addition to “overt” forms of political activity such as flyers, posters, Internet calls to action and left-wing extremist publications, autonomists also resort to a broad range of militant activities. Depending on the situation, they may commit criminal offences such as property damage of all kinds and levels of seriousness, arson and dangerous disruption of road and rail transport, as well as criminal offences at demonstrations.

Such activities are directed against both people and property; targets include police officers and others whom left-wing extremists consider henchmen and profiteers of the system, as well as right-wing extremists and their organisations, training facilities and shops that cater to a right-wing extremist clientele. In this context, it is safe to assume a propensity to violence which may vary depending on the occasion. The editors of the autonomist publication *incipito*, published in Leipzig, openly endorsed the use of violence extending to bodily injury, though they did draw some distinctions:

“What is lacking, in our view, is a sense of violence as a means to an end. The point is to ‘send a message’ which makes it clear that he cannot feel safe precisely because he is a Nazi. In a certain way, this also implies keeping a clear head and knowing when to stop.”  
(*incipito*, No. 16, March 2005, p. 60)

Decisions about the form and target of an action depend largely on the extent to which the motives and intentions behind such action can be communicated to the public. For left-wing extremists who commit criminal offences, it is important that no one they consider “non-participants” is injured. For example, the *militante gruppe* (mg; militant group), which is mainly active in Berlin (see 1.3 below), emphasised:

“In general, it is important to remember that the time, place and general circumstances of militant actions should be precisely specified in order to prevent any counter-productive impact.”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 614, 7 April 2005, p. 20)

With their militant “intervention” in conflicts over controversial public issues, violent left-wing extremists hope to make militancy more popular. But their attempts to gain broader public acceptance remain unsuccessful.

### Street riots

One form of violence typically used by autonomists (and for some of them the most important expression of “militant politics”) is what they call mass militancy: street riots that develop out of or after

demonstrations. Advocates hope to portray militancy as a “normal” strategy of political discourse; their message is that violence should be expected at every demonstration.

Such rioting often breaks out during disruptions of right-wing extremist rallies and is a regular element of May Day demonstrations, particularly in Berlin. Although 1 May 2005 was the most peaceful since the annual rioting started in 1987, there were still violent incidents, some of them serious, following the officially registered demonstrations. Troublemakers threw stones, bottles and fireworks at police officers. A call to action in advance of 1 May provides the scene’s perspective of the rioting:

“Since the legendary 1st of May 1987, Berlin-Kreuzberg has an especially strong tradition of celebrating May Day in an aggressive fashion. On that day, a wild gang of autonomists, immigrants and other neighbourhood residents fought off the police in a street battle that went on for hours ... and collectivised the contents of a variety of supermarkets. Since then, in Berlin-Kreuzberg the 1st of May stands for confrontational critique of existing conditions.

By contrast, the media and politicians like to depict these confrontations as the work of crazy anarchists and hooligans. ... In doing so, of course, they completely hide the fact that the violence on 1 May is caused above all by the police. ... Whoever does not want to be beaten up by the police is just trying to keep them off, using bottles and other utensils.”

(Brochure “Das Ende der Bescheidenheit! Mai-Steine 2005: Aktionstage für sozialen Widerstand” (An end to modesty: May-stones 2005: Campaign for social resistance), April 2005, p. 20 ff.)

**Action against right-wing extremists**

In Göttingen on 29 October, about 700 violent members of the left-wing extremist scene took part in protests attended by up to 5,000 persons opposed to a march by the NPD organisation in Lower Saxony.

The militant protesters, some of whom were masked, came from various *Länder* and operated in small groups obviously working in concert; they built about 50 barricades out of wooden pallets and rubbish skips and set about 18 of them on fire. Anti-NPD protesters damaged three buildings where conservative student associations maintained facilities, among other things by trying to force their way into a building. At the order of the police, the NPD had to alter and shorten the march route due to massive disruptions by members of the autonomist scene. After the march ended, autonomists in the city centre attacked police officers with stones, bottles and sticks; 14 officers and 54 other persons were injured.

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**Clandestine activities**

In contrast to street militancy, clandestine militant actions are much more carefully planned and targeted. Such attacks often border on terrorism (cf. 1.3, below) and are usually followed by letters claiming responsibility and attempting to justify the attacks. Such attacks often occur in connection with topical campaigns and are sometimes coordinated with regard to time and location.

**Attacks in Hamburg**

For example, a series of attacks were carried out in Hamburg early on the morning of 4 March, the day of a demonstration against redevelopment of the Schanzenviertel quarter and remodelling the water tower to house a luxury hotel:

- A golf course shed on the grounds of the Marriott Hotel was set on fire and burned down; property damage amounted to €48,000.
- The home of the supervisory board chairman of the property developer responsible for the hotel project was vandalised. Unknown persons broke a glass panel in the front door and threw white paint into the entry hall; large areas of the house facade and roof over the terrace were also dirtied.

According to a statement claiming responsibility for the act, the perpetrators had hoped to have an impact on the tourism industry in particular, which they said was especially sensitive and which the responsible political figures liked to call the "engine of the growing city of Hamburg". The statement noted that tourism depended on a city's reputation, and nothing was easier to attack and damage than a "good reputation".<sup>99</sup>

**Attacks in Berlin**

A number of attacks were carried out in Berlin, some of them causing extensive property damage, in connection with the forced evacuation of the left-wing residential and political project "Yorckstrasse 59" in the Kreuzberg district on 6 June:

- On 21 May and 2 June, several lorries belonging to a medical supplies company and a removal company were set on fire; some of the lorries were totally destroyed.
- In the early hours of 27 June, unknown persons in several Berlin districts vandalised 15 vehicles owned by six removal companies. They slashed tyres and brake hoses and sabotaged the vehicles' electrical systems.

Statements claiming responsibility threatened those responsible for enforcing the evictions along with others involved, e.g.:

<sup>99</sup> See *INTERIM*, No. 613, 24 March 2005, p. 7.

“to all those who are carrying out the evictions in yorck 59 or who support them in any way (cops, removal companies, property management, property owners ...) we say clearly: leave it alone. we are not joking about this matter and will keep our eye on you.”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 618, 16 June 2005, p. 8)

“The world is not fair and capitalism is crap – that is obvious, but everyone can choose which side to be on. And removal companies that carry out forced evictions ... are on the other side! We view our action ... as a warning to get out of the forced evictions business.”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 620, 14 July 2005, pp. 24-25)

### Media

Autonomists continue to use “proven” methods such as printed publications, information “shops” and meetings.<sup>100</sup> In addition, they take advantage of modern communications technologies such as the Internet and mobile telephony. The possibility of protecting the confidentiality of communications fosters conspiratorial behaviour, increases the ability to manoeuvre and makes it more difficult for security authorities to investigate.

But some segments of the autonomous scene take a more critical view of the use of modern technology. A “conversation” with autonomists printed in *INTERIM* (No. 628 of 22 December) reveals the split within the scene between the desire to use the new technology and the risk that this technology may be used against them: “It’s like with mobile phones, you voluntarily buy your own tracking device, and at the same time it’s useful for organising.” Those quoted in the magazine stressed that modern communications and computers had become essential for organising one’s life. They did not want to give up national electronic mailing lists, web posts or SMS distribution lists which they said helped them stay ahead of the “cops” in the case of spontaneous mobilisation; but, they added, there was also a slight sense of insecurity. It is important, they said, to disseminate information about the risks of technology as broadly as possible, so that people use technology more carefully. In view of possible police measures, they said, one should forgo using such technology for “subversive stuff” and instead act on the principle “Better a typewriter than a computer, or better direct and without a

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<sup>100</sup> Several scene publications, some of which are produced and distributed clandestinely, publish letters claiming responsibility for an attack, position papers, calls to participate in demonstrations, instructions on how to build incendiary and explosive devices, among other things, and other articles relevant to left-wing extremist discourse and praxis. Most of these publications – e.g. *Swing* (Frankfurt/Main), *Zeck* (Hamburg) and *incipito* (Leipzig) – are of mainly regional significance. The biweekly magazine *INTERIM* published in Berlin has a national audience, as does the underground magazine *radikal*, of which one issue appeared in 2005.

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telephone than with a cool code". For "low-level stuff" this is less problematic, they said; practical implementation is ultimately always a question of balance, and making things as difficult as possible for the prosecuting authorities is a good rule of thumb.

### 1.3 Autonomist structures with proto-terrorist elements

#### Difficult to distinguish from terrorism

Organisations have developed within the militant autonomist scene whose attacks have crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence.

#### "No-name" militancy

The members of these small, clandestine groups live a life that looks perfectly normal to the rest of the world. They leave behind few traces that could help the authorities identify them and as a rule sign each of their letters claiming responsibility for an attack with a different name in order to avoid criminal prosecution ("no-name" militancy). However, some groups do operate under the same "brand name" as an expression of continuity, to be recognised and to provide a contact point.

Again in 2005, small groups engaging in terrorist operations committed significant crimes involving sometimes serious property damage:

- Early on the morning of 1 February, unknown persons set fire to a VW van parked on the grounds of the BEWAG electricity utility in Berlin. The vehicle burnt up completely. In two other locations at roughly the same time, vehicles belonging to Deutsche Bahn AG were set on fire; they were also destroyed. Three additional vehicles were damaged by the flames, some of them seriously. A group calling itself autonome gruppen/peng-zong-kollektiv (autonomous groups/peng-zong collective) claimed responsibility, saying that the acts were related to a conference of the Deutsches Atomforum (DAtF, German atomic forum) at the Maritim Hotel in Berlin on 1-2 February, which was attended by representatives of the affected companies:

"Both companies profit from nuclear energy. We are radical leftists who (also) take part in the heterogeneous anti-nuclear resistance. We are nicer than our reputation and we keep moving."  
(*INTERIM*, No. 611, 10 February 2005, p. 4)

- In the early hours of 28 July, unknown persons set fire to a company car used by the managing director of copper producer Norddeutsche Affinerie AG Hamburg and parked in front of his

home in Hollenstedt, Lower Saxony, resulting in property damage of approximately €70,000.

An anonymous letter claiming responsibility stated that the managing director filled several positions that were appropriate for “pointing out and attacking various facets of imperialist rule”. But the attack’s real aim went beyond that:

“Our act ... is also meant as a proposal for a broad and militant campaign for the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, near Rostock, to follow up directly on the protests at Gleneagles.”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 622, 15 September 2005, p. 17)

- Early on the morning of 17 October, unknown persons set fire to a building belonging to the Federal Foreign Office that was being renovated. They used an incendiary device with a time delay to set fire to the building’s wooden facade; the fire spread to the top floor, causing millions of euros’ worth of damage. The group autonome gruppen/militant people (mp) later claimed responsibility for the incident in a statement entitled “No G8 2007 – shake things up!”:

“With this act, we hope to go on the offence against Germany’s new foreign policy, i.e. major power policy in economic and military terms. One of the next stations of German foreign policy will be staging and hosting the G8 summit in Heiligendamm near Rostock. ... We regard our act as being in critical solidarity with the colourful protests against capitalist globalisation.”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 625, 27 October 2005, p. 6)

**The militante gruppe continues series of attacks**

The militante gruppe (mg, militant group) continued to operate under the same “brand name” since 2001, both in position papers and in statements claiming responsibility for attacks. By the end of 2005, it had carried out 14 arson attacks on vehicles and buildings, most of them in the Berlin-Brandenburg area, under this name; three of these occurred during the reporting period:

- Early on the morning of 10 January, the mg set fire to the shell of grocery discounter under construction in the Berlin district of Tempelhof-Schöneberg. Extensive damage to the structure, particularly the wooden framework of the roof, resulted. The group sent a “declaration of attack” to several daily newspapers denouncing at length the discounter’s alleged exploitative labour practices and improper treatment of staff.<sup>101</sup> This incident illustrates how quickly – despite the perpetrators’

<sup>101</sup> See *INTERIM*, No. 612, 24 February 2005, p. 5.

intent not to harm any “non-participants” – human life can be placed at risk: When the fire broke out, a construction worker (apparently unnoticed by the perpetrators) was busy in the roof structure; he happened to notice the fire and was able to escape without injury.

- The mg set fire to three vehicles belonging to the Brandenburg ministry of the environment and consumer protection in Potsdam on 29 April, thus continuing its declared campaign opposing the “attack from above by the socio-technocratic class”, as it described the implementation of the Federal Government’s social welfare reforms (Hartz IV). The attack resulted in damage of more than €100,000.

In a statement claiming responsibility, the group stated belligerently that the militant left needed to focus its resistance on “the responsible power structures made up of capitalist politics, economics and science”.<sup>102</sup>

- In the early hours of 9 November, the group carried out an arson attack against the office building of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in the Steglitz district of Berlin.<sup>103</sup> Incendiary devices with a time delay were left in front of two ground-floor windows, causing damage to the facade and the structure.

The mg explained the attack by referring to the DIW’s role as “prompter” for the policy-makers. According to the mg, the reforms directed against the “declassed and marginalised sectors of society” are proposed by institutes like the DIW and often put into practice without further amendment. This makes them an “institutional part of the organised class attack from above”, the mg stated, and thus top-priority targets for militant interventions.

#### **Militancy debate**

At the same time, the mg continued its efforts to create a network of militant groups and to carry on a “militancy debate” over the legitimacy of more drastic forms of action beyond mere property damage; again in 2005, however, these efforts produced no noticeable response.

For example, a 20-page text entitled “(Urban) guerrilla or militia?” which dealt with the issue of “reappraising history” appeared early in the year. Along with a lengthy discourse on theoretical and practical aspects of the history of various models of guerrilla activity, the paper contains a clearly formulated goal:

<sup>102</sup> See *INTERIM*, No. 616, 19 May 2005, p. 16.

<sup>103</sup> The group had already carried out an arson attack on the building in the early morning of 1 January 2004.

“Whether we want to or not, we cannot avoid a (new) concentration on clandestine politics, one that goes to the very marrow of our bones. ... History shows that one cannot lead the struggle for communism with a snap of the fingers nor with persuasive words.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 608, 23 December 2004, pp. 18-19 and No. 609, 13 January 2005, p. 22 ff.)

There is still no indication that the debate is making rapid progress, with possible practical implications.

**New issue of underground magazine *radikal* published**

As in 2004, a new issue of the underground publication *radikal* (“Episode 158, summer 2005”) appeared, again in the service of the militancy debate. In their foreword, the editors of the insider magazine, which is produced and distributed in conspiratorial fashion, took a coquettish tone:

“More than a year ago we announced our return. ... The mere fact of our existence constitutes a revolt against the ever-tightening controls on communication. But we will continue to slip through the net and provide a forum for debates and calls to action which are almost impossible to conduct or place anywhere else.”

(*radikal*, No. 158, Summer 2005, p. 3)

**Interview with the mg**

In addition to articles – including modified instructions for building an incendiary device called a “luxury car killer” – the 60-page publication contains a “written interview” with the mg entitled “We are ready for the long haul”. The *radikal* editorial team said that the interview was intended to “give a little boost to the discussion over the outlook for militant organising”.

## **2. Traditional anarchists**

In Germany, classic anarchist concepts are represented mainly by groupings from the Graswurzelbewegung (grass-roots movement) and the anarcho-syndicalist Freie Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter Union (FAU, Free Workers Union), which is the German section of the Internationale Arbeiter Assoziation (IAA, International Workers Association).

**“Grass-roots movement”**

The roughly 200 members of the Graswurzelbewegung are organised in numerous action groups, training collectives and other circles; in line with the idea of grass-roots action, which originated in the English-speaking countries, they want to use “power from below” to do away with all forms of “violence and control”. They hope to “replace

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hierarchy and capitalism with a self-organised, socialist economic order, and the state with a federalist, grass-roots democratic society.”<sup>104</sup>

They practice civil disobedience, including the conscious violation of rules. They also consider “non-violent resistance”, including property damage but not violence against persons, to be legitimate.

Again in 2005, followers of the *Graswurzelbewegung* supported protests against nuclear transports, for example with sit-ins. In their publication *Graswurzelrevolution* (grass-roots revolution), they urged “anti-militaristic” and “anti-racist” action.

#### FAU-IAA

The FAU-IAA (still numbering about 300 members) is striving for a “society without rulers based on self-organisation and self-administration”.<sup>105</sup> Its efforts concentrate on the “anti-capitalist struggle” in factories and trade unions against the oppression and exploitation of the working class by means of varied mechanisms of power. In order to achieve its aims, the FAU-IAA favours “direct action” such as sit-ins, boycotts and strikes.

The anarcho-syndicalists again focused on “anti-militarism” and the campaign against the government’s social welfare reforms. In early 2005, FAU-IAA members took part in protests against new legislation on unemployment and welfare benefits (known as the Hartz IV laws) in front of and inside public employment agencies. A follow-up published on the Internet called on supporters to “organise councils, syndicates and collectives!”

Anarcho-syndicalists traditionally use the 1 May holiday to protest against the state and the social order; for example, in a May Day speech that was later published on the Internet, the FAU-IAA’s chapter in Frankfurt (Main) stressed:

“Class struggle from above? It’s high time to attack the privileges of the propertied class and their monopoly on a worry-free future! The burgeoning resistance in recent years was correct and significant. Now it is important to step up this resistance and expand its base. ... Capital is well-organised; let us answer by becoming organised ourselves and building revolutionary trade unions! ... Let us fight for a self-organised, classless society without a state.”

<sup>104</sup> Definition of a grass-roots revolution in the publication *Graswurzelrevolution* (grass-roots revolution), No. 300, June 2005, among others.

<sup>105</sup> Printed in every issue of the anarcho-syndicalist publication *Direkte Aktion* (Direct action) under the heading “What does the FAU want?”

### III. Political parties and other groups

#### 1. Die Linkspartei.PDS (The Left Party.PDS)

Founded:	1989/90: name changed from Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) to Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism); 2005: name changed to Die Linkspartei.PDS
Headquarters:	Berlin
Chairman:	Lothar BISKY
Membership:	61,500 (2004: 61,400), of which 6,057 in the western <i>Länder</i> (2004: 4,320)
Publications: (selection)	<i>DISPUT</i> (Dispute), monthly; <i>DIE LINKE.PDS-Pressedienst</i> (THE LEFT.PDS Press Service), weekly; <i>Mitteilungen der Kommunistischen Plattform der Linkspartei.PDS</i> (Bulletin of the Communist Platform of the Left Party.PDS), monthly; <i>Marxistisches Forum</i> (Marxist Forum), at irregular intervals; <i>PDS International</i> , at irregular intervals

#### Concrete evidence points to left-wing extremist activity

Statements contained in the Left Party.PDS party programme and the party's political practice serve as concrete evidence of left-wing extremist activity as defined by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*, BVerfSchG).

The party's activities, its orientation and the way it presents itself to the public were greatly influenced by preparations for its participation in the early federal elections on 18 September, in which it co-operated with the non-extremist party Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die

Wahlalternative (WASG, Election Alternative for Work and Social Justice).

In July the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism) changed its name to Die Linkspartei.PDS (The Left Party.PDS). However, this did not lead to a change in the party's politics; the programme adopted in October 2003 is still current. According to this party programme the party's goal is to establish a socialist system which reaches beyond the limits of existing society. As provided for in the programme and statutes, openly extremist elements are still active within the party. The Left Party.PDS also continues to co-operate with left-wing extremists in Germany and abroad.

## 1.1 General developments

### Renaming

At its extraordinary party conference in Berlin on 17 June the PDS voted with a clear majority to change its name to Die Linkspartei (The Left Party). At national level and in most regional associations 'PDS' is added to the name (Die Linkspartei.PDS, The Left Party.PDS). The short form is Die Linke.PDS (The Left.PDS). This renaming meant the PDS fulfilled one of the conditions stipulated by the WASG for the two parties to co-operate during the federal elections held on 18 September. In June the two party executives had agreed to launch a new project over the coming two years comprising the left-wing parties in Germany. According to a "co-operation agreement" which was adopted at the party conference in Dresden on 10/11 December, the planned merger with the WASG is to take place by 30 June 2007.

Party members were afraid the name change would mean giving up "the PDS's critical attitude towards society" and that in future its ideas could stop "where capitalism ends". Leading functionaries responded to these fears by promising that:

"It was the PDS ... that put the idea of a free, socialist society on its agenda, in defiance of all the prophesies of doom which claimed that socialism was well and truly dead. And that agenda - in its entirety - belongs in such a left-wing alliance and must form the basis of any future left-wing party."

(*PDS-Pressdienst* (PDS Press Service), No. 28, 15 July 2005, p. 7)

"We are - and will remain - democratic socialists. Over the past 15 years we have worked on developing a clear, political profile. ... We

will not give up our aims and objectives, which reach beyond capitalism."

(*DIE LINKE.PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 30/05, no date, p. 9)

In June their deputy chairwoman, Katja KIPPING, stressed the importance of the goal of socialism:

"For me - and the PDS - the socialist nature of the party is not up for discussion. But since we are aware of these concerns, we have agreed that despite renaming the party we want to lay down in our statutes that socialism is our foremost objective."

(*Neues Deutschland* (New Germany), 25/26 June 2005, p. 6)

### Overthrowing the system

The goal of the Left Party.PDS is still to establish a socialist system which reaches beyond existing social structures. The definition of this socialist goal as set out in the 2003 programme is borrowed from the Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. One member of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation), which has close links to the party, declared that:

"The Left Party.PDS's understanding is that democratic socialism is a transformational project which begins with existing conditions and reaches beyond the limits of capitalism in the long term. The goal is to establish a society 'in which the free development of each has become the condition for the free development of all.' (Footnote: Taken from the Left Party.PDS programme following the Marx/Engels manifesto.)"

(*Die Linkspartei - Ursprünge, Ziele, Erwartungen* (Left Party - Origins, Goals, Expectations), in the series: Texts/Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Vol. 23, Michael BRIE (ed.), 2005, p. 40)

The "co-operation agreement" with the WASG also declares that its goal is a "society in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all". Left Party.PDS party programmes always quote a shortened version of this goal. Party members schooled in classic Marxism are aware of the reference, i.e. that a revolution is the precondition for the society it is striving to establish:

"However, the precondition for such a society is not explicitly named, which ... in the Manifesto comes before the sentence quoted above, namely when the proletariat has made itself the ruling class following a revolution and the old production relations have been abolished."

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(*Opp!* - Die Zeitung des PDS-Landesverbandes Sachsen (Opp! - Newspaper of the PDS Saxony Regional Association, No. 1-2, January/February 2005, p. 5)

**Attitude to  
parliamentarianism**

Despite participating in governments and parliaments, the Left Party.PDS continues to have an ambivalent attitude to parliamentarianism. This is evident in its political strategy, which it calls a "strategic triangle", comprising parliamentary resistance, extra-parliamentary resistance and the visionary development of the society of the future.<sup>106</sup>

In July the party's deputy chairwoman, Katja KIPPING, underlined the particular relevance of the extra-parliamentary struggle when she declared that the party stood for "politics which was based on the interplay between extra-parliamentary and parliamentary powers, the combination of work within the party and pressure from the street".<sup>107</sup>

**Strategy and tactics**

The Left Party.PDS is endeavouring to change the intellectual and political climate in Germany, to establish a "counter-hegemony" and thereby to fundamentally call neoliberalism into question by means of social protest and parliamentary work. According to a functionary who played a key role in drafting the party's programme, the strategy and politics of a left-wing party of the future must be based on criticism of capitalism and on democratic socialism, which is clearly delimited from social democracy:

"The struggle for a more left-wing social democracy does not do justice to the social responsibility of a new left-wing party and its ability to provide a vision for the future. ... In times in which the left wing, which is critical of capitalism, is almost catastrophically on the defensive both politically and intellectually and issues of power and property are practically taboo, we need to go on the offensive with them again ..."

(*Neues Deutschland*, 20/21 August 2005, p. 22)

**Large proportion of  
former SED  
members**

According to leading party functionaries, the proportion of members who had belonged to the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) in the GDR is still between 70 and 80%.<sup>108</sup> The decline in membership noted over many years

<sup>106</sup> *PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 20/2005, 20 May 2005, p. 12.

<sup>107</sup> *DIE LINKE.PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 29/05, no date, p. 1.

<sup>108</sup> Lothar BISKY, *So viele Träume - Mein Leben* (So Many Dreams - My Life), March 2005, p. 262. (In his book BISKY starts from the assumption that the PDS has a total of around 63,000 members. Approximately 18,000 members were, he says, never in the SED. Thus, more than 70% are former SED

continues. In late 2004 the party had more than 61,567 members (late 2003: 65,753). Membership has thus declined by more than half over the past ten years. Above all, this decline is due to the very high average age of party members. The party is stepping up its activities to recruit new members.

## 1.2 Openly extremist structures in the party

The party programme and statutes of the Left Party.PDS state that openly extremist groups may be politically active within the party. This is described as "pluralism", which the party claims must be preserved. The party's chairman, Lothar BISKY, supports this principle of pluralism:

"I was and am a proponent of this principle ... it applies to all in this party or to none."

(*PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 22, 3 June 2005, p. 4)

Openly extremist groups are still represented on important committees within the party. In addition, they send delegates to party conferences according to a predetermined key and receive financial support in accordance with the Left Party.PDS financial plans.<sup>109</sup>

In particular, the Kommunistische Plattform der Linkspartei.PDS (KPF, Communist Platform of the Left Party.PDS), the Marxistische Forum der PDS (MF, Marxist Forum of the PDS), the Geraer Dialog/Sozialistischer Dialog (GD/SD, Gera Dialogue/Socialist Dialogue), the Forum Kommunistischer Arbeitsgemeinschaften (Forum of Communist Workers' Associations, formerly the Bund Westdeutscher Kommunisten (BWK, Alliance of West German Communists)) and - at least in two *Länder* - the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Junger GenossInnen in und bei der PDS (AGJG, Working Group of Young Comrades in and with the PDS) are active within the party. These dogmatic groups repeatedly stressed their wish to work together more closely.<sup>110</sup>

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members.); Gregor GYSI, *Stern*, 30 June 2005, p. 40 ("More than 20% of our members were not in the SED.").

<sup>109</sup> *DISPUT* (Dispute), No. 4/2005, April 2005, p. 26 et seq.

<sup>110</sup> Resolution adopted at the 4th session of the 12th national conference of the KPF, *DIE LINKE.PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 41/05, 14 October 2005, p. 12; *Bulletin des GD/SD* (Bulletin of the GD/SD), 2/July 2005, p. 5.

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**Kommunistische Plattform der Linkspartei.PDS (KPF, Communist Platform of the Left Party.PDS)**

The KPF remains committed to the Marxist/Leninist tradition and continues its struggle to overthrow capitalism with the aim of establishing a socialist system. Its national speakers' council stressed that:

"We are one of those groups who have the fixed idea that the PDS is an anti-capitalist opposition group oriented to the goal of socialism. And that is as it should be ... It is especially for those reasons that capitalism is not the last word in history. Anti-capitalist criticism of the system is an indispensable prerequisite for overcoming capitalism in the end."

(*Mitteilungen der KPF* (Bulletin of the KPF), No. 2/2005, February 2005, p. 10, p. 14)

The KPF is still convinced that the attempt to establish socialism on German soil was historically legitimate:

"... Even today we reiterate our position that the most imperfect form of socialism was worth more than a capitalism which claims to be the victor in history."

(*Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 11/2005, November 2005, p. 5, p. 11, p. 14)

One member of the KPF's national co-ordination council emphasised that the transition to socialism was linked to fundamental qualitative (i.e. revolutionary) changes:

"The birth of a socialist order is associated with the transition from private/capitalist ownership of the means of production to ownership by society. And that transition cannot occur all by itself. Likewise it is impossible to consciously undergo such change if the foundations of capitalism still exist. ... The goal of a socialist party is to put an end to the exploitation of people ... by overthrowing the capitalist social order."

(*Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 1/2005, January 2005, p. 19 et seq.)

The KPF is still represented on important committees in the Left Party.PDS. For example, Sahra WAGENKNECHT, a member of the KPF's national co-ordination council, is still both a member of the national executive and a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the Left Party.PDS. In June she stressed that:

"The PDS sees itself as an anti-capitalist party with a socialist vision. ... That is why I am convinced that ... to uphold the identity of the PDS

we need to hold firm to the socialist goal, the anti-capitalist basic orientation ..."

(*Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 7/2005, July 2005, p. 1)

**Marxistisches Forum der PDS (MF, Marxist Forum of the PDS)**

The MF is a group of orthodox communist members and supporters of the Left Party.PDS. The national MF has around 60 members; its headquarters are in Berlin. As well as the national MF there is also the Marxistisches Forum Sachsen (Marxist Forum of Saxony), an independent state-wide working group associated with the Saxony regional association. In July one MF member, who is also chairman of the Marxist Forum of Saxony, expressed his fundamental rejection of the Basic Law (Germany's constitution):

"According to the Marxist view, constitutions are the result of class struggles or even of revolutions. ... Generally speaking, and as is the case with the Basic Law drawn up in Bonn, they constitute ceasefire lines and mark the boundaries of the fighting classes ... the struggle ... for fundamental social and socio-economic changes can be fought 'on the basis of the Basic Law'. Naturally, the Marxist left wing also has to want to change that very basis."

(*Geschichtskorrespondenz* (Historical Correspondence), July 2005, posted on the Internet)

Another member of the Marxist Forum of Saxony declared that he was in favour of a renewed attempt at setting up a socialist system and at a Marxist analysis of why socialism failed in Europe:

"The main concern of a Marxist-oriented analysis of the causes is naturally to arm ourselves for the next attempt at establishing socialism. Such an analysis is indispensable for what will initially be a theoretical kick-start for socialism and for programmatic and political reflections of a Marxist-Leninist party ..."

(*Marxistisches Forum*, No. 49, January 2005, p. 7)

**Geraer Dialog/ Sozialistischer Dialog (GD/SD, Gera Dialogue/Socialist Dialogue)**

The GD/SD arose in reaction to the intense, fundamental disagreements at the party conference in Gera in October 2002. Since then, the group has been a collecting point for extremist elements within the Left Party.PDS. For example, representatives of other extremist groups (e.g. the KPF and the MF) are part of its executive bodies (national speakers' council and national co-ordination council). The goal of the GD/SD is a socialist/anti-capitalist renewal of the party. In reference to its goals and co-operation with other extremist groups within the Left Party.PDS, two members of the national speakers' council stated that:

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"Together with the KPF and the MF and many critical comrades at the grass-roots we will continue to fight to uphold the name PDS and thus to uphold the socialist goals in order to change society, to uphold our anti-fascist traditions and actively pursue an anti-imperialist, anti-war policy."

(*Bulletin des GD/SD*, 2/July 2005, p. 5)

The GD/SD has representatives in important bodies in the party. For example, Dorothee MENZNER, a member of the GD/SD national speakers' council, is also a member of the national executive of the Left Party.PDS. In the federal elections on 18 September she was listed number two on the Left Party.PDS's regional list of parliamentary candidates for Lower Saxony and won a seat in the Bundestag.

At their general meeting on 10 January, delegates rejected a motion to dissolve the GD/SD. The five leading members of the national speakers' council and national co-ordination council who proposed the motion subsequently announced they were resigning from the group, but not from the party. In their opinion, the GD/SD was increasingly lacking in sufficient members to form an independent movement with a socialist vision within the party. Only 10% of delegates were willing to oppose the party leadership's political and programmatic goals at party conferences, they said.

**Youth organisation  
[`solid]**

The name of the youth organisation [``solid], which is associated with the party, is an acronym of the German words for socialist, left-wing and democratic.<sup>111</sup> According to the Left Party.PDS, [``solid] has more than 1,500 members spread across all 16 *Länder*.<sup>112</sup> However, the actual membership can only be around 800. According to the Left Party.PDS annual financial plan, [``solid] receives € 70,000 in funding.<sup>113</sup> The national speakers' council emphasised its will to change the system:

"Among the many ideas that we have in common with the PDS, the socialist aims and objectives are a decisive aspect in our co-operation, which is characterised by solidarity and, where necessary, by criticism. That is why the vision of overthrowing capitalism - the main reason for the deplorable state of society - cannot be sacrificed at the altar of co-operation."

<sup>111</sup> According to Section 1 para. 2 of the statutes, [``solid] is officially associated with the PDS. "It is legally independent from a party as defined in the Basic Law."

<sup>112</sup> *PDS-Pressdienst*, No. 11/2005, 18 March 2005, p. 4.

<sup>113</sup> *DISPUT*, No. 4/2005, April 2005, p. 26.

(*PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 26/2005, 1 July 2005, p. 7)

In May [redacted] posted articles on the Internet dealing with basic issues concerning an analysis and criticism of capitalism. They were entitled "You won't see the revolution on TV!". Based on texts taken from various communist theorists, including Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Rosa Luxemburg, the organisation analysed the way capitalism functions and the need for a critique of capitalism. According to the authors, insights into how a capitalist economy works can be used to draw important conclusions about how capitalism can be overthrown and how sensible revolutionary strategies can be developed.

[redacted] maintains contacts to other left-wing extremist youth organisations in Germany and abroad. In August a delegation of 25 [redacted] members travelled to the 16th World Festival of Youth and Students in Caracas, Venezuela,<sup>114</sup> where they met with members of the French communist youth organisation Jeunes Communistes (Young Communists). The German participants also included representatives of the Assoziation Marxistischer StudentInnen (AMS, Association of Marxist Students), the Deutsche Kommunistischen Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and the Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend (SDAJ, Socialist German Workers' Youth).

[redacted] also took part in a conference organised by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, which has close links with the party. The motto of the conference held in Berlin on 15 October was "The time will come ... for a left-wing youth movement!?" The conference discussed ways in which left-wing youth organisations could work together. The approximately 230 participants included representatives of the SDAJ, the Antifaschistische Linke Berlin (ALB, Anti-fascist Left-Wing in Berlin), the Trotskyist groups Linksruck and the Sozialistische Alternative (SAV, Socialist Alternative), and the Turkish youth organisation DIDF.<sup>115</sup> At the conference agreement was in particular reached on joint activities to be held in protest against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in 2007.

**The party's own youth organisations**

The party still has its own youth organisation in Berlin/Brandenburg and in Saxony. In contrast to [redacted], which is associated with the party, these are seen as "part of" the party. They explicitly identify with its goals and objectives, and hope to be able to form cadres for the

<sup>114</sup> *DISPUT*, September 2005, p. 50.

<sup>115</sup> Föderation der demokratischen Arbeitervereine e. V. (Federation of Democratic Workers Associations, reg'd society), cf. Section III: Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State (excluding Islamism).

party, whose members are ageing.

### 1.3 Participation in elections

#### **Land parliamentary elections**

In the elections to the Schleswig-Holstein parliament, the PDS won 0.8% of the second votes (11,392 votes; 2000: 1.4%, 20,666 votes). In the elections to the North Rhine-Westphalian parliament the party won 0.9% of the second votes (72,989 votes; 2000: 1.1 %, 79,934 votes). The PDS thus again failed to come close to entering a *Land* parliament in western Germany.

#### **Federal parliamentary elections**

The Left Party.PDS took part in the federal elections in all 16 *Länder*. Their open regional lists contained the names of 302 candidates, including members of the non-extremist WASG and representatives of extremist parties and organisations, for example the DKP, the Trotskyist groups Sozialistische Alternative (SAV, Socialist Alternative) and Linksruck. The Left Party.PDS won 8.7% of the second votes (4,118,194 votes), more than doubling its result in comparison to the 2002 federal elections (4.0%, 1,916,702 votes). The proportion of second votes it won increased in the eastern *Länder* (incl. East Berlin) to 25.4% (2002: 16.9%), and in western *Länder* (incl. West Berlin) to 4.9% (2002: 1.1%). In Berlin it won three directly elected seats. Prior to the election, only two MPs, Petra PAU and Gesine LÖTZSCH, had been represented in the parliament after winning directly elected seats. This time the party took 54 seats in the Bundestag, which was sufficient to form its own parliamentary group.

### 1.4 Co-operation with German left-wing extremists outside the party

#### **Relations with the DKP**

On account of their common traditions, the Left Party.PDS's relations with the DKP are still characterised by criticism as well as solidarity. These relations take various forms, ranging from taking part in party conferences, to holding meetings, to standing for election on joint, open lists. For example, a dozen DKP members stood for election on the Left Party.PDS's open regional lists for the federal elections on 18 September. In return, the DKP did not nominate any of its own candidates<sup>116</sup> but called on supporters to vote for the Left Party.PDS.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> *junge Welt* (Young World), 7 June 2005, p. 1.

<sup>117</sup> Supplement to the DKP's central organ, *Unsere Zeit* (UZ, Our Time ), 26 August 2005, p. 3.

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Other co-operation between the two parties in particular took place at local and regional level and often through communist elements in the Left Party.PDS - particularly those in the KPF. For example, a member of the KPF national speakers' council spoke at the DKP's 17th party conference in Dortmund on 12/13 February<sup>118</sup> and a member of the DKP party leadership made a speech at the 3rd session of the 12th national conference of the KPF in Weimar on 12 March.<sup>119</sup> The 4th session of the 12th national conference of the KPF in Berlin on 9 October voted to step up its co-operation with the DKP.<sup>120</sup>

**Relations with autonomists and attitude to violence**

Some representatives, organisations and structures within the Left Party.PDS continue to co-operate in alliances with left-wing extremists who are prepared to use violence. They showed understanding for the " manifold activities " of autonomous groups in their anti-fascist struggle. For example, a large number of Left Party.PDS members took part in activities against an NPD march in Göttingen on 29 October, during which there were violent clashes (cf. Section IV, 1). On the Internet the local council group and the district association of the Left Party.PDS praised the " tremendous success of the broad-based anti-fascist alliance ".

On 28 September groups within the Left Party.PDS, including the Hamburg regional association, a few functionaries in the party and the youth organisation [ `solid ], plus numerous autonomous and anti-fascist groups signed a call for solidarity with members of the Autonomer Zusammenschluss Magdeburg (Autonomous Alliance of Magdeburg), whom Naumburg/Saale Higher Regional Court had charged with membership of a terrorist organisation and several counts of arson.<sup>121</sup> The call played down the group's deeds and complained about the criminalisation of anti-fascist youths, who would be given long prison sentences on account of their purported " terrorist acts ", which they claimed were limited to minor damage to property.

<sup>118</sup> UZ, 18 February 2005, p. 1.

<sup>119</sup> *Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 4/2005, April 2005, p. 24 et seq.

<sup>120</sup> *DIE LINKE.PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 41/05, 14 October 2005, p. 12.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. footnote 155.

## 1.5 International links

The Left Party.PDS is openly committed to internationalism. It continues to maintain a variety of contacts with communist parties abroad, for instance by sending delegates to their party conferences, attending conferences and taking part in bilateral meetings and visiting press festivals organised by party newspapers.

### European co-operation

The Left Party.PDS is a member of the Party of the European Left (EL) founded in Rome in May 2004. This alliance of 17 parties from 15 countries brings together a range of parties which vary considerably in terms of politics and organisational structures, although they have long co-operated closely on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The EL comprises "traditional communists, left-wing socialists, red-greens, left-wingers from Western, Central and Eastern Europe, parties in government and those in opposition".<sup>122</sup> The full members include the communist parties of Belgium, France, Austria, San Marino, Spain and the Communist Refoundation Party (PRC) from Italy. Nine parties have "observer status", including the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia from the Czech Republic, the Party of Italian Communists, the Communist Party of Slovakia, the Communist Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) from Cyprus and - since 10 January - the DKP.

The first conference of the EL took place in Athens on 29/30 October. With the resolution "Yes, we can change EUROPE!", member parties signalled that they wanted to reach agreement on a common European policy. The following is taken from the resolution which was later posted on the Internet:

"On the world political stage, Europe and the European Union in its current form are for us the minimal framework within which we want to pursue our politics as an expression of the class struggle. ... What is really new at the beginning of this millennium is that new movements are being born and that they are able to join forces and work together. ... The task of a European left wing must be to understand the nature of these new movements and to be prepared to use the resources they produce. ... At the same time ... - the dramatic consequences of capitalist globalisation are becoming apparent to all peoples. These two developments have put the transformation of

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<sup>122</sup> *DISPUT*, October 2005, p. 24.

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capitalist society back on the agenda. ... The alternative between 'socialism or barbarism' is again the issue of the day."

The EL has 17 MEPs in the European Parliament. They are part of the Confederated Group of the United European Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), which is currently made up of 41 MEPs from 14 countries, including representatives from the communist parties of Italy, Portugal, Greece and the Czech Republic. The Left Party.PDS has seven MEPs and is thus the strongest group within the GUE/NGL.

The Left Party.PDS is also part of the New European Forum of the Left (NELF), an association of 18 communist, leftist-socialist and leftist-environmental parties and organisations from 16 European countries. It includes the Left Party.PDS as the only German member organisation, as well as the communist parties of France, Portugal, Austria and two communist parties from Italy.

#### **Solidarity with socialism in Cuba**

The Left Party.PDS sets particular store by its solidarity with Cuba. For example, the party executive agreed to send an official and representative delegation to Cuba from 20 to 27 November:

"Our political task takes on concrete shape in our going to Cuba and it sends a political signal as regards the PDS's solidarity with the Cuban revolution ... Once we have analysed the visit after the delegation returns, we will draw conclusions and make suggestions regarding further co-operation and solidarity with the Communist Party of Cuba." (Resolution by the party executive of 23 May 2005, in: *PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 23, 10 June 2005, p. 8)

By its own accounts, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Cuba Sí beim Parteivorstand der PDS (Working Group 'Cuba Si' of the Party Executive of the PDS), which was founded in 1991, has 39 regional groups and is a key element in this solidarity work. It continues to collect donations of money and goods for humanitarian purposes and together with the KPF took part in the project "Computers for Cuba".<sup>123</sup>

#### **Solidarity with Kurdistan**

For years the Left Party.PDS - both individual representatives and party organisations - has taken up the concerns of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party), which has been banned from all activity in Germany, and those of its successor

organisations, KADEK (the Kurdish Congress for Freedom and

<sup>123</sup> Cf. also *DIE LINKE.PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 41/05, 14 October 2005, p. 12.

Democracy) and Kongra Gel (the Kurdistan People's Party) (cf. Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State (excluding Islamism), Section II, 2.2), in order to provide political support. In late March/early April, for example, a delegation from Hamburg comprising several PDS members travelled to Turkey to observe the Kurdish Nevroz (New Year) festivities on behalf of the PDS executive.<sup>124</sup> For Kurds the Nevroz festivities are inextricably linked to their long fight for freedom and peace and their struggle against political, social and cultural oppression.

**Colombian  
FARC-EP**

The Left Party.PDS gave the Colombian terrorist guerrilla movement Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army)<sup>125</sup> a platform for its political agitation. *DISPUT*, a magazine for Left Party.PDS members,<sup>126</sup> published an interview with the chairman of the Secretariat and head of the International Commission of the FARC-EP on the current situation in Colombia and the "goals of the FARC against the national oligarchy". He also declared that the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia had for more than 40 years been making use of the "right to revolt" and were fighting to establish a new Colombia.

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<sup>124</sup> *Landesinfo Hamburg, Rundbrief für Mitglieder und SympathisantInnen des PDS-Landesverbandes Hamburg* (Information for Hamburg, Circular for Members and Supporters of the PDS Hamburg Regional Association), No. 2, 20 April 2005, p. 12 et seq.

<sup>125</sup> The FARC-EP was founded in Colombia in 1966. With approximately 20,000 fighters it is currently the largest and most active guerrilla organisation in Latin America. Its politics are based on Marxism-Leninism and its objective is the revolutionary overthrow of the social system in Colombia. To achieve its goals its military units are fighting the country's armed and security forces. In the past it has been responsible for bombings and assassinations which have claimed numerous lives in Colombia. It has kidnapped Colombian and foreign civilians - including German nationals - and members of the Colombian apparatus of state and government. The FARC-EP has been put on the EU's list of terrorist organisations.

<sup>126</sup> *DISPUT*, No. 4/2005, April 2005, p. 35.

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## 2. Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and associated groups

### 2.1 Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party)

Founded:	1919 (as the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD, Communist Party of Germany)); called DKP since 1968
Headquarters:	Essen
Chairman:	Heinz STEHR
Membership:	Less than 4,500 (2004: around 4,500)
Publications:	<i>Unsere Zeit (UZ, Our Time)</i> , Circulation: Around 6,300 (2004: 7,500), weekly

#### Continued revolutionary orientation

The DKP reaffirmed that its long-standing ideological/political orientation still holds. A paper which served as the basis for a discussion on the party's future programme described the party as the "revolutionary, Marxist party of the working class" which "is striving to bring about a fundamental change in the capitalist relations of property and power". It claimed to base its politics "on the theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin and on the works of other Marxists" and to link "efforts to educate and provide political instruction and to propagate its goals as closely as possible with actively supporting and promoting practical activities". The DKP says that its "unalterable goal" is socialism. To achieve that goal the party wants to overthrow the existing social system by "gaining political power for the working class in an alliance with other workers". A future socialist system is, according to the DKP, no longer up for discussion. "[A]ll attempts by the deposed exploiters to reinstate the constitution and laws of a capitalist system of exploitation irreconcilable with a socialist state must be prevented based on this socialist legitimacy".<sup>127</sup>

<sup>127</sup> UZ, 1 April 2005 (insert).

**Difficult financial situation**

The party also remained on a weak financial footing. In its statement of account prepared in accordance with Section 23 of the Political Parties Act (*Parteiengesetz*, PartG), the DKP reported income in 2004 of €1.3 million, including €480,000 in donations, some of it inheritances. As in previous years, the DKP again benefited from estates inherited from long-standing comrades and was thus once again able to avert bankruptcy. The party's weekly, *Unsere Zeit* (*UZ*, Our Time), proved to be especially expensive. Its deficit in 2005 alone amounted to €45,000.<sup>128</sup>

The main topics of agitation of its ageing party members is "anti-imperialist" work, resistance to the dismantling of the welfare state and rejection of the EU constitution.

**No candidates nominated to stand in federal elections**

At its 3rd conference (9/10 July) the Party executive resolved that the DKP would "call on voters to support a left-wing alliance (WASG and PDS)" and not nominate its own regional lists for the federal elections on 18 September. Instead "meetings with the PDS and WASG" were to be used swiftly to propose "DKP candidates at regional and local level".<sup>129</sup> In the end a dozen DKP members stood for election on the Left Party.PDS's regional lists. None of them won enough votes to enter parliament.

In particular the more traditionalist party structures in the eastern *Länder* criticised the party leadership's decision to nominate neither its own regional lists of candidates nor individual candidates in constituencies in favour of the Left Party. PDS;<sup>130</sup> some accused the DKP of giving up its identity as a communist party.

Ideological differences similar to those which had in 2004 led to considerable tension within the party continued to exist, but did not escalate. These differences were still clear at various stages in the debate concerning the party programme.

The DKP's key publication, *UZ*, organised its 14th Press Festival at the Revierpark Wischlingen in Dortmund from 24 to 26 June. The motto of the event was "Fight in solidarity! Social is (a) m(ust)!"<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> *UZ*, 11 November 2005, p. 16.

<sup>129</sup> *DKP-Information* No. 2/2005, 15 July 2005, p. 10.

<sup>130</sup> *DKP-Information* No. 3/2005, 30 September 2005, p. 5.

<sup>131</sup> Reports in *UZ*, 1 July 2005.

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The three-day event drew approximately 20,000 visitors. The broad cultural programme was very popular. Podium discussions with speakers from the DKP's traditional "allies" were likewise popular. Representatives from 22 "brother parties" came from abroad to take part.

#### International links

Considering the party's overall significance, it still has notable international links. For example, it has observer status in the Party of the European Left (EL, cf. 1.5 above). It also has close links with more traditional communist parties which do not countenance the EL's alleged "revisionist" line.

## 2.2 Organisations associated with the DKP

A number of organisations associated with the DKP either largely share the party's orientation or are headed by DKP members.

### 2.2.1 Youth organisations

#### SDAJ and AMS

The youth organisations Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend (SDAJ, Socialist German Workers' Youth) and the Assoziation Marxistischer StudentInnen (AMS, Association of Marxist Students) traditionally have close links with the DKP. Both organisations are legally independent, but are indistinguishable from the DKP in terms of their politics. The SDAJ (with just over 300 members in Germany) no longer has members in every *Land*. At its national conference in Hanover on 9/10 October 2004, it elected a national executive which now also constitutes the group's collective management. The office of national chairperson was abolished.

In August an SDAJ delegation comprising several dozen members took part in the 16th World Festival for Youth and Students in Caracas, Venezuela.<sup>132</sup> The aim of this traditionally communist and anti-imperialist "World Festival" is to promote socialist ideas and regimes. The SDAJ still belongs to the World Federation of Democratic Youth, a former Soviet front organisation founded in 1945 and one of the organisers of such events.

By its own account the AMS (which has just under 60 members) is the only national Marxist student organisation in Germany. One member of its speakers' council is a member of the DKP party executive. The

<sup>132</sup> UZ, 19 August, 26 August and 2 September 2005.

AMS's "Propositions on Marxist higher education policy" propagate the idea that education must serve "to show others how the capitalist system works and to indicate ways to overthrow it". That includes "the alliance with working people and their class organisations on all important issues" as well as active agitation and propaganda on the street.<sup>133</sup>

### **2.2.2 Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes - Bund der Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten e. V. (VVN-BdA, Union of Victims of Nazi Persecution - Alliance of Anti-Fascists, reg'd society)**

**Influenced by  
left-wing  
extremism**

Members and former members of the DKP and traditionalist members of the Left Party-PDS still hold important positions of leadership within the VVN-BdA, which is influenced by left-wing extremism. The organisation is thus still predominantly committed to orthodox/communist "anti-fascism", which argues that right-wing extremism is inherently linked to market economy systems and that state institutions in western democracies are thus more likely to support right-wing extremist activity than fight it. Those who hold such views believe that a socialist/communist dictatorship is the only logical alternative to "fascist" threats. However, out of consideration for its efforts to form an alliance with left-wing elements in the democratic spectrum, the VVN-BdA has since 1989 stopped explicitly describing left-wing extremist systems of violence and injustice as exemplary. Nevertheless, communist crimes are consistently played down, ignored or even denied.

For example, at the VVN-BdA's national conference (held in Frankfurt/Main on 29/30 May), the theologian Prof s.c. Heinrich FINK was unanimously elected as one of the group's two co-chairmen. The fact that a few weeks previously documents from the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, the GDR's Ministry for State Security, also known as the Stasi) had been widely discussed in the press had no impact on the voting. According to press reports, FINK had collaborated with the Stasi until 1989 and had, among other things, passed on the content of confidential pastoral discussions with his students to the GDR's state security authorities. Instead, the second chairman, Werner PFENNIG, stated in a VVN-BdA press release that:

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<sup>133</sup> *Kommuniqué* (Communiqué), AMS newspaper, No 5/05 (spring 2005).

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"Heinrich Fink is a Christian socialist who has admitted that he was involved in attempts in the GDR to build up an anti-fascist state system. The fact that he, as a member of the PDS and of the VVN-BdA, represents unpopular politics is not an insult to him, but rather to those who are not openly discussing his politics except by way of the infernal Stasi accusations. ... In any case, the VVN-BdA sees no reason to doubt the integrity of its chairman."

(*Antifa*, VVN-BdA organ, June 2005, p. 20)

The fight against apparent "historical revisionism", i.e. defending the legends of communist resistance against the rejection of right-wing and left-wing dictatorships which the Basic Law calls for, is still one of the key concerns of the VVN-BdA's "ideological struggle". A high-ranking member of the VVN-BdA explicitly rejected more differentiated accounts of the events of May 1945, such as those propagated by democratic groups on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, saying they "for the most part cover up the origins of fascism".<sup>134</sup> The VVN-BdA holds firm to its communist belief that capitalism alone was responsible for "fascism and war". A statement issued by the national executive claimed its aim was to

"resist the massive pressure to use the concept of totalitarianism and a 'comparison of dictatorships' to permanently push through a right-wing-oriented culture of remembrance which makes the Nazi barbarism anonymous and exonerates it; which forgets the crimes and victims of the German Empire up to 1918 and the Weimar Republic years; and aims over the long term to level, distort and subject anti-fascist perspectives on history to anti-communist domination."

(*Antifa*, July/August 2005, p. 21)

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<sup>134</sup> Gerd DEUMLICH, chairman of the Emslandlageregemeinschaft (Emsland Association), which is part of the VVN-BdA, in the DKP theoretical publication *Marxistische Blätter* (Marxist Papers) 3/2005, p. 15.

### **2.2.3 Marx-Engels-Stiftung e. V. (MES, Marx–Engels Foundation, reg'd society)**

**Influenced by  
left-wing extremism**

The MES is influenced by left-wing extremism. It remained one of the instruments used in the "ideological struggle" primarily by DKP party theoreticians and propagandists, as well as by traditionally communist, former SED academic cadres. Like his predecessor, its newly elected chairman is a member of the DKP. Taking into consideration the "irrevocable dialectics of theory and practice in the spirit of Lenin", he outlined its tasks as follows: The MES as an institution is independent of parties and other organisations, he claimed, although its members are convinced that a Marxist analysis of the present is also always linked to the issue of an efficiently organised anti-capitalist resistance.<sup>135</sup> The MES made efforts to extend its range of activities. For example, in April it organised a conference on "Islam - Islamism - 'Islamic' Resistance" in conjunction with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Wuppertal, North Rhine-Westphalia; it had a clear "anti-imperialist" and above all anti-US emphasis.

### **2.2.4 Bundesausschuss Friedensratschlag (German Peace Forum)**

**Influenced by  
left-wing extremism**

The German Peace Forum, a forum for communists, supporters of the Left Party, PDS and traditional partners of left-wing extremists, is influenced by left-wing extremism. Its main public activity was its annual conference, called the Peace Forum (Friedenspolitischer Ratschlag), in early December. A "statement" drafted by functionaries ahead of the conference and presented to participants merely for acclamation, holds fast to a Leninist analysis of the causes of war, according to which defence measures implemented by western democracies always serve imperialist objectives abroad and the fight against social protest movements at home: "The extended 'war against terror' is itself terrorism and escalates the spiral of violence. As regards domestic politics, this war is increasingly used to abolish basic democratic rights."<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> *UZ*, 29 July 2005, p. 16.

<sup>136</sup> Statement of the Peace Forum, in: *UZ*, 16 December 2005, p. 7.

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### 3. Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany)

Founded:	1982
Headquarters of Central Committee:	Gelsenkirchen
Chairman:	Stefan ENGEL
Membership:	Approximately 2,300 (2004: more than 2,000)
Publications:	<i>Rote Fahne</i> (RF, Red Flag), weekly; <i>Rebell</i> (Rebel, magazine of the youth organisation of the same name), bi-monthly; <i>Lernen und Kämpfen</i> (Learn and Fight), several times a year

#### Participation in federal elections

The Maoist/Stalinist-oriented MLPD remained isolated even within the left-wing extremist spectrum. It attempted, in vain, to become involved in the joint project initiated by left-wing parties in the run-up to the federal elections on 18 September. In the end the MLPD/Offene Liste (MLPD/Open List) nominated its own candidates in all 16 *Länder*. The party leadership declared that from the outset the election campaign had been a measure to "expand and speed up the party organisation";<sup>137</sup> it had high hopes that it would win potential supporters and more members through the election campaign. It gained 0.1% (45,000) of the second votes in the elections, a figure that was statistically irrelevant. However the party won four times as many votes as the last time it took part in federal elections in all *Länder* (in 1994). The party made gains in its traditional strongholds in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg, but above all in some *Länder* in eastern Germany.

The party chairman, Stefan ENGEL, declared that the MLPD's "actual influence on the masses" was even greater than the election result showed:<sup>138</sup>

<sup>137</sup> MLPD central organ, *Rote Fahne* (RF, Red Flag), 29 July 2005, p. 16.

<sup>138</sup> RF, 23 September 2005, p. 12.

"The bourgeois elections are themselves a massive manipulation of public opinion, with their purported equal opportunities in stages, in which small parties are systematically excluded from the media and summed up under "other" ... The only force in Germany that can change society is the MLPD. Elections can never be more than a gauge of the consciousness of the masses."

(*RF*, 26 August 2005, p. 15)

The MLPD continued its party-internal tradition of reacting to alleged "deviations" from the party line with internal "purges". For example, around the middle of the year the party leadership organised the 1st Extraordinary MLPD Party Conference. The conference was occasioned by alleged "tendencies towards a revisionist degeneration" in the party's Central Controlling Committee (ZKK). In fact, the reason was probably a show of strength on the part of the party leadership vis-à-vis the ZKK. The ZKK had been elected at the VIIIth Party Conference in 2004 and was subsequently suspended. To insiders the "purge" was portrayed as a great success of the party as a whole:

"The MLPD's extraordinary conference marks a historic victory of the party's system of self-control over the threat of revisionist degeneration within the party's ZKK and a change in the nature of the party to a new type of party."

(*Dokumente des 1. außerordentlichen Parteitages der MLPD*, p. 152)

In fact orthodox Stalinist patterns of thought and action are more and more in evidence within the MLPD. The party leadership demands total control over what its members and leading functionaries think. It declared that "controlling the thoughts of the leading cadres within the party in particular" was of decisive importance in forestalling "revisionist degeneration".<sup>139</sup> There were increasing signs of a growing personality cult of ENGEL, who has been party chairman since 1982: The party's key publication *Rote Fahne* devoted numerous pages to celebrating ENGEL as "Germany's longest-serving party chairman".<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> *Dokumente des 1. außerordentlichen Parteitages der MLPD* (Documents of the 1st Extraordinary MLPD Party Conference), p. 94.

<sup>140</sup> *RF*, 21 January 2005, p. 8 et seq.

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#### 4. Trotskyist groups

Supporters of the Russian revolutionary Leo Bronstein, known as Trotsky (1878-1940), distinguish themselves from the Leninist-Stalinist tradition of revolutionary Marxism in that they believe that establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat can be achieved only through councils of workers by means of a worldwide revolution. As a result their orientation is consistently "international". Seventeen international Trotskyist umbrella organisations with 21 sections and splinter groups are currently active in Germany. The total number of activists fell slightly to approximately 1,600, organised in groups ranging in size from very small splinter groups to viable structures with several hundred members. The groups can be split into two types of Trotskyist organisations according to their political activities:

Ideologically rigid groups remained isolated even within the left-wing extremist spectrum; as the self-appointed guardians of orthodox Trotskyism, their activities are largely restricted to ideological struggles with competing Trotskyist groups. One of the most sterile amongst these so-called Propaganda Fighting Groups, the Spartakist-Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SpAD, Spartacist Workers' Party of Germany, the German section of the New York-based International Communist League), propagates "reforging the Fourth International, the global party of the proletarian revolution".<sup>141</sup> Its youth organisation aims to fight for "new, socialist revolutions around the world", based on a "proletarian, revolutionary and internationalist programme, the programme of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky".<sup>142</sup> The SpAD's competitor, the Gruppe Arbeitermacht (GAM, Workers' Power Group, the German section of the London-based League for the Fifth International), has groups in a dozen cities; its aim is to "disarm the bourgeois state"<sup>143</sup> and to establish a society in which "the working classes rule by means of councils". Such a revolution cannot be restricted to one country, the group says, but must be based on a global revolution.<sup>144</sup>

By contrast, action-oriented Trotskyist groups seek to take part in social protest campaigns and typical left-wing extremist fields of action. They are also prepared to join non-extremist groups (which

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<sup>141</sup> *Spartakist* No. 158, spring 2005, p. 14.

<sup>142</sup> *Spartakist* No. 160, autumn 2005, p. 5.

<sup>143</sup> *Neue Internationale* (New International) No. 8/9-05, p. 6.

<sup>144</sup> GAM flyer, summer 2005.

they call entryism). As they often have young supporters, are tightly organised and co-ordinated at international level, their activities are at times much more prominent than those of larger left-wing groups.

#### **4.1 Sozialistische Alternative (SAV, Socialist Alternative)**

The SAV is the German section of the international Trotskyist umbrella organisation, the Committee for a Worker's International (CWI), based in London. The CWI heads 30 national sections and aims to "abolish the capitalist system of profit everywhere in the world and build up a federation of socialist democracies".<sup>145</sup>

The German section shares the CWI's goal of establishing a "revolutionary, socialist mass international".<sup>146</sup> It has approximately 400 members who are part of larger groups mainly in Berlin, Hamburg, Kassel, Cologne, Aachen and Stuttgart.

The SAV saw the non-extremist WASG as an opportunity to build up a "mass party for the dependent employed, the unemployed, the young and pensioners."<sup>147</sup> The SAV leadership instructed its cadres to "support an aggressive line, for a democratic structure and a socialist programme within the WASG".<sup>148</sup> At local level SAV members managed to take on leadership roles in the WASG. However, they also met with resistance and were given to understand that the WASG did not wish other parties to become involved. A further area of action of the SAV was the Netzwerk für eine kämpferische und demokratische ver.di (Network for an Aggressive and Democratic ver.di) which arose in the former Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV, the trade union for public services and transport). The SAV declared that its members were "active trade unionists and were involved in setting up opposition groups and alliances within trade unions".<sup>149</sup>

The SAV's youth organisation is part of the CWI-controlled International Socialist Resistance and in Germany goes by the name

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<sup>145</sup> Every edition of the SAV's organ, *Solidarität* (Solidarity), p. 11 in each case.

<sup>146</sup> *Solidarität* No. 38, August 2005, p. 10.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

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of Widerstand international - wi! (International Resistance!). It sees itself as "part of the movement against capitalist globalisation and war"<sup>150</sup> and as such took part in international protests, for example against the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland in July.

#### 4.2 The group Linksruck

The group Linksruck (Shift to the Left) is the German section of the London-based international Trotskyist umbrella organisation International Socialist Tendency (IST). It wants a "revolution, not merely as a daydream of a better world, but as a means to push through social demands against the ruling classes". It argues that the "destruction of the armed state apparatus" and "depriving the bosses of power" is necessary to achieve that goal.<sup>151</sup> Its approximately 300 members continued their attempts to join social protest movements. They agitated against the "dismantling of the welfare state" and called on followers to take part in protests against the US president's visit to Germany in March. Linksruck's main reason for getting involved in left-wing protest movements is to recruit members to strengthen its own organisation. The following is taken from an internal paper issued by the group to mobilise supporters to take part in a counter-demonstration against an NPD demonstration in Berlin on 8 May:

"That is why the campaign against the NPD is a stepping stone towards achieving our growth goals by May. The prerequisite is that we link joint activities to mobilise supporters with membership discussions."

(*Linksruck-Notizen* (Linksruck Notes), 7 March 2005, p. 3)

Linksruck had instructed its cadres to join the WASG even before the early federal elections were called. Their limited human resources were to be divided up into "teams" which would act exclusively on behalf of Linksruck and others which would work within the non-extremist WASG. The objective was not to be constructively involved in a parliamentary party, as Christine BUCHHOLZ, a member of the Linksruck federal leadership and part of the extended WASG national executive, explained:

"No government will be able to push through left-wing politics from its vantage point in a parliament. ... A left-wing government can only

<sup>150</sup> wi flyer "Zukunft erkämpfen" (Fighting for the future), 2005.

<sup>151</sup> *Linksruck - Zeitung für internationalen Sozialismus* (Linksruck - Paper for International Socialism), 20 July 2005, p. 7.

make real improvements under one condition, namely that bosses are afraid of losing their power on account of a strong grass-roots movement, mass demonstrations and general strikes."  
(*Linksruck - Zeitung für internationalen Sozialismus*, 20 July 2005, p. 4)

The activities of Linksruck members met with some resistance within the WASG and they were thus by no means a resounding success. However, on account of their unity, Linksruck cadres were able to place members in WASG executives in some towns where the group has a lot of members.

**5. Rote Hilfe e. V.  
(RH, Red Aid, reg'd society)**

Founded:	1975
Headquarters:	Göttingen (National Secretariat)
Membership:	More than 4,300 (2004: more than 4,600) in less than 40 local groups
Publications:	<i>DIE ROTE HILFE</i> (RED AID), quarterly

As in previous years, the RH continued to pursue its main aim, as outlined in its statutes, of being an organisation that spans various movements and which supports left-wing extremists serving prison sentences and those affected by what it views as "state repression" who are part of the left-wing extremist spectrum, providing them with financial support and political solidarity.

On 18 March, marking the annual "Political Prisoners' Day",<sup>152</sup> the national executive compiled a "special edition" of its publication *DIE ROTE HILFE* as a supplement to the 11 March issue of the daily newspaper *junge Welt* (jW, Young World). Along with reports on left-wing extremists imprisoned at home and abroad, the paper contains calls for the "abolition of all prisons".

<sup>152</sup> The traditional day of action, 18 March, recalls the bourgeois resistance to feudalism in 1848 and the start of the Paris Commune in 1871. As early as 1923 the Internationale Rote Hilfe (International Red Aid) declared this date to be a "day of solidarity with political prisoners".

In the appeal proceedings on points of law (*Revision*) against two militant left-wing extremists from Magdeburg,<sup>153</sup> the RH together with the autonomous Soligruppe Magdeburg/Quedlinburg (Solidarity Group of Magdeburg/Quedlinburg) called for the prisoners' immediate release. In a press release posted on the Internet on 19 October, the national executive called on supporters to observe the proceedings, claiming that "there is only one logical step for anyone who truly stands up for justice, namely that we demand their immediate release!"

In particular the RH, along with other support groups, used reports continuously posted on its website to monitor the proceedings against a Belgian and three Spanish anarchists to whom Aachen Regional Court had given long prison sentences for kidnapping and other crimes. In the 3/2005 edition of its quarterly paper *DIE ROTE HILFE* the RH used the proceedings in Aachen to report on prison conditions in Spain, where two of the three Spaniards had already served long prison sentences.

Disagreements arose within the party after the national executive refused to expel a member who had reported another member of the RH to the police for fighting during a demonstration. The local group in Berlin found that this was unacceptable behaviour since "co-operation with the state organs of repression is a 'flagrant violation' of the principles on which RH is based and endangers the safety of individual members and the organisation as a whole";<sup>154</sup> it called for an immediate new election of the national executive. The national executive referred to the fact that the RH spanned various movements and condemned the nature of the argument as completely lacking in solidarity.

In February the RH founded a society to "establish and promote an archive of organisations in solidarity with workers and their social movement" (Red Aid Archive). This implemented a resolution adopted by members at the national delegates' conference in September 2004, namely that the work of the RH also included looking into its own history. The archive contains documents on loan from the RH's previous archive in Göttingen. The RH gave the society start-up funds.

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<sup>153</sup> On 16 December 2003 Naumburg Higher Regional Court in Saxony-Anhalt sentenced the two militants from Magdeburg to two years in juvenile detention on four counts of arson. The court found that the two left-wing extremists had been involved on 18 March 2002 in arson attacks against the offices of the *Land* criminal police office (LKA) and against vehicles belonging to the Federal Police (BGS) and other similar criminal offences, also committed under the name "revolutionaere aktion carlo giuliani" (revolutionary action carlo giuliani). A third defendant was acquitted.

<sup>154</sup> RH members' circular, 3/2005, p. 2.

According to its statutes, along with archiving relevant materials, the society also sees its task as educating interested members of the public and organises seminars and lectures to that end.

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## IV. Areas of activity

### 1. Anti-fascism

#### Anti-fascism aimed at overthrowing the system

The “anti-fascist struggle” or “anti-fascism” is a traditional focus of activity and discussion among left-wing extremist groups and is directed only superficially against right-wing extremism. Its ultimate aim is to overthrow the free and democratic society as a “capitalist system”, in which it believes fascism is rooted. In this respect the autonomist Bündnis Antifaschistischer Gruppen Hessen (BASH, alliance of anti-fascist groups in Hesse) declared on the Internet:

“Determined anti-fascism has to confront this society and its state if it wants to succeed in fighting fascist tendencies. This means that serious anti-fascism must be revolutionary, that is directed at fundamentally overthrowing current conditions. ... Therefore, revolutionary anti-fascists will never participate in civil society for good reason.”

Under the heading “Whoever talks about fascism may not keep silent about capitalism” on its website, the youth organisation [solid] of the Linkspartei.PDS (left-wing Party of Democratic Socialism) in Brandenburg (cf. Section III, 1.2) holds forth just as clearly and openly about the “basic connection” between fascist theory and practice and capitalism, and draws the conclusion:

“For us, anti-fascism means not only fending off and fighting fascist activities but also fighting the prevailing system of capitalism.”

#### Activities

In particular after the success of right-wing extremist parties in the 2004 *Land* parliamentary elections, violent left-wing extremists focused even more on the “anti-fascist struggle”. As compared to previous years, this entailed increased activities against “Nazi rallies” and in some cases aggressive actions during confrontations with right-wing extremists in various regions. A strong police presence and appropriate police measures were often able to prevent direct confrontation between the different groups.

Activist autonomists concentrated their activities on the fight against “fascists”. They sought direct confrontation with their political adversaries on the streets and tried to prevent or disturb their rallies either through mass militancy or in small groups. They also targeted facilities like meeting places and information booths of right-wing

extremists. Members of the scene wrote in an Internet posting entitled “Stop Nazi attacks”:

“... wherever they appear they are attacked; even when they come home from demonstrations they must still be prepared that a bunch of 30 of them will be bashed. ... there is only one remedy. We must step up the protection of our own structures; we must mercilessly breathe down their neck, i.e. back to old procedures, house calls, grabbing individuals, wrecking cars etc.”

However this militancy also met with criticism from some members of the scene who warned:

“Anti-fascism isn’t hooliganism. OK, every Nazi deserves to be smacked, especially in defence situations, but we should do no more than teach them a lesson. But if a Nazi is beat up so badly, as during the return from Pirna to Leipzig, that it ruptures his liver and he is in danger of dying, the violence used is no longer justified.”

(*Incipito*, No. 15, January 2005, p. 25)

More academic left-wing extremists called for focusing on the fight against the “capitalist system” in their “political” work. For example the autonomist group Politik.Organisation.Praxis (P.O.P., Politics.Organisation.Practice) stressed in a manifesto published on the Internet:

“It is therefore essential to adequately analyse current social interrelations to identify possible activities from a revolutionary point of view. ... We are convinced that firm structures are needed to overcome the state and capitalism. Only together are we strong because a well structured organisation is better able to conduct the political battle. ... It has to be noted that in the long run every revolutionary organisation must be able to bring about real change; we want class struggle today, tomorrow, until we reach our goal!”

### **Militant activity**

The following are examples of militant actions by left-wing extremists directed against right-wing extremists:

- On 29 January about 1,750 violent persons including up to 1,200 masked and about 500 persons with striking tools took part in a demonstration in Kiel organised by the left-wing “Round Tables against Racism and Fascism” and directed against a right-wing extremist rally. After the demonstration, which was attended by about 7,000 persons, numerous small left-wing groups started rioting along the demonstration route of the right-wing extremists. They set containers on fire, shot signal flares at water cannons,
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slashed car tyres, broke the windows of a Sparkasse bank and a patrol car and threw bottles at police officers.

- On 1 May about 2,000 violent persons including several hundred members of the autonomist scene demonstrated in Leipzig against a rally initiated by the Hamburg right-wing extremist Christian WORCH. During the demonstration, which was attended by about 4,000 persons, violent left-wing extremists shot signal flares, threw stones and bottles at police officers and participants of the right-wing rally, built barricades and repeatedly held sit-ins. The right-wing extremists had to break off their event ahead of schedule. A total of 66 police officers were injured and 31 police vehicles were damaged. The police arrested 104 persons. An Internet posting announced before the rally:

“It is obvious that we will go to any lengths to spoil the party for the nationalist mob. Therefore we call upon everybody to aggressively confront the Nazis.”

- A wide range of groups mobilised against a rally of the regional party association of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party) in Göttingen, Lower Saxony, on 29 October. Along with numerous democratic organisations, local bodies of the Linkspartei.PDS and the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party), and individual autonomist groups supported an appeal which stated: “We ask everybody to participate in the activities against the Nazi rally with the means and forms of protest available.” The actions – which included serious riots (cf. Section I, 1.2) – were later assessed on the Internet as follows:

“The interaction between the work of anti-fascist alliances and militant actions against the neo-Nazi rally made this day a success for the leftists in Göttingen. ... The Nazis should be happy that they got off lightly today. Without police protection the fascists would not have been able to set foot inside the city!”

Violent left-wing extremists did not hesitate to use direct physical attacks against actual or supposed right-wing extremists, and they were even willing to accept – in some cases serious – injuries of their “political” adversaries.

- On 19 June four masked persons of the leftist scene attacked a member of the right-wing scene with striking tools in Potsdam, Brandenburg. They hit the victim on the head with a telescopic baton and kicked and beat the man when he was already lying on

the ground. The offenders were charged with joint attempted homicide.

- On 3 September about 500 autonomists took part in a demonstration in Oldenburg, Lower Saxony, which was attended by a total of 1,300 persons and directed against a rally of the regional party association of the NPD in Lower Saxony. In late afternoon at the train station in Sandkrug, Lower Saxony, a group of 15 to 20 suspected left-wing extremists attacked eight participants of the NPD event who were on their way home. The raid was well coordinated, i.e. the masked attackers waited for their victims and took them by surprise. They used iron bars, baseball bats, batons, pepper spray and blank guns, which they had brought with them especially for that occasion.
- On 7 October a group of around 40 persons from the leftist scene attacked up to ten members of the right-wing scene in Wernigerode, Saxony-Anhalt. The offenders were armed with baseball bats, pickets and brass knuckles. Two persons who were thrown to the ground and kicked suffered serious head injuries and bruises.

The left-wing extremists also wanted to uncover right-wing extremist activities and expose and fight individual persons. An Internet posting stated:

“Exposure aims at tracking down neo-Nazis in their retreats and depriving them of their anonymity, but in particular at showing their neighbours which unpleasant contemporaries live right next door.”

As part of their so-called research, autonomists pursued aggressive “intelligence work”. They gathered information about officials, training facilities, meeting places and other logistical facilities for publication in printed media or on the Internet and for preparing militant actions. On 1 October members of the left-wing scene hacked the website of the Freier Widerstand (Free Resistance) and published the information gained – more than 16,000 files – on the Internet. Scene members wrote:

“We exploited vulnerabilities of the Freier Widerstand and thus gained access to their chatroom. ... This action shows that Nazis should feel safe neither in real nor in virtual life. Not today and not in the future.”

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## 2. Campaign against “dismantling the welfare state”

At the beginning of the year, left-wing extremists with different ideological backgrounds tried to exploit public dissatisfaction with the labour and social welfare reforms of the German government, which the scene calls “welfare robbery”, and joined the Monday demonstrations in late summer 2004 with their own actions. On 3 January when the employment benefit II (ALG II) was paid out for the first time, up to 2,000 activists – most of them peaceful – participated in a general day of action under the motto “agency closing time”. This included “imaginative” actions in front of and inside employment agencies. The largest rally with 180 participants took place in Berlin. Given the considerable media interest, some left-wing extremists critically remarked on the Internet that the biggest weakness of their campaigns was that they ran the risk of “mistaking media for social reality”. In fact, they wrote, they were not able to mobilise participants for the “agency closing time” outside their own scene. In particular, the expected “mass solidarisation” of the public did not take place.<sup>155</sup> Follow-up actions such as the day of action “WORKFARE IS NOT FAIR” on 20 May protesting the so-called one-euro jobs and another general day of action under the motto “Closing Hartz ” on 5 September took place largely unnoticed even by left-wing extremists.

Low interest was also paid to the few regular “Monday demonstrations against Hartz IV” which were mainly initiated by the Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany). Its central organ Rote Fahne ceaselessly published on its website dates, locations and the – very low – numbers of participants.

This year’s only nation-wide demonstration against so-called social robbery was a “March against the Federal Government” in Berlin on 5 November. With about 4,000 participants it was far from the size of the protests from late summer or autumn 2004 and from the 25,000 participants expected by the organisers (later amended to 15,000).

Supporters of the autonomist scene pursued their “anti-capitalist fight” also through individual actions. They were initially members of the Berlin autonomist scene and called themselves The Superfluous.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>155</sup> *radikal*, edition “Episode 158”, summer 2005.

<sup>156</sup> According to their own profile on the Internet, the Superfluous define themselves as people in industrialised countries who are excluded from social wealth. They perceive themselves as the “objective of the top-down class struggle and the current poverty campaign in Germany”, and they fight against the “fanatic profit system which does not dispose of inconvenient work but of people”. The slogan is simply: “Capitalism is superfluous – Everything for everybody!”

With white masks and uniform sweat suits they disturbed guests in what they call luxury restaurants<sup>157</sup> or attacked staff of welfare authorities<sup>158</sup> and sponsors of so-called one-euro jobs.<sup>159</sup> As a self-proclaimed “wake-up service and inspection”, the Superfluous carried out a noisy action in front of the private home of the then-Minister of Economics and Labour in Bonn-Bad Godesberg on 16 November. Especially in cities they asked people to participate in “For Free Actions”, i.e. to shoplift and to obtain benefits by fraud, for example by riding without buying tickets. In addition, autonomist groups repeatedly attacked the “capitalist logic of exploitation” with militant means. The scope of criminal offences ranged from vandalising buildings or vehicles to serious arson. Preferred targets were employment agencies, sponsors or providers of so-called one-euro jobs and food discounters, which they accuse of severely exploiting their staff.

### **3. Campaign by left-wing extremists against nuclear energy**

In 2005 left-wing extremists continued to support protests against the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, their influence on the anti-nuclear movement, most of whose followers are not extremists, remained minor.

The dedication and resistance of left-wing extremists aim at the more general goal of overthrowing the prevailing system. For example, after an arson attack against vehicles of Deutsche Bahn and the Berlin electric power company BEWAG on 1 February, which was directed against the conference of the Deutsches Atomforum e. V. (DAtF, German Atomic Forum), autonomist activists<sup>160</sup> stressed:

“We do not automatically consider our actions more important or better [than distributing flyers and activities]. But they often better reflect our hatred against the prevailing order. ...  
Currently, left-wing policy should aim at promoting social conditions which offer an alternative to the prevailing consensus, including the nuclear consensus. This may be achieved by militant actions, among other things.”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 611, 10 February 2005, p. 4)

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<sup>157</sup> For example in Hamburg on 1 May and in Darmstadt, Hesse, on 11 August.

<sup>158</sup> For example in Lüchow, Lower Saxony, on 9 August.

<sup>159</sup> For example in Berlin on 19 October.

<sup>160</sup> Complete name: autonome gruppen/peng-zong-kollektiv [autonomist groups/peng-zong collective]

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The authors argued for more militant actions, not only during the annual nuclear waste transports in November.

However, the three nuclear waste transports from the research centre in Rossendorf, Saxony, to the interim storage site in Ahaus, North-Rhine/Westphalia, in May and June took place without relevant incidents. Between 1,000 and 2,000 anti-nuclear activists took part in the protests initiated mainly by anti-nuclear groups from North-Rhine/Westphalia and Saxony; there were only few left-wing extremists.

As in the previous years, left-wing extremist activities focused on nuclear waste transports from the French reprocessing plant in La Hague to the interim storage site in Gorleben, Lower Saxony, between 19 and 22 November. On 23 October, before the transports were carried out, autonomist and left-wing extremist groups from northern and eastern Germany had announced on the Internet that they would turn the nuclear waste transport to Gorleben into a disaster and interfere with the normal operation of society:

“The CDU at federal and state level, other members of various parties and the nuclear lobby dream of turning the site in Gorleben into a permanent storage site for German nuclear waste. We will resolutely exert bottom-up pressure against all those who support this project and try to turn Gorleben into one of the world’s biggest permanent storage sites for highly radioactive waste. ... In this spirit: Make up your minds and make up gangs! Autonomist and left-wing extremist groups from northern and eastern Germany.”

The text ended with the slogan “AGAINST CASTOR, CAPITAL & COPS!”

The actions against nuclear waste transports were supported also by autonomist groups from Baden-Württemberg with propaganda on the Internet announcing a “hot autumn” with slogans such as “we have a burning interest in police quarters”<sup>161</sup> and “stop Castor!”

On 2 November unknown offenders carried out grapnel attacks on railway tracks of the Deutsche Bahn near Aumühle, Schleswig-Holstein, and in the Hagen region of North-Rhine/Westphalia. On 7 and 10 November various newspapers received identical letters claiming responsibility for the attacks. Under the headline “Showing the nuclear lobby our claws” an unknown group called c.r.o.c.h.e.t

<sup>161</sup> The authors were obviously referring to the events on the night of 28 September 2005 near Woltersdorf, Lower Saxony, where unknown offenders set fire to mobile homes where police are accommodated during nuclear waste transports. Damage totalled around € 3 million.

wrote that the action was carried out in memory of the French activist Sebastien Briat:<sup>162</sup>

“Sebastien’s death was a painful reminder that representatives and profiteers of the ruling system’s hostile technology will ruthlessly stop at nothing.”

“Anger and mourning in resistance!

Immediately shut down nuclear power plants and the ruling class!”

The protests during the nuclear waste transport took place without relevant incidents. The actual number of participants on-site was 3,500 and thus lower than in the previous years. About 100 left-wing extremist and autonomist activists took part in each of the so-called opening rallies in Lüneburg (5 November) and Hitzacker (19 November). A rather insignificant number (about 100) of anarchists and members of the Linkspartei.PDS joined the protests.

#### **4. Anti-globalisation movement**

During the annual meeting of the heads of state and government of the eight leading industrial nations (G8) in Gleneagles, Scotland, from 6 to 8 July, militant left-wing extremist critics of globalisation again incited serious riots as they had at the G8 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France. In 2004 there were no relevant occasions to mobilise rioters since all major international summits took place in the US. After the opening events of moderate organisers, e.g. the large-scale demonstration “Make Poverty History” in Edinburgh on 2 July (estimates varied between 150,000 and 400,000 participants) had taken place peacefully, on 6 July hundreds of militants tried to block access routes of G8 delegations to the conference hotel and to enter the restricted area. Afterwards the violent offenders boasted that they had blocked about ten sections of the road “more or less successfully”, broke down barriers and “worked over the advancing host of cops” not only with missiles but also with batons and iron bars. Later, a report published in *INTERIM* commented on the participation of German autonomists in the riots:

“Behind us a group of Germans dressed in black pushed a shopping trolley filled with stones which they threw at the well-armoured police. ‘That’s how we do it in Germany’, they explained...”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 622, 15 September 2005, p. 5)

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<sup>162</sup> Briat was fatally injured on 7 November 2004 in Avricourt, France, while trying to chain himself to the tracks during the nuclear waste transport.

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With regard to the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, scheduled for early summer 2007, militant left-wing extremists expressed their hope that they would again be able to jointly “protest, block and sabotage”. In this context, they referred to the protests in Scotland as a “warm-up for 2007”.<sup>163</sup> Militant left-wing extremists operating covertly assigned the responsibility for first arson attacks to the “Resistance” against the G8 meeting and added a “proposal for a large-scale militant campaign during the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm” (cf. Section II, 1.3).

The highlight of the “anti-globalisation movement” was its own event – the 5<sup>th</sup> World Social Forum (WSF) held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, from 26 to 31 January. According to Internet reports, several hundred globalisation critics from Germany, most of them without any extremist ties, were among the more than 150,000 participants (from 135 countries) of this large-scale event which included numerous speeches, presentations and workshops. A website reports that the 5<sup>th</sup> WSF ended with a “call for international actions against war and neo-liberalism”.

Compared with other European countries the 1<sup>st</sup> Social Forum in Germany held in Erfurt, Thuringia, from 21 to 24 July took place very late. The great expectations of the organisers, who had counted on 5,000 to 10,000 participants, were disappointed with an attendance of only about 2,500. Besides numerous non-extremists, there were communists, Trotskyists, autonomists and anarchists, at least according to the left-wing extremist press.<sup>164</sup> Subsequent comments complained about a lack of a large and lively movement (in Germany) which could have supported and promoted the social forum.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> *Pasaremos - Aktiv werden gegen den G8-Gipfel* [Get active against the G8 summit], p. 8.

<sup>164</sup> *neue internationale* (newspaper of the group Arbeitermacht [workers' power]) No. 103, August/September 2005, p. 1.

<sup>165</sup> *Graswurzelrevolution* (GWR) No. 302, October 2005, p. 5.

## **Islamist / Islamist Terrorist Activities**

### **I. Overview**

#### **1. Developments within Islamism**

In 2005 Islamist activities continued to pose various levels of threat to Germany's internal security.

The most potent threat remains that from Islamist terrorists, whose campaign is geared towards realising their idea of an "Islamic world order" which clearly stands in contradiction to the concepts underlying free, democratic values and systems. They make reference to the duty they claim all Muslims are bound by, namely to join the violent "jihad" (defined as a "holy war" to defend and spread Islam).

Despite the successful executive measures taken against Islamist terrorist groups and networks in the period under review, both at national and international level, the security authorities continue to focus their efforts on the mujahidin (Fighters for Allah's Cause). Increased investigative activities, in particular in Afghanistan, have considerably restricted various Islamist terrorist organisations' (in particular Al-Qaeda's) possibilities for carrying out operations. As a result, however, these networks have increasingly decentralised their structures, and the offices for the protection of the constitution now face new challenges.

Even though the threat to Germany is clearly lower than that faced by the countries directly involved in the military intervention in Iraq, it must be recognised that Germany is also, in the eyes of the mujahidin, classed as one of the so-called crusaders, the helpers of the United States and of Israel. Germany's involvement in Afghanistan has a role to play in this, as does the fact that German marines are deployed in Somalia, and Iraqi military and police officers are being trained by Germans. The attacks against London's public transport system on 7 July and the attempted attacks on 21 July are a clear indication that Europe is part of the Islamist terrorists' theatre of operations. It is also clear that Islamist terrorists have the means in

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terms of personnel, material and logistics to carry out larger scale attacks anywhere in the world, including in the heart of Europe.

Germany's internal security is also under threat from Islamist organisations which do not actually carry out international terrorist attacks but which engage in more regional activities. These organisations are above all intent on replacing the existing state and social systems in their countries of origin with a strictly Islamist state based on sharia law. The majority of these organisations use violence for tactical reasons and also usually employ terrorists means in their home countries.

In Germany these organisations in particular focus on collecting donations to support the activities of their parent organisations in their respective countries of origin, as well as on looking after their compatriots. It is thus very important to understand the instruments and structures they use when collecting donations in Germany and to monitor the transfer of money to their respective parent organisations.

The spectrum of Islamist groups includes the Palestinian Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), whose goal is to establish an Islamist state on the entire territory of "Palestine", and which thus denies the state of Israel the right to exist.

Like Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, "Party of God") also denies Israel's right to exist. In view of the Iranian president's anti-Israel and anti-Semitic proclamations and given the fact that the organisation is under Iran's influence, the security authorities continue to observe Hezbollah supporters living in Germany.

The Islamist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) / Chechen Separatist Movement (CSM) is using terrorist means in its struggle to establish a Chechen "theocracy" that is independent of the Russian Federation. The organisation has supporters in Germany.

Other Islamist groups in Germany who see themselves as representing the interests of a large proportion of the approximately three million Muslims living here are pursuing a more broad-based strategy. Although they are likewise working towards replacing the current systems of government in their countries of origin with an Islamist state, they are at the same time endeavouring by legal means to create enclaves for their supporters in Germany so that they can lead their lives according to sharia law. In their view sharia law constitutes an Islamic legal system which regulates all spheres of life,

and implementing such a system in Germany is a precondition for practising "true" Islam.

At the heart of their Islamist ideology is the claim that the authority of the state should not originate with human will, but that it comes from Allah, whose will - as revealed in the Koran - represents the sole truth for all people.

The absolutism of this claim stands in irresolvable contradiction to the fundamental values and principles of a free democratic basic order, for example the principle of sovereignty of the people, the principle of majority rule or the right to form and engage in parliamentary opposition. These "legalistic" Islamist groups represent an especial threat to the internal cohesion of our society. Among other things, their wide range of Islamist-oriented educational and support activities, especially for children and adolescents from immigrant families, are used to promote the creation and proliferation of an Islamist milieu in Germany. These endeavours run counter to the efforts undertaken by the federal administration and the *Länder* to integrate immigrants. There is the risk that such milieus could also form the breeding ground for further radicalisation.

The largest of the groups in this spectrum is the Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society). Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) take a similar "legalistic" approach. Their ideas are propagated by the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD, Islamic Society in Germany, reg'd society) and its affiliated Islamic Centres.

The Pakistani Tablighi Jama'at (TJ, Muslim Faith) also has a particularly important role to play as regards the process of radicalisation. Supporters of the TJ regularly undertake missionary activities, the objective of which is to Islamise society and to change a society based on Western values into an Islamic society. TJ supporters in Germany engage in intense, personal dialogue in an effort to recruit economically and socially disadvantaged Muslims in particular. They often also organise stays in Pakistan. For some young Muslims these TJ training courses provide the point of entry into Islamism and thus also into Islamist terrorist groups.

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## 2. Organisations and followers

The number of supporters of the 28 (2004: 24) Islamist organisations active in the Federal Republic of Germany has risen to 32,100 (2004: around 31,800).

With around 27,250 (2004: 27,250) supporters, Turkish groups have the largest following. The largest organisation, with around 26,500 members, is still the Turkish Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society).

The number of supporters of Arab Islamist groups rose to 3,350 (2004: 3,250). The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) remains the largest group, with around 1,300 (2004: 1,300) supporters. Membership of the second-largest group, the Lebanese Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, "Party of God"), increased to 900 (2004: around 850).

No exact figures are available as regards followers of international mujahidin networks living in Germany.

<b>Followers <sup>1</sup></b>						
	<b>2003</b>		<b>2004</b>		<b>2005</b>	
	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
<b>Of Arab origin <sup>2</sup></b>	14	3,300	14	3,250	15	3,350
<b>Of Turkish origin <sup>2</sup></b>	6	27,300	5	27,250	5	27,250
<b>Of Iranian origin</b>	1	50	1	50	3	150
<b>Others</b>	3	300	4	1,250	5	1,350
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>30,950</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31,800</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>32,100</b>

<sup>1</sup> The figures refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded off.

<sup>2</sup> Banned groups are also included in these figures.

## II. International Islamist terrorism

### 1. Current developments

**London bombings** Terrorist attacks in Europe again claimed numerous lives in 2005.

On the morning of 7 July four bombs exploded in the centre of London, three of them on London Underground trains, one on a London bus. The bombs on the London Underground were co-ordinated to detonate at roughly the same time. According to the British security authorities 56 people, including the bombers themselves, were killed in the attacks and 528 people were injured. Five German nationals were among those injured.

Around midday on 21 July several would-be bombers attempted to carry out four more attacks in London, three on Underground trains and one on a bus. This time, however, only the detonators exploded. One person was injured in the incidents. The four suspected bombers fled, but were arrested later as a result of successful police investigations. On 23 July an abandoned explosive device was found in a park in London which was presumably intended as a fifth bomb. The fifth suspect gave himself up to the police and was arrested.

**Further terrorist attacks by Islamist terrorists worldwide**

Terrorist activities in other parts of the world also claimed numerous victims. On 7 April four people were killed and 19 injured in an attack on a bazaar in Cairo, Egypt. The dead included two French nationals, one American and the bomber himself.

On 30 April nine people were injured in a suicide attack in Cairo. In addition, two of the suicide bomber's female relatives fired shots at a bus carrying tourists. They also supposedly had family ties to those suspected of planning the attack of 7 April.

On the night of 22 July three bombs exploded almost simultaneously in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. According to official reports, 64 people were killed in the explosions. The results of investigations by the Egyptian authorities indicate that the people responsible had links to those behind the attacks in Taba, Egypt on 7 October 2004 (cf. 2004 Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, p. 198).

On 1 October three suicide attacks were carried out on two restaurants on the holiday island of Bali in Indonesia. Twenty-two

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people were killed. Two German nationals were among the 100 people injured in the incidents. The Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community) is suspected of having carried out these attacks.

**Situation in Iraq**

Iraq continued to be the focal point of the international jihad in 2005. As in 2004, there were still numerous attacks, mainly directed against the coalition forces, especially the US forces, as well as against those sections of the population that are co-operating with the coalition forces, for example those queuing up in front of police and army recruitment offices.

In particular, the organisation Tanzeem Qaedat Al-Jihad Fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn (TQJ, Al-Qaeda's Organisation for the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers) led by the Jordanian Ahmed Nazzal Fadhil AL-KHALALIYAH, alias Abu Musab AL-ZARQAWI was responsible for continued attacks against coalition forces and their supporters, as well as against the Shiite population in Iraq.

On account of the extreme brutality of their attacks and the fact that they filmed their hostages' executions, the TQJ and Ansar Al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam) attracted a great deal more public attention in Germany than other smaller mujahidin groups in Iraq.

**Anti-terror measures in Saudi Arabia**

As part of its attempts to combat terrorist structures in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Interior Minister on 28 June published a list of 36 people who are wanted on suspicion of being involved in terrorist attacks. The security authorities made several arrests over the past few months which have weakened Al-Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia. The number of attacks in Saudi Arabia has fallen thanks to the intensity of investigations and improved security at high-risk facilities.

**Decentral networks**

The number of attacks carried out around the world are evidence of the continued threat from Islamist terrorism. It also shows the increasing complexity of the Islamist terrorist spectrum, which is characterised by a high degree of fluctuation and dynamism. Observers have noted that the decentral mujahidin groups have continued to gain importance relative to Al-Qaeda. Although so-called veterans (i.e. those who have participated in combat missions in Afghanistan, Chechnya or Bosnia or who have undergone training in a mujahidin camp) continue to play an influential role within the mujahidin, the groups differ quite considerably. Some, for example, comprise a particularly large number of converts, others have hardly any; some are ethnically homogenous, others include people of

various nationalities; some groups are pursuing a very specific, common goal, whilst others are merely united in their ideological orientation. Al-Qaeda's role in this is to offer an ideal with which its members can identify and which provides operational guidance. It thus continues to generate considerable impetus for terrorist activities.

**Non-aligned mujahidin**

The wide-ranging spectrum of people whose activities are guided by this model of the global jihad are sometimes involved in networked structures of independent local terrorist groups (cf. 3. below) or in small or very small groups (so-called "non-aligned mujahidin", cf. 4. below). The latter sometimes only come together when occasion necessitates it; they are then themselves responsible for choosing their targets (often so-called soft targets) based on what they see as their scope for action and logistic options. Developments over the past few years indicate that Germany's biggest threat comes from such non-aligned groups.

**Home-grown networks**

The London bombings and attempted bombings are also a clear indication of a new type of group that is emerging in Europe. Members of these groups have no experience of the jihad themselves, or they do not have other kinds of links to the global mujahidin network. Rather, members of these "home-grown networks" are second- or third-generation immigrants who were born and raised in Western societies in Europe. Both groups of perpetrators involved in the London bombings comprised young men aged between 19 and 30 who had acquired British nationality at birth or through naturalisation, or who had a permanent residence permit for the United Kingdom. Those involved in such small groups - although they appear to be fully integrated - are willing to take part in the violent jihad after undergoing a process of Islamist radicalisation.

**2. Al-Qaeda (The Base)**

Founded:	In the mid-1980s
Leader:	Osama BIN LADEN
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	No exact figures available

The terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda has a global network of jihadists who have pledged a personal oath of allegiance to Osama BIN

LADEN and who provide active or logistical support to the organisation. The global fight against Islamist terrorism and the success of numerous investigations in the wake of 9/11 have increased the pressure on Osama BIN LADEN's Al-Qaeda organisation. At the same time the Al-Qaeda structures in Afghanistan were largely broken up with the collapse of the Taliban regime. As a result, Al-Qaeda supporters have been forced to move from there to Pakistan or Iran, as well as to the Arabian Peninsula, South-East Asia, Chechnya or northern Iraq.

On account of their own attempts to evade capture, it now appears very difficult for BIN LADEN and his deputy, Dr Ayman AL-ZAWAHIRI, to play a direct, central leadership role within the organisation. Both are currently acting more as ideological figureheads, releasing audiotapes and videos containing their messages (cf. II, 5. below). At the moment Al-Qaeda appears to be more of a "virtual" organisation which provides the impetus for those actually involved in activities, and less of a centrally organised group.

#### **Arrests and convictions**

The global network has not yet been completely broken up, despite numerous repressive measures in the past which have resulted in the arrests of many strategically important Al-Qaeda figures (including Abu Faraj AL-LIBI, who is suspected of having masterminded the two attacks on the President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan in December 2003).

Meanwhile, legal proceedings arising out of the 9/11 attacks (for which Al-Qaeda is responsible) are ongoing.

In its judgement of 9 June the Third Criminal Panel at the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) confirmed its verdict of not guilty in the criminal proceedings against Abdelghani MZOU DI. This decision in the appeal on points of law (*Revision*) means his acquittal is final. In its judgement of 5 February 2004 the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court had found Abdelghani MZOU DI not guilty of membership of a terrorist organisation or of acting as an accessory to the murder of 3,066 people. The Court did not find that MZOU DI had known about plans for the attacks of 11 September 2001. On 21 June Abdelghani MZOU DI voluntarily left Germany for Morocco.

On 19 August the Fourth Criminal Panel at the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court sentenced Mounir EL-MOTASSADEQ to seven years in prison for membership of a terrorist organisation and again enforced the arrest warrant issued against EL-MOTASSADEQ. Both

EL-MOTASSADEQ and the Federal Prosecutor's Office plus the joint plaintiffs have filed an appeal on points of law.<sup>166</sup>

### **3. Regional mujahidin groups**

Mujahidin are represented in well-known regional Islamist organisations and groups and generally see themselves primarily as members of those organisations. However, most of them have undergone training in Afghanistan or Pakistan and are thus simultaneously part of the mujahidin network. They represent an interface between this network and the regional organisations and can use their contacts to arrange for other members to spend time in such training camps, for example.

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<sup>166</sup> EL-MOTASSADEQ was released from pre-trial detention by order of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVG) of 1 February 2006. The appeal on points of law is still pending.

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### 3.1 **Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group) / Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group for Call and Combat)**

#### **Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group)**

Founded: In 1992 in Algeria

Membership/  
supporters in Germany: No exact figures available

#### **Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group for Call and Combat)**

Founded: In late 1997 in Algeria as a splinter  
group of the GIA; known as the GSPC  
since early 1999

Leader: Adelmalek DROUKDAL alias  
Abou Mossab ABDELOUADOUD

Membership/  
supporters in Germany: No exact figures available

No activities by the Algerian GAI were registered in Germany in 2005.

The national leader of the Algerian GSPC, Abdelmalik DROUKDAL, appears to be following the course set by his predecessor, Nabil SAHRAOUI, namely that the organisation be guided by the concept of the international, violent jihad.

For example, a video posted on the Internet on 22 March showed DROUKDAL calling on his supporters to increase their involvement in the international jihad. He also criticised the United States and Arab governments, and promoted jihad as the only way to restore "honour and dignity", ultimately in order to establish the "caliphate that receives true guidance based on the Prophet's example".

In another message posted on the Internet in mid-August, DROUKDAL called on "French brothers" to assassinate members of the Algerian government who were in France.

Furthermore, several communiqués issued by the GSPC also contained expressions of solidarity for other protagonists in the international jihad, for example Osama BIN LADEN and Abu Musab

AL-ZARQAWI, as well as for the "fighters in Chechnya, Palestine and on the Arabian Peninsula".

### **3.2 Ansar Al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam)/ Ansar Al-Sunna (AAS, The Army of the Protectors of the Sunna)**

Founded:	AAI: In 2001 as a successor to Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) AAS: In 2004
Leader:	Abdullah AL-SHAFI
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	No exact figures available

In spring 2001, following several complex processes of fragmentation and amalgamation, the Kurdish Islamist AAI was born out of Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam). The AAI's goal is to establish an independent Islamist nation-state in the Kurdish part of Iraq. To do so, it uses terrorist means, including suicide attacks.

Following the official end to combat operations in Iraq in the summer of 2003, the AAI extended its original area of operations around the Kurdish city of Halabja to cover the whole of northern Iraq, including the Sunni triangle around Baghdad. Its "fighters" are organised in cells and have since been waging a guerrilla war in those regions against the US troops and their infrastructures, their allies and against the newly established Iraqi security forces.

The Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan–Iraq (DPK-I) both have armed structures and are also a target of AAI terrorist attacks, since they are co-operating with the coalition forces. The AAI sees both parties as rivals in the struggle for hegemony in the Kurdish part of Iraq.

In the course of 2004 the AAI created a type of umbrella organisation known as Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna (The Army of the Protectors of the Sunna [faith]), or Ansar Al-Sunna (AAS), which has also attracted a variety of foreign mujahidin. It usually assumed this name when carrying out numerous violent activities in Iraq throughout 2005.

These activities included, among other things, a video broadcast on the Internet of a high-ranking member of the Iraqi security forces in

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**Threats linked to the Iraqi parliamentary elections**

Mosul being executed on 23 January. In a statement (described as a "final warning") issued on an Islamist homepage on 27 January, the terrorist group threatened the Iraqi population if it voted in the parliamentary elections. The group claimed that polling stations would be natural targets for mujahidin attacks. A three-minute video containing a similar message was posted on the same website the same day. The video showed the destructive effect of a bomb detonating in a building in Mosul which the authorities had designated for use as a polling station.

The AAI has a network of sympathisers and supporters in various European countries - including Germany - although it has no fixed organisational structures. The AAI's network of supporters in Germany is tasked with open and covert agitation for the organisation's goals, plus classic logistical activities. These include, among other things, procuring and transferring donations to Iraq to provide financial support to the AAI/AAS and recruiting mujahidin.

The security authorities have long taken firm action against the mainly logistical activities of AAI supporters living in Germany:

**Criminal proceedings against AAI supporters in Germany**

On 12 January 2006 the Munich Higher Regional Court sentenced the Iraqi national Amin Lokman MOHAMMED to seven years in prison for membership of a foreign terrorist organisation, for smuggling foreigners on a gang basis and for fraud. The verdict became final on 23 January 2006. The Court found that both Ansar Al-Islam and Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna, for whom the Iraqi national had been active, fulfilled the preconditions for classification as a foreign terrorist organisation.

These were the first proceedings in which Section 129b of the Criminal Code (Foreign Criminal and Terrorist Organisations) found application following its creation in the wake of 11 September 2001.

Investigative proceedings against three alleged AAI supporters from Berlin, Stuttgart and Augsburg who are suspected of planning an attack on the Iraqi President, Iyad Allawi, during his official visit to Berlin on 2/3 December 2004 have been ongoing and charges were brought on 10 November.

In early December 2003 the Federal Public Prosecutor opened an investigation into structures underlying suspected supporters of the AAI, which is classed as a foreign terrorist organisation. As part of this investigation, a total of 20 properties belonging to a total of 14 suspects were searched in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein on 14 June and several arrests were made.

#### 4. Non-aligned mujahidin

Mujahidin also meet in small and very small groups. They generally congregate around a leader, are integrated into the global mujahidin network through multifarious contacts and are actively involved in various activities for the jihad, such as collecting donations, smuggling volunteers (either into training camps or to areas of armed combat) or by helping to prepare terrorist activities. What is common to all these structures is their members' willingness to take part in the violent, worldwide jihad.

Several networks ascribed to the non-aligned spectrum have also been broken up in Germany over the past few years.

#### Arrests and convictions

For example, Ibrahim KHALIL and Yasser ABOU SHAWEESH were arrested at their respective places of residence in Mainz and Bonn on 23 January. They have been charged under Section 129a of the Criminal Code with supporting a terrorist organisation. KHALIL and ABOU SHAWEESH were clearly planning to carry out attacks in the Arab region. They were to provide the funding for these attacks by faking deaths and subsequently making fraudulent life insurance claims.

Ihsan GARNAOUI, along with others, had been planning to carry out attacks in Germany in early 2003 and was arrested on 20 March 2003 in this connection. On 6 April the First Criminal Panel at the Berlin Court of Appeal sentenced GARNAOUI to a total of three years and nine months in prison, among other things for an offence against the Weapons Act. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence in support of another charge, namely the attempt to found a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 129a of the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, the Court found that GARNAOUI had undergone training for the violent jihad during his nearly two-year stay abroad and that he had been planning to carry out a bomb attack in Germany at the beginning of the war in Iraq.<sup>167</sup>

On 26 October, after a total of 136 days in court following the initiation of proceedings in February 2004, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court reached its verdict in proceedings against four members of the German branch of the international Islamist terrorist al-Tawhid network.

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<sup>167</sup> On 8 February 2006 the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) dismissed the appeal on points of law against the Court of Appeal's decision.

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The Higher Regional Court sentenced the accused Palestinians Mohammed ABU DHESS, Ismail SHALABI and Ashraf AL DAGMA to prison sentences of between six and eight years, among other things for membership of a terrorist organisation in conjunction with preparations to forge official identity papers on a gang basis. The fourth accused, the Algerian Djamel MOUSTAFA, was sentenced to a total of five years in prison for supporting a terrorist organisation and other offences. The court took MOUSTAFA's extensive confession into consideration when determining his sentence.

The Higher Regional Court found that the four accused had planned attacks on Jewish/Israeli targets in Germany on instructions from the terrorist AL-ZARQAWI (for whom an international arrest warrant has been issued) and that they had also supplied forged papers to comrades-in-arms living abroad.

In the autumn of 2003 Shadi ABDALLAH, a confessed member of the network led by ABU DHESS, had been sentenced to four years in prison for membership of a terrorist organisation.

## 5. Public statements

The media continue to be important to international Islamist terrorists, and the Internet has become the medium of choice. The broadcasting of statements, video and audio messages and other propaganda material ensures a great deal of public attention. Certain groups, such as the Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades, have up until now only been in evidence in the "virtual" domain. The aim of publishing such material is to inform and motivate supporters, to recruit new members and sympathisers, and to establish or maintain a certain level of threat. By publishing authentic and purported reports of their successes, the groups aim to strengthen their own position vis-à-vis their opponents. Further goals are to legitimise future attacks and forcefully demonstrate their own ability to act.

Al-Qaeda also used the media on several occasions in 2005 to publish numerous statements. It was usually Osama BIN LADEN's deputy, Ayman AL-ZAWAHIRI, who addressed the public in video messages. As usual these were broadcast by Qatari TV station Al Jazeera. AL-ZAWAHIRI usually broached well-known subjects in these messages, such as the need to continue the jihad. He also threatened further attacks should the West (which he claims is anti-Muslim) adhere to its policies and Western troops remain in Islamic countries. In the second half of the year AL-ZAWAHIRI issued three video statements regarding the London bombings. For example, in videos broadcast on 4 August and 1 September he claimed that the British Prime Minister Tony Blair bore responsibility for the attacks. The latter video comprised edited sequences showing AL-ZAWAHIRI and Mohammed Sidique KHAN, one of the 7 July bombers. AL-ZAWAHIRI appeared in a similar video of 19 September 2005, in which he linked Al-Qaeda to the bomb attacks in London for the first time:

"The blessed London campaign is one of those campaigns which Al-Qaeda had the honour of waging against crusading British arrogance. It is a campaign against the more than 100 years of crusading aggression and against the British crime regarding the founding of Israel and against continuing British crimes against Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq."

However, in a statement published on 23 October following the earthquake in Pakistan, AL-ZAWAHIRI did not take an aggressive stance, but rather restricted himself to calling for aid for the victims of

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the natural disaster. In his most recent statement, issued on 30 January 2006, AL-ZAWAHIRI derided US President George W. Bush and condemned the air raid on a house in Damadola, Pakistan, on 13 January 2006.

Terrorist groups in Iraq, such as the AAS or the Islamic Army in Iraq, who have claimed responsibility for kidnapping foreigners in Iraq, are likewise characterised by their increasingly professional use of the media. They often make use of the Internet to broadcast their messages to a wide audience, thus obviating the need for many staff or large amounts of funding and without revealing their own whereabouts. Statements claiming responsibility for attacks in Iraq and opposing any kind of democratic reform efforts in Iraq are published practically on a daily basis.

AL-ZARQAWI also time and again used audiotape messages published on the Internet to call for the jihad against the United States to be continued and stepped up. The following is taken from an audio message posted on the Internet on 29 April:

"We promise God that for as long as our hearts continue to beat the Roman dog Bush will find no peace of mind and his army will not lead a good life."

As well as Americans, AL-ZARQAWI regularly calls Iraqi Shiites the enemies of the Sunnis. In a statement issued on 14 September he declared "all-out war" on them. AL-ZARQAWI's TQJ became the focus of public attention in 2005 especially on account of its statements regarding the kidnapping and execution of high-ranking diplomats in Arab countries. In the spring those close to AL-ZARQAWI for the first time used the Internet to publish a magazine called *Thurwat al-Sinam* (Tip of the Camel's Hump). Three issues have been published so far. Several articles called on followers to join in the jihad against "unbelievers" in Iraq and in other Muslim countries. Other articles malign and discredit democratic governments. The magazine also contains reports with detailed military instructions.

Since around mid-September a news programme called *Sout al-Khilafa* (The Voice of the Caliphate) has been broadcast over the Internet at irregular intervals. In these webcasts a masked and armed speaker reads news on topics such as the jihad, international mujahidin, Palestine and Iraq, along with statements by Islamist terrorist groups from around the world. The programme has also broadcast film reports, for example on attacks and kidnappings in Iraq. On the one hand, *Sout al-Khilafa* is attempting to copy the style of

conventional news programmes, but on the other, it is clearly dissociating itself from standard media reporting practice claiming that this distorts reality. The programmes are produced by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) organisation, which has been responsible for disseminating Islamist propaganda on the Internet for many years.

### III. Islamism

#### 1. Of Arab origin

##### 1.1 Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, "Party of God")

Founded:	In 1982 in Lebanon
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	Around 900 (2004: around 850)
Media:	<i>Al-Ahd</i> (Commitment), published weekly (only in Lebanon); <i>Al-Manar</i> (The Lighthouse), TV station (Beirut)

The Shiite Hezbollah is under considerable influence from Iran, which also provides financial support. Hezbollah has been represented in the Lebanese parliament since 1992 and made gains in the parliamentary elections held in May. Now, for the first time, a Hezbollah MP has been appointed as a member of the cabinet, namely the Minister for Energy.

Nevertheless, the military wing of Hezbollah, *Al Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Resistance), continues to play an important role.

In the Palestinian conflict, Hezbollah supports the intifada (Palestinian uprising) in the Israeli-occupied regions. Its main objective is the struggle against the state of Israel as the "wrongful occupier of Palestinian territory". The withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon in May 2000 is seen as an example of Hezbollah's successful struggle against Israel.

In early May around 1 million people - one quarter of the population of Lebanon - took part in a rally organised by Hezbollah, proving its ability to mobilise the Lebanese. The demonstration was held in reaction to the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. A report published by the UN Investigation Committee links members of the Syrian and Lebanese secret services to the assassination of Hariri on 14 February. In a speech given at the rally,

Hassan NASRALLAH, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, called for the withdrawal of members of the Syrian military and intelligence services deployed in the country since the end of the civil war in 1990. He also called for a full investigation into Hariri's murder. NASRALLAH's speech also contained anti-American and anti-Israeli statements.

Most of the organisation's supporters in Germany showed only little interest in becoming actively involved in local Hezbollah societies. The numbers of the faithful attending mosques for religious festivals were likewise small; they only rose during Shiite festivals, for example the Day of Ashura (the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein). A few small-scale, so-called victory celebrations were held on 23 May, the "Day of Liberation" commemorating the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon. In keeping with tradition, a Hezbollah MP attended some of these events.

In 2005 only very few Hezbollah supporters took part in Al-Quds Day demonstrations held annually in Berlin in memory of the "occupation" of the City of Jerusalem (cf. 3.1 below).

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## 1.2 Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party)

Founded:	In 1953 in Jordan
Leader:	Ata Abu AL-RASHTA, alias Abu Yassin (since April 2003)
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	Around 300 (2004: around 200)
Publications:	<i>Khilafah Magazine</i> (The Caliphate; English), <i>Hilafet</i> and <i>Köklü degisim</i> (Turkish), <i>Al-Waie</i> (Arabic), <i>Expliciet</i> (Explicit; Dutch)
Banned:	15 January 2003

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami was founded in Jordan in 1953 by the journalist Taqi ud-Din AN-NABHANI, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB; cf. 1.4 below). As a pan-Islamic movement, the organisation addresses the entire Islamic community, or *Umma*, and explicitly rejects the existence of nation-state borders for this community.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami's declared aims are, above all, to destroy the state of Israel, to "liberate" the Muslim world from Western influences and to reintroduce the caliphate and sharia law, the underlying principles of the "Islamic order".

The organisation's headquarters are presumed to be in Lebanon. It has bases (*wilayat*) around the world, including in Egypt, Australia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan and the United States. Europe also represents a separate *wilayat*. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami spreads its propaganda chiefly by means of the Internet.

Before it was banned in January 2003, the organisation was mainly in evidence in German university towns, where its members distributed its publications and flyers. These regularly outlined anti-Jewish, anti-Israeli and anti-Western positions:

"Why don't these armies set forth to fight the Jews, to destroy the Jewish state once and for all and remove all trace of it? Why are fronts not opened up on all sides to fight the Jewish pack of thieves?"

(HuT flyer, undated)

More recent public statements by the organisation's foreign representatives also back up their standpoint:

"The party views the Western states, primarily Great Britain, America and France, as the archenemy of Islam and of Muslims."

(Interview with the HuT representative in Denmark, posted on the Internet, 17 January 2005)

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami also believes that a secular state system, i.e. also democracy, is irreconcilable with the "Islamic order":

"That is why Muslims are not permitted to accept democracy, since it is blasphemy. ... every Muslim must reject it and offer resistance to all who disseminate it."

("The US Campaign to Destroy Islam", HuT brochure, 1996)

#### **Ban**

Since Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami's propaganda activities are, among other things, directed against the concept of international understanding, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) banned the organisation in Germany on 15 January 2003.

On 25 January 2006 the Federal Administrative Court (BVwerG) dismissed Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami's appeal against the ban. That decision is now final. The court found that Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami had used the German-language magazine *Explizit* (Explicit) and various flyers to deny Israel's right to exist, to call for its violent eradication and to incite murder, and thus opposed the concept of international understanding. In the court's view, there was no doubt that the organisation was responsible for the magazine.

No further issues of *Explizit* have been published since the ban was imposed. Neither have public activities on the part of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami been in evidence in Germany since the ban.

Based on insights gained regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami structures in Germany following the ban, it can be assumed that the organisation has around 300 supporters in Germany (this figure differs from 2004 estimates).

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### 1.3 Hamas (Harakat Al-Muquawama Al Islamiya, Islamic Resistance Movement)

Founded:	In early 1988 in the Gaza Strip / today's autonomous Palestinian territories
Leader:	Khaled MASHAL (headquarters: Damascus, Syria)
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	Around 300 (2004: around 300)

Following the outbreak of the first intifada (Palestinian uprising) in December 1987, Palestinian supporters of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) formed a group led by Sheikh Ahmad YASSIN and founded Hamas in early 1988.

#### Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Hamas's main objective is to establish an Islamic state covering the entire Palestinian territory, including by use of force. It is primarily the task of the military wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, to achieve this objective. The Brigades have been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories which have claimed numerous lives.

Following the signing of the Sharm El Sheikh ceasefire agreement on 8 February between the Palestinian National Authority and the Israeli government, Hamas - at the instigation of the new Palestinian president - pledged not to carry out any attacks against Israeli targets for the time being. Hamas by and large stuck to this agreement in the run-up to the Palestinian parliamentary elections on 25 January 2006. These were the first parliamentary elections in which Hamas's political party, called "Change and Reform", had nominated candidates. It subsequently gained the majority of the seats (74 out of 132) on the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).

Hamas sees the evictions from the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip in August as a triumph of its "resistance". The following is taken from an interview with the Hamas functionary Mahmoud AL-ZAHAR after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip:

"We will advance into the settlements and pour contempt on Israel's dignity. We will stand on the ruins of the Israeli settlements and proclaim victory to our people." <sup>168</sup>

AL-ZAHAR went on to say that it was to be expected that Hamas would continue to use violent means to achieve its ends and that Hamas continued to deny the state of Israel's right to exist:

"First of all, there are no Israeli cities, merely settlements. And if the aggression and occupation continue, the Palestinian population has no other alternative but to defend itself." <sup>169</sup>

Hamas has around 300 supporters in Germany, but they are not part of any fixed organisational structures. This group of people was also hardly in evidence in the public domain in 2005. In order to prevent financial support for Hamas activities getting through from Germany, executive measures were again taken against societies suspected of having transferred donations to Hamas facilities in the Palestinian territories.

The registered fund-raising society Al-Aqsa was banned in 2002 by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) for supporting Hamas (upheld by the Federal Administrative Court's decision of 3 December 2004). The BMI has since established that the registered society YATIM-Kinderhilfe (YATIM Children's Aid), with headquarters in Essen, is a successor to Al-Aqsa. The administrative order became final on 30 August. The assets of YATIM-Kinderhilfe were confiscated. Like its predecessor, the Al-Aqsa society, YATIM-Kinderhilfe had been collecting donations in Germany in order to pass them on to alleged Hamas social facilities in the Palestinian territories, thereby providing support to Hamas's armed struggle against Israel.

On 15 January the registered society Bremer Hilfswerk (Bremen Relief Organisation), which is also suspected of being a successor to the Al-Aqsa society, disbanded after the organisation's activities had come under scrutiny during investigative proceedings under the law on associations. An investigation under the same law was also initiated into the Islamische Wohlfahrtsorganisationen e. V. (IWO, Islamic Charitable Organisations, reg'd society) headquartered in Herne on suspicion of supporting Hamas by collecting donations.

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<sup>168</sup> *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (The Middle East), 17 August 2005.

<sup>169</sup> *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 17 August 2005.

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#### 1.4 Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

Founded:	In 1928 in Egypt
Leader:	Mohamed Mahdi Othman AKEF (headquarters: Egypt)
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	Around 1,300 (2004: around 1,300)
Publications:	<i>Risalat ul-Ikhwân</i> (Circular of the Brotherhood); <i>Al-Islam</i> (Islam; now only available online)

The Islamist MB operates as an "ideological parent organisation" for numerous Sunni-oriented Islamist groups, such as the Palestinian Hamas (cf. 1.3 above).

The MB was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna and spread to nearly all Arab countries and to those countries in which Sunni Muslims are living. Its objective is to turn these countries into Islamist states, with a state system based exclusively on the Koran and the Sunna. To achieve this aim, the MB is exerting influence on religious, political and social life.

The MB's approximately 1,300 supporters living in Germany use numerous so-called Islamic Centres as meeting places and places to carry out their activities. The largest MB organisation in Germany is the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V. (IGD, Islamic Community in Germany, reg'd society) founded in 1960. By its own account, the IGD runs Islamic centres in Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt (Main), Cologne, Marburg and Münster. Its main headquarters are in the Islamische Zentrum München (Islamic Centre in Munich).<sup>170</sup>

Both the MB and the IGD fiercely condemned the 7 July London bombings.

<sup>170</sup> Programme of the IGD annual conference, 18/19 September 2004.

The IGD's chairman, Ibrahim EL-ZAYAT, stressed that no wrong could justify the killing of innocent people.<sup>171</sup> The head of the MB, Mohammed Mahdi AKEF, condemned the attacks as a "criminal act" which "was justified by no law and by no religion". However, AKEF went on to say that the spread of the culture of violence and terror and increased international pressure was the direct consequence of the US Administration and the British Government breaking the law, failing to honour international agreements and treaties, and oppressing people.<sup>172</sup>

In a press release issued in Cairo on 21 August the Egyptian MB called on compatriots to take part in the presidential elections on 7 September. It was not clear which candidate the MB was intending to support. The MB had boycotted a plebiscite held previously on a reform of the electoral law (which would have allowed several independent candidates to stand for election for the first time). The MB claimed that the new electoral law did not guarantee that independent candidates would stand a chance against President Hosni Mubarak. The MB's sudden change of heart led to speculations - also among MB supporters in Germany - about a possible pact between the Egyptian government and the MB.

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<sup>171</sup> IGD press release, 7 July 2005.

<sup>172</sup> MB press release, 7 July 2005.

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## 2. Of Turkish origin

### 2.1 Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society)

Founded:	In 1985 in Cologne (as the Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europa e. V. [AMGT, Association of the New World View in Europe, reg'd society])
Leader:	Osman DÖRING (known as Yavuz Celik KARAHAN)
Membership in Germany:	Around 26,500 (2004: around 26,500)
Publications:	<i>IGMG-Perspektive</i> (IGMG Perspective), at irregular intervals

#### Organisation and facilities

The IGMG has an estimated 26,500 members in Germany,<sup>173</sup> although its numerous facilities and wide range of courses and programmes reach a much larger circle of people. By its own account, the IGMG has more than 210,000 members throughout Europe,<sup>174</sup> the majority of which are Turkish immigrants living here permanently. On its homepage the organisation claims that it runs a total of around 2,200 facilities such as mosque communities and women's, youth and sports clubs. It is currently represented by 514 mosque communities in Europe, 323 of them in Germany alone.<sup>175</sup> Since 1995 the Europäische Moscheebau- und Unterstützungsgemeinschaft e. V. (EMUG, European Mosque Building and Support Society, reg'd society) has been responsible for managing the organisation's extensive property holdings.

#### The IGMG's ideological roots

The IGMG's ideological roots go back to ideas and concepts developed by the long-time Turkish politician Prof. Dr Necmettin ERBAKAN. His key concepts are those of *Millî Görüs* ("national view") and *Adil Düzen* ("just order"). IGMG members continue to revere ERBAKAN as the founder and spiritual leader of the *Millî Görüs*

<sup>173</sup> It should not be assumed that all members/supporters of the IGMG are pursuing or support Islamist goals.

<sup>174</sup> IGMG website, 17 October 2005.

<sup>175</sup> IGMG website, 17 October 2005, profile entitled *Islam Toplumunu Millî Görüs-Islamische Millî Görüs*, p. 12.

movement. His supporters in Turkey became members of the Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party) after its Islamist predecessors Refah Partisi (RF, Islamist Welfare Party) and Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party) were banned.<sup>176</sup> Despite the fact that ERBAKAN has been banned for life from taking on any political role, which is why he has no official function within the party, he is still seen as its figurehead and has wide-ranging influence both within the party and the movement. Along with establishing a "new Greater Turkey" following the example of the Ottoman Empire, the objectives of the movement include abolishing secular society and establishing a social system and way of life based exclusively on Islam - ultimately also at global level.

This long-term and comprehensive three-step plan (fundamentally restructuring Turkey, re-establishing a "Greater Turkey" and finally an Islamic world order) is outlined in articles and speeches by those with responsibility in the *Millî Görüş* movement. The following, for example, is what the chairman of the SP, Recai KUTAN, said in reference to his party's alleged return to strength:

"The only way to save our country is the Saadet Partisi, since *Millî Görüş* is not only a point of view for which justice is paramount, but it alone can create a viable Turkey, a new Greater Turkey and a new world based on justice."

(*Millî Gazete*, 26 October 2005, p. 1)

According to the concept of *Millî Görüş*, justice is essential and inseparably linked to Islam and a strict Islamic order, whilst political and social models which deviate from Islam are said to be synonymous with injustice or despotism. For example, the chairman of Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (Society of Anatolian Youth), the *Millî Görüş* youth organisation in Turkey, called Western democracy a "false civilisation".<sup>177</sup> ERBAKAN's explanations likewise continue to reflect this categorical and polarising point of view. The spiritual leader of the *Millî Görüş* movement postulates that religion influences all areas of life. In his speeches he makes reference to the concept of an all-encompassing "Islamic civilisation" which alone is able to break the materialistic power of the "unbelievers" and guarantee peace and freedom for humankind.<sup>178</sup> During a Ramadan event organised by the

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<sup>176</sup> The RP was banned in 1998, the FP in 2001.

<sup>177</sup> *Millî Gazete*, 18 October 2005, p. 1, p. 10.

<sup>178</sup> *Millî Gazete*, 13 October 2005, p. 10.

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SP in Istanbul, ERBAKAN made the following statements via a telephone link-up:

"Wherever the imperialists go they spread death and destruction. The Islamic civilisation will bring freedom and justice to all people."  
(*Millî Gazete*, 20 October 2005, p. 1)

The *Millî Görüş* movement holds fast to its ideological precepts. The *Millî Gazete* columnist Efser SELAMET defined this continuity as "unity in essence and word" and explicitly declared the following as regards the *Millî Görüş* movement:

"What we said in 1970, we are still saying today. What is right, is right at any time. What is right cannot be changed according to the times and the circumstances. Efforts to change what is right lead to nothing but self-deceit. The only right way is *Millî Görüş*."  
(*Millî Gazete*, 22 July 2005, p. 15)

**Islam: the only political and social system**

The *Millî Görüş* movement believes that Islam as it understands it provides the binding framework for each individual's life as well as for political and social life. The movement believes that justice, righteousness and good - the "just order" - can only be achieved by letting one's entire life be guided by Islam:

"As regards sharia law, there are two types of politics: Despotic politics, that is politics which goes directly against the rights of the people and which prohibits sharia; and just politics, that is politics which saves the rights of the people from the hands of the despots, which banishes subjugation and evil, and thwarts those who sow the seeds of discord and unrest; it is part of sharia law. ... Politics can create a just foundation based on sharia law. ... If politics declares itself independent of sharia, it makes itself absolute and itself becomes the source of subjugation."  
(*Millî Gazete*, 5 July 2005, p. 13)

Articles published in the *Millî Gazete* often propagate an uncompromising, absolutist understanding of Islam, which firmly rejects possible reforms:

"I am a Sunni Muslim and do not want any reforms and innovations in my religion. The Islamic faith does not need any reforms, changes or innovations. ... The theses put forward by some radicals, converts and reformers are completely wrong. There are no reforms in Islam. ... Reforms and changes can only be implemented in corrupt religions, human ideologies and teachings."  
(*Millî Gazete*, 9 September 2005, p. 4)

**The IGMG: part of the *Millî Görüş* movement**

The IGMG still belongs to the *Millî Görüş* movement. Although ERBAKAN last appeared in person at an IGMG event in 2002, he compensates for his absence by occasionally taking part via live link-ups and by sending his confidants in the SP to such events. IGMG supporters regularly play host to party functionaries from Turkey at official or private events in Germany or elsewhere in Europe and help to keep the IGMG in line with the party's goals.<sup>179</sup> High-ranking SP representatives again took part in large-scale IGMG events in 2005. For example, in mid-May the well-known party functionaries Arif ERSOY and Numan KURTULMUS were guests at the IGMG's Family Day in Kerpen, the biggest event of the year attended by more than 10,000 people. Seref MALKOC, one of the deputy chairmen of the SP and Managing Director of the *Millî Görüş* TV station TV 5, gave a speech at a meeting of international IGMG functionaries in Leverkusen on 24 September. The main focus of the event attended by several thousand people included the organisation's work programme for the year 2005/2006.<sup>180</sup>

The IGMG tries to play down its affinity with the *Millî Görüş* movement to those outside the organisation. The following, for example, is taken from a newspaper interview with the IGMG Secretary-General, Oguz ÜCÜNÇÜ:

"That means that what is currently happening in day-to-day politics in Turkey virtually has no effect on our lives and our demands in Germany. That is why we have developed a very keen eye for the fact that we have to do our job very well here and then rely on the support we get from Turkey when it comes to topics which truly depend on Turkey. That means, for example, that EU membership is a matter close to the IGMG's heart. You will see that we do not toe the same line as the *Millî Görüş* movement in Turkey. We have a different perspective."

(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 January 2005, p. 6)

The IGMG Secretary-General's statements are an expression of still largely unsuccessful efforts to negotiate more room for manoeuvre in

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<sup>179</sup> *Millî Gazete*, 25 January 2005, p. 20 (when leading SP functionaries took part in the Feast of Sacrifice organised by the Verein Junger Muslime Bremen [Society of Young Muslims in Bremen] in Delmenhorst); *Millî Gazete*, 28 January 2005, p. 20 (when SP functionary Mukadder BASEGMEZ took part in a Feast of Sacrifice organised by the IGMG-Northern Ruhr in Bielefeld); *Millî Gazete*, 24/25 September 2005, p. 2 (when the SP functionary Arif ERSOY took part in a youth festival organised by the IGMG community in Bielefeld).

<sup>180</sup> *Millî Gazete*, 28 September 2005, p. 1, p. 16.

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order to be able to focus more on the specific concerns of Muslims living in Europe. However, there are still no signs that the IGMG is attempting to break free of the *Millî Görüş* movement and thus also to dissociate itself from ERBAKAN.

***Millî Gazete*  
(National  
Newspaper)**

The Turkish daily newspaper *Millî Gazete* plays a key role in maintaining cohesion within the *Millî Görüş* movement and in propagating its ideology. A European edition of the paper is also sold in Germany.

Along with reports from Turkey focusing on SP activities and public statements, the newspaper contains in-depth reports on, among other things, IGMG events.

The goals of *Millî Gazete* were outlined in detail in an article published on the occasion of the paper's 33rd anniversary:

"[The newspaper's] goal is to ensure that the spiritual and moral values of our forefathers again become the intrinsic factors of life in our society. ... In every edition *Millî Gazete* has emphasised the national culture, rather than an imperialist understanding of culture, and has endeavoured to revive Islamic civilisation and culture."  
(*Millî Gazete*, 12 January 2005, p. 11)

The "chairman" of the Turkish edition emphasised the newspaper's central, and in his view, indispensable, role in maintaining cohesion within the *Millî Görüş* movement:

"If you want our *hoca* [teacher] Necmettin Erbakan to enter every household, you must read *Millî Gazete*. This newspaper reflects the *Millî Görüş* position in every respect and in every item of news. Even if *Millî Gazete* only consisted of a blank sheet of paper bearing the words '*Millî Gazete*', you must buy *Millî Gazete* in order to support the *Millî Görüş* movement. ...  
We must thank God that we are part of *Millî Gazete* and thus also of *Millî Görüş*, which speaks the truth and stands up for truth and the righteous."  
(*Millî Gazete*, 20 July 2005, p. 12)

*Millî Gazete* also attempts to recruit supporters from within the IGMG. Representatives from the newspaper have taken part in IGMG events and seminars. The speeches made on those occasions have emphasised the importance of the *Millî Gazete*.<sup>181</sup> Occasionally, subscriptions for *Millî Gazete* are given away as prizes at IGMG

<sup>181</sup> *Millî Gazete*, 25 February 2005, p. 3, and *Millî Gazete*, 6 April 2005, p. 3.

events.<sup>182</sup> The following statement made by a regional IGMG functionary shows how strongly the IGMG identifies with the newspaper. During the Sacrifice Feast the functionary in question explicitly declared:

"*Millî Gazete* is our lifeline. It should be our primary task to stand up for it, to read it and to motivate others to read it."  
(*Millî Gazete*, 17 February 2005, p. 3)

Since mid-2005 a different masthead has appeared in the European edition of the newspaper. The text states, among other things:

"*Millî Gazete Europe*

- is neutral vis-à-vis all institutions and parties,
- is not pursuing the goal of establishing a parallel society, but rather is aiming to build a multicultural, multireligious, multilingual, multiethnic and pluralistic society; it stands up for 'unity within diversity,
- rejects all forms of discrimination, racism and anti-Semitism, ...
- is extremely conscientious as regards democracy, human rights and freedoms, supports the freedom of the individual and the sovereignty of the law, respects the constitutions and laws of European countries ...
- The opinions expressed in its columns are those of the respective author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of our paper.
- The newspaper is not the official publication of any institution."<sup>183</sup>

The change in the masthead did not, however, signal a change in the newspaper's content. The paper's editorial line has not undergone any substantial change. On the contrary, those responsible for the *Millî Gazete* hoped to defuse the criticism that the publication was Islamist-oriented and to make it less open to attack by giving it a more moderate appearance. However, the close-knit relationship between *Millî Gazete*, the IGMG and the *Millî Görüs* movement has remained unaffected. All in all one can assume that the opinions expressed in *Millî Gazete* are still representative both of the IGMG's understanding of Islam and of its ideology.

**The IGMG's youth and educational work**

One of the main emphases of the IGMG's activities continues to be its work with youth and in the field of education. A poem published in *Millî Gazete* outlines its ideal of youth:

<sup>182</sup> *Millî Gazete*, 16 July 2005, p. 20.

<sup>183</sup> First noted on 17 June 2005.

"They show respect for and their obligation to our religion, the fatherland, the flag, they are concerned about those who betray the fatherland, they are dutifully devoted to the leader of *Millî Görüs*, Erbakan, our young people are self-aware and respectful. ... When it comes to their home or honour, their own life means nothing, our young people are self-aware and respectful. They study their history, restore their confidence, endeavour to follow in their forefathers' footsteps, they are faithful to the Koran and the Sunna, these soldiers, our young people are self-aware and respectful."

(*Millî Gazete*, 9/10 April 2005, p. 10)

As part of an IGMG competition, one IGMG functionary said that the aim was to train up educated, cultivated young people who stood up for national and moral values.<sup>184</sup> As regards the background to its youth educational seminars, the organisation's own publication, *IGMG-Perspektive* (IGMG Perspective), stated that the seminars should be held in order to develop young Muslims' Islamic identity and to strengthen their religious feelings.<sup>185</sup>

The IGMG regularly stresses that its training courses also promote integration, among other things. Given the fact that *Millî Görüs* ideology regards Islamic civilisation as being irreconcilably opposed to Western society, it is, however, doubtful whether and to what extent these courses actually promote integration.

#### Anti-Semitism

The IGMG in principle denounces anti-Semitism in its official statements. Accordingly, the organisation's official catalogue of books and its webpages do not contain any overtly anti-Semitic literature. However, in some cases such publications are indeed available through IGMG mosques.

During a search of an IGMG mosque in Munich on 30 September 2004 and on 14 April 2005, several books of an obviously anti-Semitic nature were found, some of whose content incited to hatred. The publications were intended for sale and included, for example, the Turkish edition of the "classic" anti-Semitic text *The International Jew* by Henry Ford. The other publications seized on those occasions, namely *Das Holzsword des Juden* (The Jew's Wooden Sword) by

<sup>184</sup> *Millî Gazete*, 27 May 2005, p. 3.

<sup>185</sup> *IGMG-Perspektive*, March 2005, p. 10.

Mustafa AKGÜN and *Freimaurerwesen und Kapitalismus* (Freemasonry and Capitalism) by a "research group" not further specified by name, propagate anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. Other material seized included the book *Der Aufschwung des Islam* (The Rise of Islam) by *Millî Gazete* columnist Gülay PINARBASI. The book draws on a distorted image of the global power of the Jewish press, which allegedly forms the basis for the worldwide rule of Zionism and the subversion of all other peoples.

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## 2.2 Hilafet Devleti (The Caliphate State)

Founded:	In 1984 in Cologne
Headquarters:	Cologne
Leader (prior to ban):	Metin KAPLAN
Supporters in Germany:	750 (2004: 750)
Banned:	12 December 2001

The leader of Hilafet Devleti, which has been banned in Germany, was Metin KAPLAN, the self-appointed "Emir of the Believers and Caliph of the Muslims". The organisation's goal was to overthrow the secular system in Turkey and to establish an Islamic system based on sharia law. Its long-term aim was the worldwide rule of Islam. The party described democracy and the multi-party system as irreconcilable with the principles of the Islamic faith and thus rejected them.

### **Ban continues to have an effect**

The bans imposed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) in 2001 and 2002 on Hilafet Devleti and a total of 36 sub-organisations, plus numerous subsequent police executive measures, continue to discourage KAPLAN's supporters from becoming active. Executive measures targeting KAPLAN's supporters were carried out again in 2005. For example, on 29 September numerous properties were searched in Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, in the Netherlands and in Belgium, among other things on suspicion of activities carried out following a ban. Further searches were carried out in Bavaria on 23 November, during which some items were also confiscated.

Since the ban was imposed a large proportion of the former Hilafet Devleti members have avoided openly engaging in other activities. However, some are attempting both to uphold organisational structures and to continue disseminating the teachings of the "Caliph" - for example via the Internet. Turkish-language websites are posted and updated on a Dutch server. The homepage of one of Hilafet Devleti's two websites depicts the organisation's flag (which has been banned in Germany) and the party's founders, Cemaleddin KAPLAN and his son Metin. Both sites also contain texts about and by Metin

KAPLAN, including articles about the legal proceedings against him in Turkey.

**KAPLAN  
given life sentence  
in Turkey**

After being deported to Turkey on 12 October 2004 and following a trial by jury in Istanbul, Metin KAPLAN was sentenced to life in prison on 20 June 2005, among other things for high treason. KAPLAN was found guilty of a total of 13 criminal charges brought by the public prosecutor's office. He was accused, among other things, of planning an attack on the Atatürk Mausoleum on 29 October 1998, the Turkish national holiday, when the government was to assemble there for a state occasion. The judgement was reversed on 30 November by the highest Turkish court of appeal. No date has yet been set for new proceedings.

### **3. Others**

#### **3.1 Iranian influence on Shiites living in Germany**

**Islamisches  
Zentrum Hamburg  
(IZH, Islamic Centre  
in Hamburg)**

The Islamische Zentrum Hamburg (IZH, Islamic Centre in Hamburg) is Iran's most important Islamic centre in Germany and one of the most important points of contact for Shiite Muslims in Europe. Several other Iranian facilities in Germany, for example in Berlin, Frankfurt (Main) and Munich, are affiliated with the IZH.

The IZH propagates Shiite precepts and links them to propaganda for the doctrine of the theocratic state which is rooted in the Iranian constitution. According to this doctrine the authority of the state does not originate with the people, rather it can only be legitimised by religion; the religious leader stands above the national assembly and the state president and is both political and religious leader with practically unlimited powers.

The director of the IZH is Ayatollah Seyyed Abbas GHAEM-MAGHAMI. Shiites of all nationalities visit the IZH, as do German converts.

The IZH's activities include holding Friday prayers, lectures on Islamic topics and festivities on Shiite holidays. It also produces publications of a religious nature, including the monthly magazine *Al Fadschr* (The Light of Dawn). The magazine deals with Koran-related topics, reports

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on regular events, excerpts from Friday prayers and "news from the Islamic world".

**Al-Quds Day**

Together with members of the Iranian community in Berlin the IZH regularly co-organises the annual large-scale event to mark Al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day). Al-Quds Day commemorates the "occupation" of Jerusalem and was introduced by Ayatollah KHOMEINI in 1979. It has been marked in Germany by Shiites of various ethnic backgrounds since 1996.

Only around 330 people, including Iranian, Lebanese and Turkish nationals, took part in the demonstration held on 29 October 2005. This was the lowest number taking part for years. Anti-Israeli public statements made by the newly elected Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, during a speech made on Al-Quds Day and the stricter conditions imposed by the Berlin authorities as a result were probably the main reasons why fewer people participated. Against this background demonstrators in Berlin were not permitted to use the Iranian president's anti-Israeli statements on their banners or by "openly carrying pictures". The Iranian president's public statements caused international outrage; Muslim organisations in Germany publicly dissociated themselves from what he had said, although the IZH did not.

**Muslim-Markt  
(MM, Muslim Market)**

The Internet portal Muslim-Markt (MM, Muslim Market) both directly and indirectly spreads anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli propaganda. The MM is operated by the Islamist Yavuz ÖZOGUZ, a Shiite of Turkish descent, with help from his brother Gürhan ÖZOGUZ. The ÖZOGUZ brothers have close links to the theocratic government in Iran represented by the religious leader Ayatollah KHAMENEI and thus act in accordance with the Iranian government's wishes.

On 9 September Yavuz ÖZOGUZ published a text on the MM portal in the form of a prayer, directed at a German scholar of Islam who had in the past taken a stance against Islamic fundamentalism. ÖZOGUZ's text read as follows:

"If Islam is as R. repeatedly portrays it, then may the Almighty Creator destroy all members of that religion! And if Mr R. is a hate-monger and liar, then may the Almighty Creator punish him for his crimes and also punish those who continue to insist on the untruths R. is spreading, despite repeated notice."

The person referred to in the text believed it constituted incitement to his murder and reported it to the police.

### 3.2 Tablighi Jama'at (TJ, Muslim Faith)

Founded:	Around 1926 in (British) India
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	Around 500 (2004: around 450)

The TJ was founded by Maulawi Muhamad Ilyas around 1926 as a pietist movement for the reawakening of faith. Its headquarters are in Lahore, Pakistan.

Ilyas was a follower of the Indian Dar al-Ulum, or Deoband School, an orthodox wing of Indian Sunni Islam which seeks to defend Islam and set it apart from other religions, especially Hinduism. The movement has in the meantime taken on nearly global proportions; its aim is to teach Muslims how to live their life based strictly on the Koran and Sunna.

TJ followers are obligated to undertake regular, voluntary and unpaid missionary activities in order to spread the faith and to achieve especial piety themselves by working as preachers. During their pilgrimages, which also lead them to Germany, they visit mosques, where they preach to TJ supporters and engage in their missionary work. In addition, they also meet individual Muslims in private.

Converts of this successful missionary work are often helped to find places at Pakistani Koran schools, where they spend several months studying. Such intensive training courses lend themselves to the purpose of indoctrinating participants in Islamist ideas. In some cases, those taking part in such courses have subsequently found their way into mujahidin training camps in Afghanistan.

Even though the movement professes to reject violence and presents itself as apolitical, due to its strict understanding of Islam and its global missionary activities there is a danger that it could promote the process of Islamist radicalisation and sow the seeds from which future jihadists or Islamist terrorists may grow.

The TJ has facilities in Hanover, Hamburg, Cologne, Erfurt, Nuremberg and Munich. The TJ has no fixed, nation-wide organisation in Germany; its activities are controlled and co-ordinated via a hierarchically organised network of people and via informal

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contacts among its followers. The TJ's primary target group in Germany is economically and socially disadvantaged young Muslims, as the TJ feels they are very receptive to its message. The organisation also targets young converts, who are recruited in intense, personal meetings.

In April the TJ organised a one-week meeting in Hamburg attended by 1,000 people from Germany and abroad. Guests included high-ranking preachers from India and Pakistan. At the end of the event attendees were put into groups and sent out on their missions. These journeys were not restricted to Germany, but in some cases took the missionaries to neighbouring countries in Europe.

### 3.3 Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) / Chechen Separatist Movement (CSB) <sup>186</sup>

Founded:	In the early 1990s in the Caucasus
Leader:	Sheikh Hakim SADULAYEV
Membership/ supporters in Germany:	Around 500 (2004: 500)

In 2005 public attention was again drawn to the violent conflict in the Russian Republic of Chechnya, which is increasingly spreading to Chechnya's neighbouring republics. A major incident in the conflict took place on 13 October, when CRI/CSB fighters and their local allied groups attacked state facilities in Nalchik, the capital of the Russian Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. More than 130 people were killed in the attacks.

#### The conflict in Chechnya

The CRI/CSB was founded in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The goal of the CRI/CSB is Chechen independence from the Russian Federation. Islamist forces within the CRI/CSB have gained more and more influence over the years. Their aim is to establish a North Caucasian "theocracy/caliphate" in Chechnya and beyond.

The ongoing struggle against the "occupation" of Chechnya by Russian security forces has claimed numerous civilian lives outside of Chechnya too, as evidenced in the taking of hostages in Moscow in 2002 and in Beslan in 2004.

Aslan MASKHADOV was elected president of the CRI in 1997, but the government of the Russian Federation ceased to recognise him as such in 1999. MASKHADOV was killed in March 2005. The new "president" of the CRI, Sheikh Hakim SADULAYEV, was largely unknown until his election and is considerably more Islamist-oriented. The Islamist field commander Shamil BASAYEV is responsible for a series of terrorist attacks and was called into the "government" and appointed "First Deputy Head of Government".

SADULAYEV is also responsible for founding the "Caucasus Front". Its aim is to extend the struggle against the Russian forces (which up

<sup>186</sup> The security authorities use the name Chechen Separatist Movement (CSB) to refer to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) group under its current "president" and leader Sheikh Hakim SADULAYEV.

until 2004 was restricted to the territory of Chechnya) to the entire northern Caucasus region. As a result, violent attacks have been carried out in the North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation, namely in the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, and in the region of Stavropol in the south-west.

**CRI/CSB activities in Germany**

Supporters of the movement in Germany include both Turks of Chechen descent and Chechens.

Their activities include propaganda events involving members of the "government" led by SADULAYEV, collection and transfer of donations to the CRI/CSB and other logistical support activities. As in 2004, an increase in activities was noted.

No violent activities by the CRI/CSB have so far been observed in Germany. Violent activities in Europe would run counter to the CRI/CSB's efforts to gain acceptance in Europe for its "struggle for independence".

**IV. Overview of measures taken by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) under the law on associations**

Organisation	Date of banning order	Grounds for ban	Status
<p><b>Hilafet Devleti (The Caliphate)</b> and sub-organisations</p>	<p>8 December 2001, among others</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Activities against the constitutional order and the concept of international understanding (rejecting democratic forms of government; goal of establishing an Islamic order based on sharia law and agitation against Israel, Jews and the Republic of Turkey).</li> <li>- Propagating violence as a means to achieve political ends.</li> </ul>	<p>Bans are final (Federal Administrative Court judgement of 27 November 2002, among others)</p>
<p><b>Hizb-ut Tahrir al-Islami</b></p>	<p>Banned on 10 January 2003</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Violating the concept of international understanding (denying Israel's right to exist).</li> <li>- Endorsing violence to achieve political ends.</li> </ul>	<p>Ban is final (Federal Administrative Court judgement of 25 January 2006)</p>

Organisation	Date of banning order	Grounds for ban	Status
<b>Al-Aqsa society</b>	31 July 2002	<p>Among others:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Violating the concept of international understanding</li> <li>– Supporting an organisation outside Germany which orders attacks against people, in each case by providing financial support to Hamas social organisations.</li> </ul>	Ban is final (Federal Administrative Court judgement of 3 December 2004)
<b>Islamische Wohlfahrtsorganisationen (IWO, Islamic Charitable Organisations)</b>	Investigation initiated on 5 September 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Suspected of violating the concept of international understanding by providing support to Hamas.</li> </ul>	Investigation ongoing
<b>YATIM-Kinderhilfe e. V. (YATIM Children's Aid, reg'd society)</b>	30 August 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Successor to the banned Al-Aqsa society</li> </ul>	The ban became final on 5 October 2005 following the expiry of the time limit for an appeal.
<b>Bremer Hilfswerk e. V. (Bremen Relief Organisation, reg'd society)</b>	Disbanded on 18 January 2005; struck off the official register of organisations and societies on 29 June 2005		On 3 December 2004 the BMI initiated an investigation with the aim of banning the society. The society disbanded before the ban was imposed.

Organisation	Date of banning order	Grounds for ban	Status
<b>Yeni Akit GmbH</b> Publisher of the European edition of the Turkish-language daily <i>Anadoluda Vakit</i> (Anatolian Times)	22 February 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="791 383 1086 551">– Denying and relativising the Holocaust in a manner which incites hatred.</li><li data-bbox="791 573 1086 674">– Anti-Semitic/ anti-Western propaganda</li></ul>	Ban became final in early 2006 after the expiry of the time limit for an appeal.

## **Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State (excluding Islamism)**

### **I. Overview**

#### **1. Developments within foreign extremism (excluding Islamism)**

As in previous years, the activities of non-Islamist groups of extremist foreigners in Germany are above all influenced by developments in their respective countries of origin.

##### **Left-wing extremism**

The goal of left-wing extremist groups of foreigners is still the "revolutionary" destruction of the existing social system in their home countries and the establishment of a socialist or communist system. These groups are mainly characterised by their Marxist–Leninist and/or Maoist ideologies.

##### **Turkish left-wing extremist organisations**

The majority of them are Turkish groups whose agitation in Germany chiefly involves protesting against Turkey, the European Union (EU) and, increasingly, against Germany's social policy and its policy towards foreigners. The Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front) continued the long-standing campaign regarding the "political prisoners" in Turkey who were moved from large cells into solitary confinement. As in 2004, some of these groups also carried out terrorist activities in their countries of origin.

##### **PKK/KADEK/ Kongra Gel**

The Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) today goes by the name of Kongra Gel (The People's Congress of Kurdistan); it says that in Europe it has continued to pursue its political goal of finding a peaceful solution to the "Kurdish issue". At a conference in the spring the organisation agreed to found a "new" PKK which is to adhere to the principle of "democratic confederalism" devised by Abdullah ÖCALAN. No structures belonging to the new organisation have as yet been identified in Europe.

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In mid-2004 the Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG, People's Defence Forces) declared that it was lifting a unilateral ceasefire vis-à-vis Turkey. Thereafter the group carried out attacks in Turkey against important civilian infrastructures, such as pipelines and railway lines. There were also more bombings in Turkish cities and tourist regions. A group which first emerged in August 2004, the TAK,<sup>187</sup> claimed responsibility for several of these attacks.

Since the end of a new unilateral ceasefire declared by the HPG (which lasted from 20 August to 3 October), there have been further clashes between the Turkish army and the HPG in the Kurdish regions.

**Nationalism** Nationalist/nationalist-oriented groups of foreigners - primarily Turkish - attach particular importance to the nation both in political/territorial and ethnic/cultural terms. They disregard the rights of other peoples and are thus fundamentally opposed to basic human rights and the concept of international understanding.

**Iranian opposition groups** Extremist Iranian opposition groups continue their agitation in particular against the existing system of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Their goal is still to bring about a fundamental change in this system. The activities of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran) and its political wing in Europe, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), are focused mainly on getting the organisation struck off the EU's list of terrorist organisations.

**Asian separatists** Separatist organisations from Asia focus on fund-raising and propaganda activities to support their organisations in their respective countries of origin. As regards the peace process between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government of Sri Lanka, both sides have for some time now been hardening their positions and there is the risk that civil war will again break out.

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<sup>187</sup> Kurdish: Teyrêbazê Azadiya Kurdistan. The group goes by various English names, including the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons [Translator's note].

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## **2. Organisations and followers**

The number of members and followers of the 45 (2004: 47) non-Islamist groups of extremist foreigners that endanger the security of the state again dropped - to 25,320 (2004: 25,720). The number of supporters of left-wing extremist or left-wing extremist-oriented groups of foreigners dropped to 16,890 (2004: 17,290). The figures for followers of nationalist groups of foreigners remained unchanged at 8,430 (2004: 8,430).

<b>Groups of extremist foreigners <sup>1</sup> (excluding Islamism): Followers</b>							
<b>Nationality / ethnicity</b>		<b>Left-wing extremists</b>		<b>Extremist nationalists</b>		<b>Total</b>	
		Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
Kurds <sup>2</sup>	2005	19	11,500			19	11,500
	2004	21	11,950			21	11,950
	2003	21	11,850			21	11,850
Turks <sup>2</sup>	2005	12	3,150	1	7,500	13	10,650
	2004	12	3,150	1	7,500	13	10,650
	2003	12	3,370	1	8,000	13	11,370
Arabs <sup>2</sup>	2005	4	150			4	150
	2004	4	150			4	150
	2003	4	150			4	150
Iranians	2005	2	1,150			2	1,150
	2004	2	1,150			2	1,150
	2003	2	1,200			2	1,200
Others	2005	2	940	5	930	7	1,870
	2004	2	890	5	930	7	1,820
	2003	2	900	4	880	6	1,780
<b>Total</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>16,890</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8,430</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>25,320</b>
	2004	41	17,290	6	8,430	47	25,720
	2003	41	17,470	5	8,880	46	26,350
<sup>1</sup> The figures refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded off. <sup>2</sup> Banned groups are also included in these figures.							

## II. Goals and main activities of individual groups

### 1. Turks (excluding Kurds)

#### 1.1 Left-wing extremists

The goal of Turkish left-wing extremist organisations is the revolutionary overthrow of the social system and system of government in Turkey. Based on their Marxist–Leninist and/or Maoist ideologies, some of these groups also engage in terrorist activities. Along with Turkish politics and current affairs, their agitation in Germany also increasingly focuses on matters relating to Germany's social policy and its policy towards foreigners. A further topic of agitation to which only the Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front) still adheres is the hunger strike and "death fasts" of comrades in Turkish prisons.

##### 1.1.1 Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front)

Founded:	In 1994 in Damascus, Syria after a split in the Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), which was founded in Turkey in 1978 and banned in Germany in 1983
Leader:	Secretary General Dursun KARATAS
Membership/supporters:	Around 650 (2004: around 650)
Publications:	<i>Devrimci Sol</i> (Revolutionary Left), at irregular intervals; <i>Ekmek ve Adalet</i> (Bread and Justice), weekly, ceased publication on 15 May 2005; <i>Yürüyüş</i> (March), weekly, since 22 May 2005, among others
Banned:	Since 13 August 1998

The Marxist–Leninist DHKP-C continues to pursue its goal of the revolutionary overthrow of the existing social system and system of government in Turkey and the establishment of a socialist society. The group insists that the "liberation of the people" can only be achieved through an armed popular uprising under the leadership of its military wing, the Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi (DHKC, Revolutionary People's Liberation Front).

The following is taken from a statement issued by the Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi (DHKP, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party), the political wing of the DHKP-C, on the 11th anniversary of its foundation:

"There is only one solution, namely to change this system, to chase the imperialists out of our country and to topple the oligarchic government. The revolution can solve our problems; the alternative is socialism. ... Our party believes that liberation can only be achieved by means of an armed popular uprising."  
(DHKP Internet Statement No 34, 29 March 2005)

**Terrorist  
activities in  
Turkey**

The organisation's ongoing "armed struggle" in Turkey again manifested itself in several terrorist acts. For example, on 1 July a would-be suicide bomber was shot dead by security forces as he attempted to force his way into the Turkish Ministry of Justice. The DHKC claimed responsibility for this failed attack:

"We have armed ourselves with bombs in order to call them to account for the 119 of our people they murdered in order to open the F-type prisons and to continue their policy of isolation."  
(DHKC Internet Statement No 350, July 2005)

At the same time the DHKC threatened acts of revenge:

"Those responsible for the isolation massacre will not get away without being called to account! ... As long as the isolation continues, the dying goes on, we will continue our activities."  
(DHKC Internet Statement No 350, July 2005)

By their own account, members of the DHKC's "armed propaganda units" operating in Turkey carried out several attacks on office buildings belonging to the governing AKP Party in Istanbul on 3 and 9 July to protest the shooting of the would-be assassin of 1 July. In addition, the DHKC confessed in its publication *Yürüyüş* (March; Internet editions Nos 9 and 11 of 17 and 31 July 2005) to having carried out further attacks against AKP facilities using Molotov

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cocktails and using firearms against police vehicles in Istanbul on 21 and 23 July.

The hunger strike in Turkish prisons continued to be the DHKP-C's main topic of agitation. Shortly after it began in October 2000 the hunger strike was turned into a so-called indefinite "death fast". According to the DHKP-C, around 120 prisoners have died so far, around 40 of them as a result of clashes with the security forces. The "death fast" is being staged in protest against the "solitary confinement" in which prisoners are being kept since being moved from large cells to newly constructed prisons, so-called F-type prisons. The following is taken from a statement issued by the DHKP:

"Our resistance to the F-type prisons is resistance for the sake of the revolution, to defend socialism and spread hope."  
(DHKP Internet Statement No 34, 29 March 2005)

Referring to the same topic, the DHKC inveighed against both the EU and Turkey's possible accession to the EU:

"The solitary confinement prisons introduced in Turkey as so-called F-type prisons are centres of massacre whose purpose is to eliminate the revolutionary opposition in Turkey and to smooth the way for EU accession."  
(DHKC Internet Statement, 26 May 2005)

A statement published on the Internet on 5 November by the DHKC Information Office in Brussels contained the following accusation:

"The EU is partly to blame for supporting a regime which has caused 120 prison deaths, which suppresses the democratic opposition and applies reactionary laws to undermine the right of self-defence."

Like the DHKP-C, supporters of the Solidarity with Political Prisoners and their Families in Turkey (TAYAD) group also took up the topic of the "death fast" of DHKP-C supporters imprisoned in Turkey. TAYAD's activities in Germany were mainly carried out on the initiative of the TAYAD Committee in Hamburg, which moved its headquarters to Berlin in the summer. Along with demonstrations held in front of Turkish diplomatic missions in Germany, the TAYAD committees organised information events, hunger strikes lasting several days and closely followed criminal proceedings in Turkey. However, these activities elicited little response among the German public.

The Anatolische Föderation e. V. (Anatolian Federation, reg'd society) has its headquarters in Cologne. There are indications that members

of this organisation (like members of TAYAD) also have ties to the DHKP-C. The federation continued its propaganda activities as in previous years, focusing in particular on Germany's social policy and its policy towards foreigners. When engaging in propaganda activities the Anatolian Federation tries hard not to reveal its close ties with the banned DHKP-C.

The DHKP-C's publication *Ekmek ve Adalet* (Bread and Justice) had been published regularly since March 2002. In its Internet edition of 15 May 2005 its editorial team announced, without stating any reasons, that the newspaper would cease publication. At the same time it indicated that a successor, called *Yürüyüş* (March), would be available from 22 May. The first edition of *Yürüyüş* contained an unequivocal declaration of support for the revolutionary overthrow of the existing system in Turkey and the establishment of a socialist society:

"Our revolution has a clear goal, namely to overthrow the current system, to establish a revolutionary rule of the people and to found an independent, democratic, socialist Turkey."  
(*Yürüyüş* Internet Statement, 22 May 2005)

On 24 January Karlsruhe Regional Court fined a DHKP-C functionary and a DHKP-C activist for violating a ban on an organisation and for taking part in a DHKP-C training course in August 2002.

On 21 June Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court imposed a suspended prison sentence of one year and three months on a DHKP-C functionary for membership of a terrorist organisation.

On 26 July the Federal Public Prosecutor at the State Security Division of Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court charged a DHKP-C functionary with membership of a terrorist organisation. The functionary was arrested on 29 June 2004 in Rotterdam after an alert had been issued for the entire Schengen area. The Netherlands extradited the functionary to Germany on 27 June 2005.

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### 1.1.2 Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party / Marxists–Leninists)

Founded:	In 1972 in Turkey
Membership/ supporters:	Around 1,300 (2004: around 1,300)
The organisation is split into the	
<b>Partizan group</b>	
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/ supporters:	Around 800 (2004: around 800)
Publications:	<i>Özgür Gelecek Yolunda Isci Köylü</i> (Workers and Farmers on the Road to a New Democratic State), fortnightly; <i>Komünist</i> (The Communist), monthly
and the	
<b>Maoist Communist Party (MCP)</b> (until December 2002 called the East Anatolian Area Committee)	
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/ supporters:	Around 500 (2004: around 500)
Publications:	<i>Halk İcin Devrimci Demokrasi</i> (Revolutionary Democracy for the People), fortnightly; <i>Halk Savası</i> (People's War), monthly

The TKP/ML was founded in 1972 in Turkey but has been split into two rival factions, the Partizan group and the MCP, since 1994. Both factions see themselves as the successor to the original TKP/ML and have adopted its original ideology and goals without making any

changes to them. The group's ideology is based on Maoist-oriented Marxism–Leninism; its goal is to establish a communist society in Turkey by means of a military, revolutionary struggle there.

Both factions maintain paramilitary groups in Turkey in order to be able to achieve their goals. The Partizan group has the Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (TİKKO, Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army); the MCP has the People's Liberation Army (HKO). On several occasions these were involved in armed clashes with Turkish security forces. For example, 17 HKO/MCP members died during a shoot-out with the Turkish army in south-eastern Turkey on 16 and 17 June, ahead of a planned conference. In a written statement issued in June, the MCP announced:

"On 16 June 2005 ... 17 of our comrades were killed by the fascist Turkish state. We have been hit hard by this loss and the pain is great. ... Damn the murderous, fascist Turkish state! Long live the people's struggle! Long live Marxism–Leninism–Maoism!"

Partizan addressed the same topic in a flyer published in June:

"With the greatest respect we bow down before the glorious memory of the founders of the MCP, their leadership cadres ... the commanders of the HKO and its fighters who fell following a despicable attack by ... the oligarchic state. ... To ensure that the struggle of the fallen leadership cadre and the MCP fighters continues until the final liberation, our party, the TKP/ML, will discharge its responsibility. ... We have pledged to fight for a democratic people's revolution until we are victorious."

Both factions of the TKP/ML used the above-mentioned clashes in Turkey as an opportunity to hold joint demonstrations with other left-wing extremist Turkish groups in various German cities to protest against the Turkish army's military activities and to express their solidarity in public with the people affected and with the MCP. Around 2,000 people took part in such an event in Duisburg on 25 June.

The Avrupa Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu (ATİK, Confederation of Workers from Turkey in Germany), the Almanya Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu (ATİF, Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany, reg'd society), the Avrupa Demokratik Halklar Konfederasyonu (ADHK, Confederation for Democratic Rights in Europe) and the Föderation für demokratische Rechte in Deutschland e.V. (ADHF, Federation for Democratic Rights in Germany, reg'd society) likewise all took up the incident. In doing so these organisations clearly

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showed their affinity with the Partizan group and MCP issues, as in previous years. The following is taken from an ADHK flyer issued in July:

"On 16/17 July the Turkish state used its racist forces to carry out another massacre. ... These heroic offspring of our peoples ... had come together to find a solution and to change our country's fate. These brave people ... sacrificed their lives for our people's struggle for freedom and for the people's struggle."

The following is taken from a joint "obituary" posted on the Internet by ATİK, ADHK and other groups:

"Those who were murdered were important activists in the democratic struggle against Turkish nationalism. ... We demand a thorough investigation into the incidents and will, if necessary, take our demand to the International Court of Justice!"  
(ATİK Internet publication, 8 July 2005)

The Partizan group and the MCP have separate structures in Germany which they use to help support their parent organisations in Turkey. They get the necessary funding by collecting donations, selling publications and holding events. The following is taken from a flyer published by Partizan in October 2004:

"The revolution is necessary! ... Each true communist party and especially a fighting party needs financial support from its grass-roots. ... Help your party financially and strengthen it."

In addition, the Partizan group held an indoor event in Ludwigshafen on 14 May on the anniversary of the founding of the original TKP/ML. Around 3,000 people took part in the event. Around 1,000 people took part in each of two events organised by the MCP on the same occasion in Wuppertal on 7 May and in Ludwigsburg on 21 May. Such activities are used to motivate the organisation's supporters in Germany and to recruit new members. The following is taken from a flyer dated 14 April and signed by the Central Committee of the MCP, which has its headquarters in Turkey:

"In our country the path is the people's struggle. ... The time has come to take further steps! Join the HKO."

### 1.1.3 Marksist Leninist Komünist Partisi (MLKP, Marxist–Leninist Communist Party)

Founded:	In 1994 in Turkey through the merger of the TKP/ML-Hareketi (TKP/ML Movement) and the Türkiye Komünist İşçi Hareketi (TKİH, Turkish Communist Workers' Movement)
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/ supporters:	Around 600 (2004: around 600)
Publications:	<i>Atilim</i> (The Venture), weekly; <i>Internationales Bulletin der MLKP</i> (International Bulletin of the MLKP), monthly; <i>Partinin Sesi</i> (The Voice of the Party), bi-monthly

The MLKP's declared aim is to abolish the Turkish system of government by means of a violent revolution and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat. Its ideology is based on the teachings of Marx and Engels and on ideological principles put forward by Lenin and Stalin.

In Germany, the MLKP restricted itself mainly to propagandistic comments on current political affairs. The group engaged in no noteworthy public activities.

In its publication, the *Internationales Bulletin der MLKP* (International Bulletin of the MLKP), the MLKP criticised the G8 Summit held in Gleneagles, Scotland in July. It also condemned the 7 and 21 July bombings in London:

"... we very clearly emphasise that this act does not conform to the socialist viewpoint and the understanding of justified revolutionary violence and it is thus unacceptable."  
(*Internationales Bulletin*, No 36, August 2005)

Further statements are indicative of the anti-imperialist ideology which is typical of left-wing extremist Turkish groups:

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"The true reason for the bombings which turned London into a blood-red sea is British imperialism, which is drowning the peoples of this world in blood, from Afghanistan to Iraq and from Palestine to the whole world. That is why the Bushes and Blairs are to blame for the death of the innocent people who died in the attacks, since they claim 'we will establish a new system in the Middle East' and 'bring democracy'. ... The imperialist aggression and barbarism will be destroyed by the united struggle and actions of the British working class, the peoples of Iraq and the Middle East, and the working class of the world and the people of the world at international, national and local level."

(*Internationales Bulletin*, No 36, August 2005)

Almanya Göçmen İşçiler Federasyonu (AGİF, The Federation of Immigrant Workers from Turkey in Germany, reg'd society) has in the past issued statements which showed clear thematic links to the MLKP and thus clearly indicated its affinity with the organisation. In 2005, AGİF commented more on current political affairs in Germany. For example, on the occasion of the Bundestag elections on 18 September it issued a "recommendation" that supporters vote for the Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschland (MLPD, Marxist–Leninist Party of Germany):

"Lafontaine, the WASG, PDS and the DKP are left-wing versions of the SPD–Green government and want to win over to their policies the increased class hatred of the masses towards the capital and exploiters. ... That is why AGİF supports the MLPD; with the prospect of fortifying the revolutionary core of the working classes and the millions of oppressed working masses in Germany against exploitation and the power of capital."

(AGİF flyer, September 2005)

## 2. Kurds

### 2.1 Overview

Of the roughly 500,000 Kurds living in Germany approximately 11,500 are followers of Kongra Gel (The People's Congress of Kurdistan). The group is calling for greater political and cultural independence for Kurds in their countries of origin, chiefly Turkey.

### 2.2 **Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) / Kongreya Azadi û Democrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy for Kurdistan) / Kongra Gel (The People's Congress of Kurdistan)**

Founded:	In 1978 as the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey
Leader:	Zübeyir AYDAR (subordinate to the "Leader of the People of Kurdistan" Abdullah ÖCALAN and the General Presidential Council)
Membership/ supporters:	Around 11,500 (2004: around 11,500)
Publications:	<i>Serxwebûn</i> (Independence), monthly; <i>Özgür Politika</i> (Free Politics) daily, among others
Banned:	Since 26 November 1993 (the ban on the PKK includes a ban on KADEK and Kongra Gel)

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### 2.2.1 General situation

Since the founder of the PKK, Abdullah ÖCALAN, was arrested in 1999, the party has attempted to rid itself of the reputation of being a terrorist organisation. Part of this attempt has included a name change - in spring 2002 to KADEK and in November 2003 to Kongra Gel. Despite being included in the EU's list of terrorist organisations since 2002, the organisation has been endeavouring, particularly in Europe, to gain recognition as a political force. For example, it again and again attempts to establish contacts to political decision-makers at various levels and to seek support for its concerns. In 2005 it focused, among other things, on calling for the EU's accession talks with Turkey to be closely linked to the Kurdish issue.

Around the time of the Kurdish New Year festivities (*Nevroz*, traditionally held on 21 March), Kongra Gel issued an ultimatum to the Turkish government. In February the chairman of the Kongra Gel Presidential Council, Murat KARAYILAN, announced that the organisation would be ready and willing to step up its military struggle in Turkey if the Turkish government did not take appropriate steps to solve the Kurdish issue. The deadline imposed was *Nevroz*. Since the HPG (the organisation's guerrilla units which primarily operate in Turkey and northern Iraq) ended its so-called unilateral ceasefire, the number of clashes in south-eastern Turkey has increased since mid-2004. The conflict has thus been deepening since April as the HPG, in contrast to its previous practice, began carrying out attacks against civilian infrastructure, including oil pipelines and railway lines.

#### **Bombings in Turkey**

A number of bomb attacks were also carried out in Turkish cities and holiday resorts in the summer. A group going by the name of TAK<sup>188</sup> claimed responsibility for some of these. TAK was, for example, responsible for an explosion in Tuzla on 14 June which killed one person and injured seven others. On 10 July a fragmentation bomb planted by TAK in the tourist centre Çeşme injured 20 people. TAK on numerous occasions warned tourists not to go to Turkey. Both TAK and Kongra Gel have denied any links between the two groups, but this seems to be the obvious conclusion given the similarity in their concepts.

#### **"Period of inaction"**

In autumn the organisation announced a so-called "period of inaction", during which the HPG was only to engage in "passive defence"

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<sup>188</sup> Cf. footnote 189.

measures. This phase was initially to last until 20 September, was then extended until 3 October (when accession talks with Turkey were set to begin), but subsequently called off. The venture was apparently based on the expectation that the Turkish government might signal its willingness to agree to Kongra Gel's demands.

However, even during the "period of inaction" there were repeated reports of clashes between Kurdish rebels and the Turkish security forces.

In Europe, by contrast, Kongra Gel continued the policy of non-violence it introduced in 1999 following Abdullah ÖCALAN's arrest. Nevertheless, the organisation still has a large following here which can be mobilised to take part at any time in ongoing propaganda campaigns and militant activities when the Kongra Gel leadership deems this necessary - as the PKK leadership did in 1999.

### 2.2.2 Organisation

The ban imposed on the PKK in Germany also covers KADEK and Kongra Gel. The organisation's political wing is also banned; initially called the Nationale Befreiungsfront Kurdistans (ERNK, National Liberation Front of Kurdistan), in May 2000 it changed its name to Kurdische Demokratische Volksunion (YDK, Kurdish Democratic People's Union). The YDK was disbanded in June 2004 during the 5th Ordinary European Congress held in France. It was replaced by the Co-ordination of Democratic Kurdish Society in Europe (CDK), essentially the YDK under a different name. The CDK is now the organisation's political wing in Europe and, on account of its ramified system of functionaries, it has a decisive influence on Kongra Gel's illegal apparatus in Germany.

#### "New" PKK founded

A Congress to Re-establish the PKK was held in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq from 28 March to 4 April. Around 250 delegates took part. It was subsequently announced that a "new" PKK had been founded and this was to be seen as the organisation's "official re-birth". According to a declaration signed by the delegates, the "new" PKK is to play a key role in the democratisation of the Middle East.

The focus is on Abdullah ÖCALAN's principle of "democratic confederalism", which is also linked to the concept of *Koma Komalen*

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*Kurdistan* (KKK, union of Kurdish communities). The “new” PKK thus says that it has finally abandoned the original goal of an independent Kurdistan and replaced it with the objective of developing a so-called Federation of the Democratic Middle East. This would be a federal union of Kurdish settlement areas in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, although the existing national boundaries would be respected. In the main this corresponds to the ideas outlined in KADEK's and Kongra Gel's party manifestos, namely that of a so-called Federation of the Democratic Middle East which covers all Kurdish regions.

The "new" PKK says that it does not intend to replace Kongra Gel. Rather, the latter is to continue as an umbrella organisation under which as many Kurdish movements and organisations as possible are to be united. The founding of the "new" PKK has not yet led to any changes in the organisation's European structures. Rather, the revival of the old name has more of a declaratory effect, aimed at getting followers to return to past traditions and values of the old PKK and especially to encourage the cadres to apply themselves to the organisation's tasks in the spirit of Abdullah ÖCALAN.

The Third Kongra Gel General Assembly was held from 4 to 21 May in northern Iraq. Murat KARAYILAN was confirmed as Chairman of the Presidential Council and Zübeyir AYDAR as Chairman of Kongra Gel.

Kongra Gel's illegal and in essence conspiratorial structures and those of its front organisation, the CDK, have largely remained unchanged. At the top hierarchical level the organisation continues to divide Germany into what it calls its northern, central and southern *serits*. These are divided into a total of 29 regions. To realise the leadership's plans and to inform the grass-roots of their activities, Kongra Gel and the CDK use local associations which serve as meeting places and points of contact for their supporters. Many of these associations are united under the Föderation kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland e. V. (YEK-KOM, Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany, reg'd society), an umbrella organisation. At national level Kongra Gel also has numerous so-called mass organisations which each represent specific interest groups and sections of Kurdish society. Of these, the Youth Movement of Kurdistan (TECAK), the Free Women's Union (YJA) and the Association of Students from Kurdistan (YXK) are particularly active. Other groups are the Union of Kurdish Teachers (YMK), the Union of Kurdish Journalists (YRK), the Union of Kurdish Lawyers (YHK), the Union of Kurdish Writers (YNK), the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (CIK), the Union of Yezides from Kurdistan

(YEK), the Union of Kurdish Families (YEK-MAL) and the Union of Alevites from Kurdistan (KAB).

The Homeland Office (ÜLKE Office) is also part of Kongra Gel. Its activities are shrouded in uncommon secrecy and are thus difficult for outsiders to detect. This unit supports the organisation's activities in the Middle East from its vantage point in Europe, for example by smuggling functionaries and forging passports to that end. Several police measures in the Netherlands in late 2004 seem to have severely damaged the organisation. As a result, hardly any activities were noted in 2005 - at least not in Germany.

**Kongra Gel  
"mouthpieces"  
banned**

The organisation's media are of central importance as they are used, among other things, to spread messages from leading Kongra Gel committees and functionaries and to publish reports on terrorist activities in the Kurdish regions. In September the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) banned the publisher of *Özgür Politika* (ÖP, Free Politics), which is available in Germany, and the operator of the Mesopotamia Haber Ajansi (MHA) news agency, which also has its headquarters in Germany. On account of their structural links and content, both media can be viewed as Kongra Gel "mouthpieces". In December the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) reversed the ban for legal reasons, i.e. without an examination of the facts.

*Özgür Politika* was also available on the Internet until it was banned. The online version was practically identical to the print version. Following the ban all news relating to Kongra Gel was initially available via the MHA's website; in late October the Fırat News Agency (ANF) took over this task.<sup>189</sup> In addition, viewers can now also access news relating to the organisation via a live stream operated by ROJ-TV.

### **2.2.3 Kongra Gel propaganda**

Kongra Gel again engaged in numerous propaganda activities aimed at making the organisation's concerns more widely known in Europe. The main topics - especially after the start of the EU's accession talks with Turkey - were the familiar call for greater recognition of the political and cultural identity of Kurds in Turkey and the prison conditions of Abdullah ÖCALAN, the "Kurdish national leader". The large numbers of people taking part in these campaigns and the

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<sup>189</sup> *Yeni Özgür Politika* (New Free Politics) was first published on 16 January 2006.

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numerous events held are also renewed evidence of the organisation's ability to mobilise many followers in Germany.

On 12 February, on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of Abdullah ÖCALAN's arrest in Kenya on 15 February 1999, Kongra Gel supporters held a big demonstration in Strasbourg. The event was organised by the Federation of Kurdish Associations in France (FEYKA KURDISTAN). Its motto was "Free Öcalan - A Democratic Solution to the Kurdish Issue". Around 9,000 people from several European countries - mainly Germany - took part.

On 8 March, International Women's Day, Kurdish women's organisations (mainly those close to Kongra Gel) held meetings and staged rallies in several European countries. Numerous events were held in Germany too, chiefly in local associations close to Kongra Gel. As in recent years, no big public demonstration was held at national level.

**National indoor  
events at Kurdish  
New Year, Nevroz**

Traditionally, Kongra Gel supporters stage functions and hold torch-lit processions to celebrate Kurdish New Year (*Nevroz*, on 21 March). Unlike the past few years, when a big, central, European demonstration was held, the highlight of this year's *Nevroz* festivities in Germany was three national indoor events: on 19 March in Essen (attended by the Kongra Gel Chairman Zübeyir AYDAR), on 26 March in Hamburg and on 2 April in Frankfurt (Main). Several thousand people travelled to each of these events.

On 1 May Kongra Gel activists and followers took part in the traditional local rallies and nation-wide demonstrations in Germany, as in previous years.

**2nd International  
Zilan Women's  
Festival**

The Women's Office for Peace (CENI) held the 2nd International Zilan Women's Festival on 18 June in Gelsenkirchen.<sup>190</sup> CENI has close ties with Kongra Gel. The motto of the event was "Women want peace and justice - For an ecological and democratic world". Around 3,500 people travelled to the event by bus. Especially *Özgür Politika* and ROJ-TV had advertised the event, which was also broadcast live on ROJ-TV. The programme included messages of greeting from women's organisations linked to Kongra Gel which called for the

immediate end to all military operations by the Turkish state against

<sup>190</sup> The festival is named after Zeynep Kinaci ("Zilan"), whom Kongra Gel supporters honour as a martyr. On 30 June 1996 Kinaci blew herself up in Tunceli, East Anatolia during a military parade, killing at least six soldiers. More than 20 others were injured, some of them seriously.

the HPG and for followers to support the Kurdish people's struggle for freedom.

The Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD) on 14 July 2005 initiated a new Europe-wide campaign of solidarity. The campaign also collected signatures for a petition and was to last until March 2006. Its mottoes were "Free Öcalan", "Solidarity with Öcalan" and "I acknowledge Öcalan as the political will of the Kurdish people". The aim of the campaign was to get Kurds around the world to accept ÖCALAN as their political leader. Once the campaign was over all the signatures were to be handed over to the Council of Europe and other international institutions. At a press conference, the chairman of KON-KURD, Ali YIGIT, stated that each signature brought them closer to solving the Kurdish problem and that the campaign would be used to make the "Leader of the Kurdish people", Abdullah ÖCALAN, the point of contact as regards political matters.

#### **13th International Kurdistan Cultural Festival**

The 13th International Kurdistan Cultural Festival was held in Cologne on 3 September. Around 40,000 people attended the event, the motto of which was "EU-Turkey: We are also a negotiating partner - Solve the Kurdish issue, Free Abdullah Öcalan". Visitors travelled from all over Germany and from neighbouring countries, especially France, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, to take part. As in previous years, the programme consisted of various cultural and folkloristic performances, as well as political speeches. Murat KARAYILAN, the leading Kongra Gel functionary, took part via a live telephone link-up.

Kongra Gel chairman Zübeyir AYDAR sent a message of greeting. During the festival numerous visitors openly waved flags to express their support for Kongra Gel and in particular for Abdullah ÖCALAN. The festival was also broadcast live on ROJ-TV, which has close ties with Kongra Gel. The event was peaceful and trouble-free.

On 5 September the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) banned the E. Xani Presse- und Verlags-GmbH, the publisher of *Özgür Politika*. Several protests were held in various German cities following the ban. For example, on 13 September around 200 Kurds staged a protest on a field in front of the Düsseldorf *Land* parliament (following a call by YEK-KOM). Various posters, banners and older issues of *Özgür Politika* were displayed. Most of the demonstrations were registered with the authorities and went off peacefully. On 7 September, however, several youths threw burning Molotov cocktails onto a federal road in Hesse. They also left behind a placard with a warning to the BMI.

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**Major demonstration  
at start of EU  
accession talks  
with Turkey**

On 1 October KON-KURD organised a big demonstration in Brussels, Belgium. Around 4,000 people from several European countries, including a large number from Germany, took part. The motto of the demonstration was "A. Öcalan is the political will - Kurds will be a partner during negotiations". It addressed the start of the EU's accession talks with Turkey on 3 October, the ban on Kurdish media facilities in Germany, and calls for Öcalan to be freed and for "Peace in Kurdistan".

The 9th of October is the anniversary of Abdullah ÖCALAN's expulsion from Syria. According to Kongra Gel, 9 October 1998 was the start of the "international conspiracy" which eventually led to ÖCALAN's arrest and sentencing in Turkey. Demonstrations and protest pickets were held on 8 and 9 October in Mannheim, Duisburg, Saarbrücken, Berlin and Cologne. Participants emphasised their solidarity with Abdullah ÖCALAN and condemned the "international conspiracy".

#### **2.2.4 Financial and business activities**

Kongra Gel again collected several million euros in donations during its annual campaign in Germany. However, this was less than had been collected in previous years. The organisation was apparently not able to move its supporters to donate more money. Other income was generated, in particular, by monthly membership fees and the sale of publications. On 18 October a leading functionary of Kongra Gel's "finance and business office" (EMB) in Darmstadt was arrested on suspicion of being the ringleader of a criminal organisation (Section 129 subsections (1) and (4) Criminal Code). The EMB is responsible for all the organisation's financial matters in Europe. It has a comprehensive overview of income and expenses. Larger expenses must first be approved by the EMB.

The annual congress of the Association of Kurdish Employers (KARSAZ), which has close ties with Kongra Gel, took place in Raunheim, Hesse from 30 April to 1 May. The event concentrated on ways to strengthen the Kurdish economy and attract investments in "Kurdistan"; the KON-KURD chairman gave a speech. The association has up until now had no influence and has engaged in few activities that have generated any publicity.

#### **2.2.5 Criminal proceedings against former functionaries**

On 4 January the former chairman of Heyva Sor A Kurdistanê (HSK, Kurdish Red Crescent) was sentenced to a fine of 40 daily rates by Koblenz Regional Court for membership of a banned organisation. The court found that the HSK was a branch of the banned PKK.

On 1 February, while attempting to enter the Federal Republic of Germany, a high-ranking Kongra Gel functionary was arrested on an arrest warrant issued by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH). On 17 August the Federal Public Prosecutor at Frankfurt (Main) Higher Regional Court charged him with being the ringleader of a criminal organisation. The proceedings ended on 23 December, when he was sentenced to two years and three months in prison. The defendant was found guilty of belonging to the European leadership of the PKK between 1999 and 2001.

On 8 February a Turkish national of Kurdish origin was arrested in Berlin on an arrest warrant issued by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) on 13 April 2004. On 17 August the Federal Public Prosecutor charged him before Stuttgart Higher Regional Court with membership of a criminal organisation. On 21 December the defendant was found guilty of being responsible, as leader of the cadre, for the PKK's former north-west region (Hamburg, Berlin, Kiel and Oldenburg) between July and December 2001. He was given an 18-month suspended prison sentence.

On 29 April two former PKK functionaries who had already been found guilty of membership of a criminal organisation were given prison sentences in the second appellate proceedings before Celle Higher Regional Court. The court sentenced one of the defendants, who had also violated various laws concerning foreigners, to two years and eight months in prison; the second defendant was sentenced to two years and two months in prison. The second appeal concerning the sentence was necessary as the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) had confirmed Celle Higher Regional Court's initial guilty verdict, but had reversed the terms of the sentence.

The main proceedings before Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court against two leading PKK/KADEK functionaries who had been arrested in May 2004 began on 9 May. They were charged with leadership/membership of a criminal organisation and grievous bodily harm.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> On 3 February 2006 the Higher Regional Court sentenced one of the defendants to two years and four months in prison for membership of a criminal organisation. The Court sentenced the other defendant to two years and ten months in prison for being the ringleader of a criminal organisation.

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On 7 June Dortmund Regional Court sentenced a long-standing leading functionary of the organisation to two years in prison for violating the law on associations, for extortion and for membership of a criminal organisation. It found that the defendant had, among other things, been the regional representative for Dortmund, Bonn and Duisburg.

On 16 June Koblenz Higher Regional Court gave a 28-year-old Turkish national of Kurdish origin a two-year suspended prison sentence for membership of a criminal organisation. The court found that he had been KADEK/Kongra Gel's regional leader in Darmstadt and Mainz. In addition, there was evidence that he had procured forged identity papers and passed them on to comrades.

On 18 October a 36-year-old Turkish national of Kurdish origin was arrested in Darmstadt on an arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge at the Federal Court of Justice (BGH). He is suspected of being involved in Kongra Gel commando structures as a leading financial functionary and thus of leading a criminal organisation within the meaning of Section 129 Criminal Code (StGB).

### 3. Iranians

Iranian opposition groups in Germany engaged in numerous activities in an attempt to draw attention to their concerns. In particular they picked out the political situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the country's nuclear policy, the human rights situation and the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as key topics. Supporters of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political wing of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran), also repeatedly called for the MEK to be struck off the EU's and the United States' list of terrorist organisations. The Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI) chiefly protested against human rights violations in Iran and focused its agitation on defending the rights of Iranian women.

#### 3.1 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran)

Founded:	In 1965 in Iran
Headquarters:	Formerly in Baghdad; there are no registered offices in Germany
Leader:	Massoud RADJAVI
Publications:	<i>Modjahed</i> (Religious Fighter), weekly, among others
Outside the home region represented by the	
<b>National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)</b>	
Founded:	In 1981 in Paris; represented in Germany since 1994
Headquarters:	Berlin
Leader:	Spokesperson for Germany: Dr Massoumeh BOLOURCHI
Membership:	Around 900 (2004: around 900)

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The MEK is the most important Iranian opposition group and used to be the most militant. Together with its former military wing, the National Liberation Army (NLA), it was responsible for numerous attacks on targets restricted to Iran. No more terrorist activities or such plans have been noted since the attacks on facilities belonging to the Iranian security authorities in Tehran on 25 October 2001 and 19 May 2002.

The organisation has been permanently affected by developments in Iraq. Since the NLA was broken up, its camps in Iraq were dissolved and MEK members remaining in the region were interned in the so-called Ashraf Camp, the MEK has been in a state of flux. It is in effect currently unable to carry out terrorist activities, even though the organisation has not explicitly renounced violence. It endeavours to show undiminished strength to outsiders. For example, on the 41st anniversary of the founding of the MEK a memorial service took place on 6 September in the "Ashraf Camp" in Iraq. During the event a former NLA commander was elected the MEK's new "first executive". In fact, however, the organisation's situation in Iraq and the lack of support from the deposed regime of Saddam Hussein has forced the organisation to restrict itself to political agitation. The political wing of the MEK, the NCRI, plays a key role in this and is active mainly in Europe and North America.

**Propagating  
the "third way"**

The activities in which the NCRI engages are especially geared to gaining political importance and being recognised as an Iranian opposition movement in exile. In 1993 the NCRI elected Maryam RADJAVI, the wife of the MEK leader Massoud RADJAVI, as the "future president of Iran". She is currently propagating what she calls the "third way", according to which the political system in Iran is to be changed neither by military intervention from the outside (the "first way") nor by political influence from the EU (the "second way", which it claims is a policy of appeasement). Rather, the organisation believes such a change should be brought about by the Iranian population itself (under the leadership of the NCRI). Within this context the MEK described Maryam RADJAVI as the "heart of the resistance". The prerequisite "for change and the creation of a democratic Iran" was, however, the removal of the "unjustified terrorist label" applied to the MEK, it claimed.

As part of its political agitation the NCRI primarily aims to present itself as a lobby group, a "democratic" Iranian movement in exile whose objective is to influence public opinion and social and political decision-makers as it sees fit. To that end the organisation also

arranges demonstrations as well as art, music, cultural, information and propaganda events.

On 10 February, around 1,500 NCRI supporters demonstrated in Berlin in protest of the 26th anniversary of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The president of the Berlin police had initially banned the event but then authorised it after imposing certain conditions, following a summary decision by the Berlin Administrative Court. Those taking part in the event were, in particular, to refrain from any form of advertising for the MEK, which is on the EU's list of terrorist organisations.

The French authorities had already banned an event that was to take place in Paris.

On 9 May around 500 supporters of the organisation gathered to take part in an indoor event in the Max-Schmeling-Halle in Berlin, where the new strategy of the "third way" was propagated.

As in 2004, the "Day of Re-Birth" was commemorated in June near the organisation's French headquarters. The event marks the day (17 June 2003) on which the French security authorities searched the MEK's European headquarters in Auvers-sur-Oise near Paris and arrested Maryam RADJAVI. Around 6,000 supporters took part in the big event.

The NCRI continued its street collections in 2005 to finance its activities, some of which are very cost-intensive. To that end, it mainly used the Menschenrechtszentrum für ExiliranerInnen e. V. (MEI, Human Rights Centre for Exiled Iranians, reg'd society) with headquarters in Düsseldorf. The Menschenrechtsverein für Migranten (MIM, Human Rights Association for Iranian Migrants), with headquarters in Aachen, contacted those who had formerly donated to the Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e. V. (FHI, Aid Project for Iranian Refugees, reg'd society), which was disbanded in October 2003.

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### 3.2 Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI)

Founded:	In 1991 as a splinter group of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI)
Membership/ supporters:	Around 250 (2004: around 250 in total in Germany prior to the split)
The organisation is split into the	
<b>Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI)</b>	
Leader:	Hamid TAGHWAI
and	
<b>Hekmatist (The Worker-Communist Party of Iran)</b>	
Leader:	Koroush MODARESI

In August 2004 the WPI split into the Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI) and Hekmatist (The Worker-Communist Party of Iran). The party is still split, and both factions invoke the ideology of WPI founder Mansour Hekmat, who died in 2002. Hekmat planned to carry out a revolutionary coup and to establish a socialist system of councils in Iran. However, the two factions are of fundamentally different opinions as regards the strategy for achieving this objective.

Hekmatist believes a socialist revolution is possible even with the help of non-socialist opposition groups. The following is taken from a strategy paper adopted by the group at its founding conference in August 2004:

"We are and are fighting for a socialist revolution. ... The party's immediate goal is to convince the majority of the population of our programme and to bring about a change in the political situation in Iran. To that end it is bringing together those who are dissatisfied with the regime to form a network which represents the entire power and all the skills in the population to oppose the Islamic rulers."

By contrast, the WPI calls for a purely working-class revolution under the party's leadership. In an interview with Radio International shortly after the split in August 2004, WPI leader Hamid TAGHWAI stated:

"Our position is that when we have taken over power, we will immediately proclaim a socialist republic. ... [Hekmatist's position] is that the revolution is not imminent, that instead the Islamic regime will collapse and that when that happens, even if the party gains political power, we will still not be able to proclaim a socialist republic because the movement against the Islamic regime is not a socialist one. That is why they approve of gaining political power first and foremost by means of a coalition and compromise with other parties."

**Stepping up  
campaign work**

As part of its efforts to gain social and political influence, the WPI stepped up its campaign work in 2005, in particular by manning information stands dealing with human rights violations, for example. Organisations such as the Internationale Kampagne zur Verteidigung der Frauenrechte im Iran e. V. (International Campaign to Defend Women's Rights in Iran, reg'd society) and the Internationale Föderation iranischer Flüchtlinge (IFIR, International Federation of Iranian Refugees; in Farsi: *Hambastegi*) were often active in these efforts; their issue orientation points to their close ties to the WPI.

On the other hand, the WPI was not able to mobilise large numbers of people to take part in demonstrations. Even events that drew public attention, such as the presidential elections in Iran in the summer, failed to attract more than 50 people.

Hekmatist engaged in far fewer public activities. It fell well behind the WPI both in terms of the numbers of information stands and numbers taking part in rallies.

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#### 4. Tamils

##### **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**

Founded:	In 1972 in Sri Lanka
Leader:	Cadre for the German section
Membership/ supporters:	Around 800 (2004: around 750)
Publications:	<i>Viduthalai Puligal</i> (Liberation Tigers), fortnightly

The peace negotiations between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka remained stalled again in 2005. The Tamils and the Sinhalese hardened their positions and the ceasefire was broken (for which each side blamed the other) on an increasing number of occasions. The LTTE declared that it was still prepared to negotiate. However, it accused the government of not having proposed any suitable ideas as regards the country's future federal structure.

##### **Elections in Sri Lanka**

For its part, the government accused the LTTE of being responsible for the majority of violent attacks, not least for the murder of the Sri Lanka's foreign minister in the summer. The election of a new president on 17 November (who, as far as can be seen to date, has adopted a tougher course vis-à-vis the LTTE), may further heighten the existing tensions and thus also increase the risk of renewed civil war. Public statements by leading LTTE representatives are evidence of their increasing dissatisfaction with the current situation and thus of the risk that negotiations may ultimately fail. Continued LTTE provocation of the Sri Lankan army, for example by means of fatal attacks against government soldiers and a bombing which sank a motor torpedo boat belonging to the Sri Lankan navy, as well as various acts of reprisal by members of the army against the Tamil population brought the country to the brink of renewed armed conflict in late 2005. However, thanks to the Norwegian mediators the danger was averted for the time being.

LTTE supporters in Germany are also rather pessimistic as regards a future peace deal. The LTTE and its aid and front organisations are using this situation to collect donations not only for the reconstruction of the areas they now occupy and for other humanitarian and

administrative purposes. There are indications that some of the money is also being used to arm the LTTE so that it will be ready to act if and when the conflict begins. The LTTE also continued its propaganda activities in Germany.

**Demonstrations  
in Europe**

In late September the EU announced that, in view of the increasing violence in Sri Lanka, the governments of the Member States would no longer receive LTTE delegations. LTTE supporters protested strongly against this announcement, which they described as one-sided and unjust. On 24 October several thousand Tamils - a significant number of whom came from Germany - demonstrated in front of EU offices in Brussels and called for the decision to be reversed. This undertaking, plus a symbolic hunger strike in Düsseldorf in mid-June to protest the Sri Lankan government's alleged obstruction of international aid, shows that its propaganda work is directed not only at compatriots, but also increasingly at the European public.

## 5. Sikhs

### **Babbar Khalsa International (BK)**

Founded:	In 1978 in India
Leadership:	National executive
Membership/s supporters:	Around 200 (2004: around 200)
Publications:	<i>Aazad</i> (Independence)

### **International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)**

Founded:	In 1984 in the United Kingdom
Leadership:	Split into three factions, each with its own national executive
Membership/ supporters:	Around 600 (2004: around 600)

### **Kamagata Maru Dal International (KMDI)**

Founded:	In 1997 in the United States
Leadership:	National executive
Membership/ supporters:	Around 40 (2004: around 40)

Around 11 million people in India, or 1.1 per cent of the population, profess the Sikh religion. The majority live in the federal state of Punjab in northern India. For decades diverse separatist Sikh organisations have been using militant and terrorist means to fight for the establishment of an independent state of Khalistan. Numerous attacks against Indian targets in and sometimes outside India can be attributed to these Sikh groups. Although their objective is largely the same, they follow different leaders.

Of the roughly 70,000 Indian nationals living in Germany, around 20,000 are Sikhs. An estimated 840 of these are thought to be actively involved in extremist separatist Sikh organisations in Germany. These include Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), the International Sikh

Youth Federation (ISYF) and Kamagata Maru Dal International (KMDI).

These organisations have not yet carried out any attacks in Germany. Their main objective is to collect funds. They organise events to collect donations. Some of the funds raised are sent to their parent organisations in India to finance their armed struggle for independence. Donations are also passed on to the surviving dependants of "martyrs" to the struggle and are used as legal aid for fellow Sikhs in prison.

### III. Overview of other noteworthy organisations and their most important publications

Organisation	Membership / supporters (partly estimated)		Publications (including frequency)
	2005	(2004)	
<b>Turks (excluding Kurds)</b>			
Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (ADÜTDF, Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Hearths in Europe, reg'd society)	7,500	(7,500)	
Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (DİDF, Federation of Democratic Clubs of Workers from Turkey in the FRG, reg'd society)	600	(600)	<i>Tatsachen</i> (Facts), bi-monthly

#### IV. Overview of measures taken by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) under the law on associations

Organisation	Date of banning order	Grounds for ban	Status
<b>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party)</b> and sub-organisations	26 November 1993	– Criminal nature of the organisation, endangering the security of the state and public order in Germany, and Germany's foreign policy concerns	Ban is final
<b>Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)</b>	9 February 1983	– Criminal nature of the organisation	Ban is final
<b>Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front)</b>	13 August 1998	– Substitute organisation for the banned Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left); criminal nature of the organisation and endangering the security of the state	Ban is final
<b>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/-Cephesi (THKP/-C, Turkish People's Liberation Party / Front)</b>	13 August 1998	– Criminal nature of the organisation and endangering the security of the state	

## **Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities**

### **I. Overview**

<b>Germany continues to be a preferred intelligence target</b>	The threat scenario as regards counterintelligence tasks remained unchanged in 2005. The Federal Republic of Germany continues to be a preferred target of the intelligence services of a number of foreign nations. These still include the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) <sup>192</sup> and some countries in North Africa and the Middle and Far East, in particular the People's Republic of China.
<b>Presence of foreign intelligence service staff</b>	Varying numbers of intelligence staff are assigned to the official or semi-official missions of these countries in Germany. From their cover posts at so-called legal residencies in Germany, these "diplomats" or "journalists" engage in – overt or covert – information-gathering activities or support intelligence operations run from the central headquarters of these services. If counterintelligence shows that such "diplomats" have engaged in activities incompatible with their alleged status, they may be expelled from Germany.
<b>"Classic" espionage; spying on opposition groups</b>	The intelligence targets of foreign services range from "classic" espionage – i.e. information-gathering activities in the fields of politics, trade and industry, the military, etc. – to the investigation and infiltration of organisations and individuals in Germany that are opposed to the current regime in their countries of origin. The intelligence services' aim is to approach selected persons in order to recruit them for intelligence activities. If the persons concerned refuse such recruitment, they or their relatives living in their home countries are often threatened with reprisals.

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<sup>192</sup> The CIS consists of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

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**Proliferation**

Finally, a number of countries are continuing their efforts to gain possession of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of the related delivery systems, and to acquire the material and the know-how required for producing such weapons and systems (proliferation; cf. Section VI).

## **II. The intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation**

### **1. Structural developments, current situation and tasks of the services in the Russian Federation**

**Structural developments**

The organisational structure and tasks of Russian intelligence services did not change significantly in 2005. This indicates that the extensive reform of the intelligence services implemented over the past years is now completed.

The services' reform and their new structure are likely to meet the requirements of the Russian leadership. The intelligence services are the main pillar of the national security architecture, and at national level reliably guarantee the country's political leaders national sovereignty and internal security. As regards intelligence, they serve as instruments and the extended arm of politics for reaching foreign policy, economic and security objectives.

**Civilian intelligence services**

In the course of restructuring the state security machinery, which started in 2003, the number of civilian intelligence services has been reduced. The remaining services assumed the tasks and powers of dissolved specialised services and emerged strengthened from the reform. Thus, the Russian Federation reverted to a partial centralisation of civilian intelligence services modelled on the Soviet example.

In a speech on the occasion of the promotion of generals in July 2005, President Putin commented on the significance of civilian foreign intelligence as a source of information for policy-making:

"In many policy areas decisions largely depend on timely and objective reports of the foreign intelligence service SVR.<sup>193</sup> I expect

<sup>193</sup> SVR: Sluzhba Vnyeshney Razvedki (civilian Russian "External Intelligence Service")

that the SVR will continue to upgrade its analysis capacities to be able to reliably report on all changes in global developments from an operational point of view.”

In this context, the president promised to financially support the services. In August 2005, Russian media reported on a major increase in funding for civilian intelligence services.

**FSB**

The domestic intelligence service FSB<sup>194</sup> is responsible for civilian and military counterintelligence, monitoring political extremism, and fighting terrorism and organised crime.

The FSB is involved in the “counterterrorism operations” in the North Caucasus. In addition, it is responsible for protecting Russian industry against industrial espionage and organised crime and for protecting foreign investors against white-collar crime. For purposes of combating terrorism, organised crime and proliferation, the FSB may also carry out transborder operations. The FSB further tries to pursue external intelligence activities with the help of foreign nationals who are recruited during their stays in Russia.

The FSB’s counterintelligence activities involve intensive monitoring of the Internet in Russia. To this end, all Russian Internet providers must grant the FSB permanent access to data traffic routed through the Internet in Russia. In addition, Russian phone companies must provide the FSB permanent access to information on customers, their long-distance calls and charges. This enables the FSB to monitor telephone contacts, their frequency and the location of the interlocutors during the call and to systematically analyse this information. Therefore, also foreign nationals using the Internet or making telephone calls in Russia inevitably come to the FSB’s attention and can be placed under specific surveillance.

The FSB is also responsible for protecting the Russian national borders and checking persons entering or leaving the country, and for ensuring the security of telecommunications. At present, the FSB employs at least 350,000 staff.

**SVR**

The SVR is responsible for gathering foreign intelligence in the fields of politics, the economy, and science and technology. The service also helps to fight proliferation and international terrorism.

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<sup>194</sup> FSB: **F**ederalnaya **S**luzhba **B**ezopasnosti (“Federal Security Service” - the Russian domestic intelligence service)

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In addition, the SVR seeks intelligence on activities and methods of western intelligence services and security agencies.

As a result of the restructuring which has taken place in recent years, the SVR was assigned tasks in the field of communications intelligence and competent staff. Hence, the service has more than 13,000 staff.

## **GRU**

The GRU<sup>195</sup> is the military foreign intelligence service of the Russian Federation. It is a subordinate agency of the Russian Ministry of Defence and has an estimated staff of 12,000.

GRU intelligence activities in Germany target all military fields: the Bundeswehr, NATO armed forces and military technology.

In contrast to civilian intelligence services in Russia, GRU's organisational structure has remained unchanged for years.

## **2. Intelligence targets and priorities**

### **Objectives**

Although political relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation have improved in recent years, Germany remains an important intelligence target of Russian services. This shows that the Russian government sees no conflict between political rapprochement on the one hand and intelligence gathering on the other.

Intelligence activities of Russian foreign intelligence services were observed in all target areas. The Russian government's current information requirements dictate the priority given to specific intelligence-gathering activities.

### **Politics**

Russian services are interested in political intelligence regarding the Russian Federation's security situation, developments of the political balance of power in Germany and western economic and alliance policy. In connection with the federal elections on 18 September 2005 and a potential change of government in Germany, Russian services increasingly gathered intelligence on political parties and their programmes, particularly with regard to possible impacts on German-Russian relations. Russian intelligence efforts permanently focused on EU and NATO developments and policies. The Chechnya issue and its assessment by German political leaders also played an important

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<sup>195</sup> GRU: **G**lavnoye **R**azvedyvatelnoye **U**pravlenie ("General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate" = Russian military foreign-intelligence service)

role.

**The military**

In the military field – GRU’s area of expertise – the services were interested in intelligence concerning security and military issues. Russian intelligence efforts also focused on internal procedures and the technical equipment of the Bundeswehr and on the armaments industry.

In this context, two GRU officers under diplomatic cover had to be expelled from Germany because they were engaged in activities incompatible with their alleged status.

**Business and the economy**

In the economic field, Russian services showed interest in background information about the European economic infrastructure, the energy industry and global commercial and economic processes.

**Science and technology**

In the field of science and technology, the services’ efforts were directed at gathering intelligence on information, micro and communications technologies and any new developments. This often included products which can be used for both civilian and military purposes (“dual use”).

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### 3. Methods of gathering intelligence

Intelligence on Germany is gathered mainly by Russian intelligence officers under diplomatic cover residing on German territory, through intelligence-gathering activities such as the use of agents which are run from the Moscow headquarters and through activities on Russian territory.

In large part, Russian services obtain information by exploiting contact persons and using open sources such as the media, the Internet or public events in Germany.

However, they continue to use covert collection methods and officers (agents) to obtain high-grade classified intelligence.

#### 3.1 Legal residencies of Russian intelligence services

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Russian Federation play an important role in the Russian services' intelligence-gathering activities in Germany.

##### Large number of intelligence personnel

In almost all of these establishments and in some Russian media representations a large number of posts are available to the intelligence services for the placement of covert intelligence officers. Within these establishments, the intelligence staff constitute the so-called legal residency. This provides the Russian services in Germany with permanent bases for all types of on-site intelligence operations.

Members of the intelligence services also in 2005 made up a large share of the overall number of staff employed at Russian missions in Germany. Compared with other European countries, Russian intelligence services are clearly overrepresented in Germany as regards the number of staff deployed. This highlights the priority which Germany is given as an intelligence target.

The cover positions for staff of the intelligence services are filled mainly by the SVR and the GRU.

##### Berlin as the largest base

The largest intelligence base operated by the Russian services in Germany is the Russian Federation's Embassy in Berlin.

##### Advantages of this method

The privileges granted to missions abroad by the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations are an excellent basis for espionage activities of intelligence officers. For example, diplomatic immunity prevents criminal prosecution, and cover positions provide various possibilities to approach useful contacts and potential target

persons.

Due to this advantageous location, members of the legal residency may gather intelligence by talking to their contact persons or meeting undercover agents.

**Overt information gathering**

For overt information gathering, residency officers maintain a network of contact persons in all intelligence areas and from various levels of society. Such contacts are established during the performance of official diplomatic or journalistic functions. Often, members of the secret services manage to obtain sensitive information simply by applying subtle eliciting techniques during talks.

From the large number of official contact persons, intelligence officers select the ones most suited as sources of information for the medium or long term. The selection is based on criteria such as access to relevant information, career prospects of the contact person, willingness to share information and personal affection. Contacts considered capable of development will subsequently be used for “semi-overt” information gathering.

**“Semi-overt” information gathering**

“Semi-overt” information gathering combines overt activities with a number of covert components. Members of a legal residency arrange further meetings with their contact persons already at preceding meetings. This obviates the need for more contact to arrange further meetings, which might attract the attention of authorities for the protection of the Constitution.

In addition, the legal residency member may ask his German contact not to call at the office, explaining that he is often away on business and his colleagues are not informed about the contact. On his way to meetings with his contact person, which are often held in restaurants, the Russian intelligence officer is very attentive to possible counterintelligence surveillance.

The long-term aim of these contacts – called “confidential contacts” by the Russian services – is to obtain a supply of information in exchange for money or other rewards. However, the persons involved mostly avoid talking about the intelligence nature of the contact.

**Covert agent handling**

Some “confidential contacts” develop into a “classic” agent relation. If a German contact person, for example, has access to sensitive and confidential information, the Russian handling agent verifies the contact’s motivation and willingness to pass on such information. By gradually asking more concrete questions and requesting more comprehensive intelligence while increasing material and psychological benefits, the Russian handling agent lures the target

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person into cooperation (which is liable to prosecution).

Such behaviour by an intelligence officer is not compatible with his diplomatic or consular status. Thus, in this stage priority is given to protecting the contact against exposure. To this end, classic intelligence methods are applied.

By introducing strict conspirational rules, increasing the number of orders to gather sensitive information and through generous financial benefits for fulfilled tasks, the intelligence nature of the operation becomes apparent also for the contact person.

### 3.2 Activities under central control

<b>Central control by the services' headquarters</b>	As part of their intelligence-gathering activities, Russian services also use agents run from the services' headquarters. Because of the geographical distance, agent handling in the target country without involving legal residencies is difficult but reduces the risk of exposure. Unlike during the Cold War, agent handlers can travel with the flow of Russian tourists and businessmen without attracting attention.
<b>Target persons</b>	At an opportune moment, persons who live inside or outside the Russian Federation are recruited as agents.  Regarding persons living abroad, Russian services specifically focus on those who come to Russia frequently for professional or family reasons or who stay for longer periods. Before being approached, potential agents are examined. This includes a wide range of surveillance measures during their stay in Russia. The surveillance results are used for recruitment, and even today they are sometimes used as compromising <sup>196</sup> evidence.
<b>Communications</b>	Some recruited agents are provided with a complex communications system to transfer their information. This includes radio intelligence communications, secret writing and encryption as well as dead letter boxes (DLBs) <sup>197</sup> used to deposit cash or intelligence tools. Legal residencies provide technical or logistical support if need be.
<b>Staff at German missions abroad</b>	German diplomatic missions in the Russian Federation are particularly interesting targets. Russian intelligence services monitor these

<sup>196</sup> Means of exerting pressure such as real or falsified evidence which might cause harm to the person concerned upon disclosure.

<sup>197</sup> Caches (in the ground or elsewhere) for the exchange of information and material or making payments to secret operatives.

institutions intensively. They seek to recruit mission staff as agents.

Russians working at these institutions as local staff are often subject to recruitment attempts. But Germans are also approached. For this purpose, Russian services search for personal vulnerabilities such as administrative offences which are exaggerated during the recruitment interview. Resulting fears are used to persuade the person concerned into cooperating.

But staff at German missions abroad have to be prepared for recruitment attempts of Russian intelligence services also in other countries with strong missions of the Russian Federation.

### **III. Intelligence and security services of other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the other Soviet republics besides Russia also gained their independence. Except for the Baltic states, they founded the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) together with Russia.

#### **All CIS member republics have intelligence services**

While Russia inherited the headquarters of the former Russian intelligence services KGB and GRU, the other CIS members set up their own intelligence services on the basis of the remaining regional intelligence structures from Soviet times.

#### **Different structures**

Most of the intelligence services of the other CIS countries combine "civilian" intelligence collection and domestic counterintelligence activities in one service, as was the case with the former KGB. In some cases, the presidential security guard and border control services were detached from the intelligence services. Furthermore, several CIS members including Ukraine and Belarus set up military intelligence services.

#### **Cooperation with Russian services**

Despite numerous agreements, cooperation between CIS services and Russian intelligence services varies. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia are among the close allies of Russia at intelligence level.

The head of the Russian domestic service FSB told the Russian Duma in May 2005 that today there was active cooperation with these countries' intelligence services,<sup>198</sup> including joint operations, information sharing, and regular consultations.

#### **Focus on internal security**

Although they are also authorised to gather foreign intelligence, most services focus on internal security and counterintelligence.

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<sup>198</sup> Russian parliament

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Nevertheless, the services' domestic activities may also threaten German security interests. German diplomatic missions in these countries must assume that they are under surveillance. Also Germans who stay in the CIS for longer periods for professional or family reasons may attract the attention of local intelligence services.

**Limited activities abroad**

Only limited activities of the other CIS members' intelligence services were observed abroad. Most of these services do not pursue any perceptible intelligence activities in Germany. However, some intelligence officers work under cover at diplomatic missions of these countries in Germany.

**The Republic of Belarus**

This applies in particular to the Republic of Belarus. Belarus has an embassy in Berlin and a branch office in Bonn. The intelligence officers working there mainly gather publicly available information and visit events dealing with various topics, for example. The services are also interested in the activities of the Belarusian diaspora in Germany.

Belarus has the civilian intelligence service Committee for State Security (Belarusian abbreviation: KDB<sup>199</sup>), a military intelligence service which is affiliated to the defence ministry, the presidential security guard service and a border police service.

**The Belarusian service KDB**

The KDB has an independent administration for foreign intelligence, which gathers information about the classic fields of politics, science, technology and the economy. Foreign intelligence of the military services focuses on military issues.

In recent years, the KDB has been assigned extensive powers such as monitoring the Internet. For years, the KDB has also been used to observe the Belarusian political opposition in the country and abroad.

Since the "orange revolution" in Ukraine in 2004, Belarusia's President Lukashenko has feared that this development would spill over into Belarus, which would further endanger his power. KDB head JERIN was dismissed after a meeting with opposition members in 2004. Since January 2005, Stepan SUKHORENKO has been leading the KDB. Together with the head of the service, numerous other leading positions at the KDB were filled with new staff, among others foreign intelligence.

Foreigners in Belarus are intensively monitored. SUKHORENKO's predecessor JERIN once told Belarusian TV that surveillance of foreigners by intelligence services was a matter of course. Intelligence

<sup>199</sup> KDB = **K**amitet **D**zyzauny **B**yaspeki

targets on Belarusian territory include foreign relief organisations which are suspected of supporting preparations for revolution. In addition, the KDB focuses on and targets diplomatic representations of foreign countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### **IV. Activities of intelligence services of countries in the Middle East and North Africa**

**Focus on spying out opposition groups** Numerous countries of the “Islamic belt” between Morocco and Central Asia pursue intelligence activities in Germany. However, the extent of these – generally illegal – activities varies. In particular authoritarian states with a large exile community in Germany have many ways of gathering the sought information about anti-regime and other undesirable compatriots whose activities might threaten their power or are considered harmful in other respects. These espionage activities aim to monitor, infiltrate or neutralise these organisations and persons.

Given the global threat posed by international Islamist terrorism, intelligence activities of many of these countries focus on Islamist extremists, in particular those living in exile communities of their compatriots.

##### **1. Iranian intelligence services**

**Political developments in Iran** The presidential elections in summer 2005 were crucial for the political development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who at that time had been unknown at international level, won the elections against the relatively moderate former President Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad is a known hardliner. His new cabinet includes members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (PASDARAN) and former intelligence officers. By including them in his cabinet, Ahmadinejad extended PASDARAN’s political influence. In his capacity as Minister of Intelligence and Security (intelligence and state security service), Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei certainly has a prominent position. He adopted his ultra-conservative views as a student at an elite Islamic school for theology and law. Mohseni Ejei

became known as a public prosecutor at the special court for the clergy – a court devoted to prosecuting and punishing reform-oriented

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and anti-regime clerics – and as a member of the press council, an institution responsible for press and media censorship.

**VEVAK**

The Iranian intelligence service VEVAK<sup>200</sup> plays an important role among the repressive institutions of Iran. Among other things, its organisational units are responsible for fighting opposition to the regime at home and abroad. Its activities continue to focus on espionage and political neutralisation of the numerous Iranian opposition groups. VEVAK is particularly interested in the most militant and active opposition group called People's Mujahidin of Iran (MEK) and its political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). In addition, the service is interested in monarchists, republicans and left-wing organisations. By recruiting active and former members of these organisations, VEVAK tries to acquire information on anti-regime activities.

One pillar of the Iranian intelligence service in Germany is the Iranian Embassy in Berlin where several intelligence officers work under diplomatic cover. Agent handlers from the Embassy but also from Iranian headquarters recruit persons for espionage activities in Germany, issue orders and receive their information orally, in writing, by telephone or via the Internet.

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<sup>200</sup> VEVAK = **V**ezerat-e **E**tala'at **V**a **A**mniat-e **K**eshvar (Iran's civilian domestic and foreign intelligence service).

## 2. Syrian intelligence services

### Syrian security authorities

Security authorities have a pre-eminent role within the state apparatus of the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria has numerous intelligence services operating both in Syria and abroad to maintain internal security and the regime's stability. By means of overlapping tasks and fields of activity the regime hopes to ensure that the various services will keep an eye on each other. The military intelligence service (SHU'BATAL-MUKHABARAT AL-ASKARIYA) is particularly significant. It is headed by the president's brother-in-law.

Intelligence services in Syria extensively monitor practically all sectors of society and community life. Supporters of dissident movements must expect massive repressive measures. Hoping to escape the reach of the omnipotent security services, dissidents flee the country to live abroad. But even there the intelligence services try to spy on them, intimidate them and neutralise their activities.

Intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover at the Syrian Embassy in Berlin are involved in the observed espionage activities. They are interested in the entire dissident spectrum which is considered a potential threat to the Syrian regime. This includes Islamist groups, in particular members of the Muslim Brotherhood (cf. Islamist/Islamist terrorist activities, Section III, 1.4), and Syrian Kurds living in Germany. Recently, Kurdish groups have been under special surveillance of the services. Riots among the Kurdish minority in Syria, where people were reportedly killed and injured, triggered massive Kurdish protest, among others in front of the Syrian Embassy in Berlin.

### A major network of covert informants

Syrian intelligence services have built up a network of covert informants in Germany for espionage purposes. In their efforts to recruit new agents and to intimidate opponents of the regime, they do not stop at repressive measures against the prospective agents or targeted opponents or their relatives living in Syria.

When target persons living in Germany visit Syria, they must expect to be detained, questioned, maltreated and recruited. In this context, the consular support for Syrians living in Germany plays an important role. The Syrian Embassy provides assistance only if the person concerned is willing to help with intelligence activities. Even if a simple visit to Syria was officially approved, the persons concerned are not safe from reprisal by Syrian intelligence services.

### Reports about state-

The United Nations (UN) appointed an internationally independent

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**supported terrorism** committee to investigate the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on 14 February 2005. The reports of the UN investigative committee indicate that high-level Syrian intelligence officers with close ties to Syrian President Assad may have been involved in planning the assassination.

The attack triggered fierce protests among the Lebanese population against the ongoing deployment of Syrian troops. Upon intervention by the international community, Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in April 2005 and closed its local intelligence offices.

### **3. Libyan intelligence services**

**No changes in the domestic situation** The internal political structures remained unaffected by Libya's political and economic rapprochement toward the West, which has been pursued since 2003. There were no reforms aiming at more democracy of the state structures. The country continues to be under the dictatorial rule of the revolutionary leader Muammar al-Qaddafi and his Revolutionary Council. In a keynote speech in September 2005, Qaddafi clearly rejected democratic reforms.

**Monitoring dissident efforts** The security apparatus focuses on retaining its power and monitors dissident efforts in Libya and abroad, in particular by Islamists. This also affects Libyans in Germany, among others exiled anti-regime journalists, members of human rights organisations and travelling Libyan businessmen and students.

The services also monitor their own staff working at Libyan embassies and consulates. The Libyan intelligence service gathers information through a network of informants and informers within the Libyan community.

## V. Far East intelligence services

Among the Far East intelligence services primarily the services of the People's Republic of China and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) pursue activities affecting German security interests.

### 1. Chinese intelligence services

The growing geostrategic significance of the People's Republic of China is evident. Chinese intelligence services play a major part in this growth. They pursue intensive intelligence activities in all fields of espionage.

Intelligence gathering is the primary task of the Ministry for State Security (MSS)<sup>201</sup> and the Military Intelligence Department (MID)<sup>202</sup> of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

<b>Intelligence targets</b>	<p>The civilian domestic and foreign intelligence service MSS monitors social organisations and dissidents in China and abroad. It seeks information about the "five poisons" which might threaten the regime (democracy movement, Muslim Uyghurs and Tibetans seeking autonomy, the cultural movement Falun Gong and all organisations and persons connected with what China regards as a separatist Taiwan).</p> <p>In the context of foreign intelligence, the MSS gathers information on politics, the economy, science and research and military affairs around the world.</p> <p>In its capacity as an intelligence service which operates world-wide, the MID mainly gathers information urgently needed for modernising the Chinese military and armaments technology. In addition, the MID gathers relevant information for Chinese defence and alliance policy.</p>
<b>Missions abroad</b>	<p>The intelligence services use diplomatic missions of the People's Republic of China and Chinese media agencies to place covert agent handlers. Intelligence officers under diplomatic or journalistic cover are rarely perceived as members of an intelligence service by their contact persons in the host country, which allows them to justify their</p>

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<sup>201</sup> MSS = **M**inistry for **S**tate **S**ecurity

<sup>202</sup> MID = **M**ilitary **I**ntelligence **D**epartment

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interest in sensitive information with their official function.

To gather intelligence, they systematically seek and maintain contacts with key personalities in associations, research institutes and other institutions. They visit trade fairs, expert conferences and other social events where they contact interesting persons. The contact is intensified through repeated invitations and strengthened by small favours. This becomes a binding relationship based on friendship ties. These contacts may be maintained for many years, but the covert intelligence officers do not reveal their true intentions to their contact persons.

Chinese services – after thorough examination – also use intelligence volunteered by persons with access to interesting information. A member of the Military Attaché's staff at a Chinese mission abroad met a German national who wanted to sell research reports about military developments of his former employer. In a joint measure, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and law enforcement authorities were able to prevent the material from being delivered. The German national was sentenced on charges of intelligence activities for the MID to eight months in prison, suspended to probation for three years.

The member of the Military Attaché's staff left Germany immediately after the case had become known.

#### **Western know-how**

The People's Republic of China reaps substantial economic, scientific and technological benefits from its cooperation with the West. The country makes great efforts to gain Western know-how in all major fields in order to catch up with the technologically advanced Western countries.

To this end, the intelligence-gathering programme includes both legal (e.g. cooperation between German and Chinese universities, research institutes and companies) and illegal components.

The first step of the programme is to identify the leading development projects/industrial production in all relevant fields world-wide. In this context, Chinese diplomatic missions play an important role. The next step is to contact/approach Chinese who work in interesting target areas (e.g. research institutions, high-tech companies) to gain know-how through all legal and illegal channels.

Chinese intelligence services are particularly interested in Germany as one of the leading Western industrial countries whose industry focuses on exports. Chinese scientists, postgraduate students and academics working or temporarily staying in Germany are asked by

the diplomatic missions or other state bodies to pass on their knowledge to the advantage of their home country also illegally, i.e. without their employer's consent.

Also Chinese delegations use their numerous visits to German companies and institutions to gather information. Special efforts are made to modernise the Chinese armed forces.

## 2. North Korean intelligence services

**Intelligence services** The North Korean intelligence and security services comprise party intelligence, the military intelligence service and the Ministry for State Security (MfSS).<sup>203</sup> All services report to state and party leader Kim Jong-il.

The MfSS gathers political intelligence at home and abroad. Its function is comparable to the former Soviet KGB.

Party intelligence mainly focuses on intelligence and propaganda operations against South Korea. The United Front Department is responsible for ideologically influencing South Korean opposition groups.

**Legal residencies** North Korean intelligence and security services maintain legal residencies at the North Korean Embassy in Berlin to perform their duties. The local United Front Department advises South Korean dissidents in Germany who support the Communist regime in North Korea. Among other things, the MfSS security officer is the contact person for all North Koreans during their stay in Germany (including visiting fellows and students).

In February 2005, the North Korean leadership for the first time announced that it possessed nuclear weapons. By its own account, North Korea will continue seeking sensitive goods and the required know-how to expand its NBC weapons programme.<sup>204</sup>

Intelligence officers accredited at the Embassy also represent procurement organisations of the Second Economic Committee (intelligence for nuclear industry) and the People's Armed Forces (intelligence for armed forces) in the Federal Republic of Germany. They try to procure sensitive goods for these institutions, which are intended for use in the North Korean nuclear programme. In response to German export regulations and controls, embassy staff increasingly try to export such goods via third countries (e.g. China, Singapore). North Korean front companies in these countries are declared as the alleged end users.

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<sup>203</sup> MfSS = **M**inistry for **S**tate **S**ecurity

<sup>204</sup> NBC weapons = nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

## **VI. Proliferation**

<b>Definition</b>	<p>Proliferation refers to the distribution of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons and of the related delivery systems, and the material and the know-how required for producing such weapons and systems. Countries involved in proliferation activities might use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during armed conflict or threaten to use them in order to enforce their political goals. Currently, these countries include Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Syria.</p>
<b>General situation</b>	<p>Proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the related delivery systems continues to give the international community cause for concern. The most prominent questions still are whether and to what extent Iran and North Korea are pursuing nuclear weapons programmes and whether non-state actors may acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.</p> <p>The development, production and enhancement of weapons of mass destruction require specific know-how and considerable technical equipment (e.g. engines, preliminary products, replacement parts). Countries at risk for proliferation still need to buy technological knowledge or certain products and key technologies on the world market. Thus they pursue relevant intelligence-gathering activities also in Western industrial countries.</p> <p>In response, especially the countries of the European Union and North America have for some time already been tightening their export laws and controls and adapting them to international requirements.</p>
<b>Procurement needs</b>	<p>Some of the aforementioned countries are already able to meet their procurement needs, at least in some scientific and technological areas, by themselves. To some extent they are even able to offer know-how, components or complete systems (e.g. missiles) on the world market. Hence, critical countries may support each other in setting up a WMD programme.</p>
<b>Methods</b>	<p>The countries interested in proliferation also use covert methods or their intelligence services to meet their intelligence needs on the world market. For example, they commission front companies to procure a relevant product, use clandestine procurement networks or found inconspicuous companies in their own country or in third countries. Their aim is to conceal proliferation-relevant purchases and their actual end use in a weapons programme from the vendor and export control authorities.</p>

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**Increasing awareness**

Offices for the Protection of the Constitution approach research institutes or companies to increase awareness of the proliferation issue and to inform them about potential risks (e.g. loss of reputation, financial penalties) which might arise from contacts with persons or institutions from critical countries.

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), the Customs Criminological Office (ZKA), the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) closely cooperate to prevent proliferation.

To inform the public, the Federal and *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution published the brochure entitled *Proliferation – Das geht uns an!* (“Proliferation concerns us!”), which is also available on the Internet ([www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de)).

## VII. Threats posed by industrial espionage

Given economic and political upheavals in connection with tough globalised competition, the issue of industrial espionage<sup>205</sup> is of special significance. There is various evidence that foreign intelligence services also target German businesses in order to gain information about them. In particular the increasing number of Internet attacks as well as their type and scope indicate that foreign intelligence services use this method to gather information.

**Threats by malware** Internet-based attacks by malware (e.g. through viruses and Trojan horses) on networks and computers of German businesses are gaining in importance.

Basically all networks are at risk of being attacked by viruses or Trojan horses. After having been installed unnoticed, these types of malware can access all kinds of login data, network information, files and documents, change files and manipulate or seize other network computers. Targeted attacks via the Internet also involve persons who are already active in targeted businesses as insiders. The BfV assumes that several capable countries resort to Internet-based espionage and intelligence-gathering.

An increasing number of IT attacks on national networks and network structures were observed in other countries, in particular in the United States. Most of these attacks have been traced back to Chinese servers. The number of coordinated attacks and the quality of the relevant technology indicate that state services may be involved or at least tolerate these actions. The Offices for the Protection of the Constitution assume that similar attacks are also directed at Germany.

For example, there was a targeted attack on a company to gain know-how and confidential business information. For this technical attack on the company network the attacker secretly installed additional hardware, presumably with the help of an “insider”.

Installing malware is possible not only via the Internet. It can install itself unnoticed when opening a promotion CD, for example.

**Increasing awareness** The BfV and the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution educate and advise companies on the risks of industrial espionage in order to protect the economy.

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<sup>205</sup> Industrial espionage = State-controlled or -supported collection of information on private businesses by intelligence services of foreign countries.

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This service is intended to help companies protect themselves against attacks of foreign intelligence services. But it also helps them prevent competitors from illegally acquiring information on their company. Known methods are analysed and included in protection strategies for German companies.

### **VIII. Arrests and convictions**

In 2005, the Federal Public Prosecutor General instituted 29 preliminary proceedings on suspicion of activity on behalf of a foreign intelligence service or on charges of treason. Warrants were issued for the arrest of four persons. At the same time, one suspect was convicted on charges of activity as an agent for an intelligence service (Section 99 of the German Criminal Code, StGB).

## Security of Classified Information and Counter-Sabotage

<b>Security tasks</b>	Security is absolutely essential to a democratic state governed by the rule of law. Security ensures that information and procedures remain secret and protected against unauthorised disclosure when their publication could threaten the existence, vital interests or security of the Federal Government and its agencies ( <i>Bund</i> ) or of any of the federal states ( <i>Länder</i> ).
<b>Classified material</b>	Irrespective of their form, sensitive facts, objects or intelligence to be kept secret are classified material and must be marked with one of the following classifications: <i>STRENG GEHEIM</i> (Top Secret), <i>GEHEIM</i> (Secret), <i>VS-VERTRAULICH</i> (Confidential) or <i>VS-NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH</i> (Restricted).
<b>Physical security</b>	Physical security provides the organisational and technical prerequisites for the protection of classified material. The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has primary responsibility for this task. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) must cooperate, pursuant to Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 3, of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution ( <i>Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz</i> ), by providing intelligence of possible relevance to the physical security of classified material.
<b>Personnel security</b>	The central task is to protect classified material. The instrument used for the purpose is security screening of persons to be entrusted with tasks of a sensitive nature. The security screening procedure is regulated in the Security Clearance Check Act ( <i>Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz, SÜG</i> ). The BfV's participation in this procedure is based on Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 1, of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution in conjunction with Section 3 (2) of the Security Clearance Check Act.
<b>Jurisdiction</b>	The fact that personnel security is assigned to the BfV as a "participatory task" means that the BfV does not have primary

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jurisdiction; responsibility for security measures lies with the competent authorities. In the federal public service, this is generally the employing authority. Classified government material requiring protection is handled not only by public institutions but also by private-sector enterprises, among others. In this case, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) assumes responsibility for ensuring the security of such material.

**Personnel-related counter-sabotage**

Preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage was introduced in the Security Clearance Check Act, in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on the basis of the Counter-Terrorism Act (*Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz*) of 9 January 2002.

**Security clearance checks**

Security clearance checks, which have proved an effective instrument in personnel security, are now being used to ensure that persons presenting a risk to security are not employed in key positions in sensitive areas. Current and prospective employees in vital or defence establishments are subject to security vetting.

**Vital facilities**

Establishments are considered vital if their disruption could seriously threaten the health or lives of large segments of the population, due to the risk inherent in the nature of their operations. 'Risk inherent in the nature of operations' refers to risk inherent in the work process itself or in the materials used in production or work (e.g. danger of fire, explosion or contamination). Vital establishments also include those that are essential to the functioning of the community and whose disruption would cause panic or distress among large segments of the population, thus threatening public order or security. This includes public provision of postal and telecommunications services.

**Defence facilities**

Preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage also applies to important defence establishments beyond the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence. These include establishments involved in creating or maintaining defence preparedness and whose disruption could seriously jeopardise the functioning of the Bundeswehr, allied forces or civil defence. Such establishments also include key manufacturers in the defence industry and supplies industry as well as central transport and telecommunications facilities.

<b>Security-sensitive positions</b>	For reasons of proportionality, measures to prevent personnel-related sabotage apply only to security-sensitive positions within vital and defence establishments, i.e. the smallest organisational units working independently and protected against unauthorised access. Only persons employed in such positions must undergo security vetting. For counter-sabotage purposes, a 'simple security check' is required, i.e. a form of vetting that causes as little inconvenience as possible to the person being vetted.
<b>Statutory ordinance and guide</b>	The Ordinance Establishing Security Vetting Requirements for Vital and Defence Establishments ( <i>Sicherheitsüberprüfungsfestellungsverordnung, SÜFV</i> ) of 30 July 2003 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1553) gives a legally binding list of vital and defence establishments. With the adoption of the amending ordinance of 17 October 2005 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2984) the scope of the ordinance was extended to include also the energy supply sector, among others. Together with the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development and the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Ministry of the Interior has drafted a guide to personnel-related counter-sabotage in industry. It can be accessed on the Internet at <a href="http://www.bmwa-sicherheitsforum.de">www.bmwa-sicherheitsforum.de</a>
<b>Consent</b>	It should be emphasised that security clearance checks may only be carried out with the express consent of the persons affected.

## The Scientology Organisation (SO)

Founded:	in the USA in 1954; first Church of Scientology of Germany founded in 1970
Headquarters:	Los Angeles (Church of Scientology International, CSI)
Membership:	Federal Republic of Germany (estimate): between 5,000 and 6,000 (2004: between 5,000 and 6,000)*
Publications:	<i>FREIHEIT</i> (freedom), <i>IMPACT SOURCE</i> , among others INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS, ADVANCE!, THE AUDITOR
Subsidiary organisations: them (selection)	In Germany, ten “churches”, among two “Celebrity Centres” and 14 “Missions”

\*) SO claims to have 12,000 members.

### 1. Introduction

The finding of the Standing Conference of the Ministers and Senators of the Interior (IMK) of 5/6 June 1997 still holds true: there is substantial evidence that the Scientology Organisation (SO) is involved in activities directed against the free democratic order, and therefore the legal prerequisites for having the SO monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution are fulfilled. Current activities and publications of the SO confirm this finding.

## 2. Background

In 1950, the founder of the organisation, L. Ron Hubbard (1911 - 1986) published his book “Dianetics – The Modern Science of Mental Health” in the USA, which since then has been the creed of the SO.<sup>206</sup> According to the SO’s Internet publications, Hubbard has solved the problems of the human mind with his “scientific method” of Dianetics. Scientologists did not start endeavouring to present their ideas as an “applied religious philosophy until 1954, when the first Church of Scientology was founded in Los Angeles. This and numerous statements by Hubbard himself regarding the alleged scientific nature of Scientology cast doubt on SO’s self-characterisation as a religious community.

According to the creed of Scientology based on the concepts of Dianetics, anybody’s “person” or “identity” is, for instance, not his/her body or name, but the “thetan”, which has no mass, no wavelength, that is to say nothing concrete.<sup>207</sup> In its ideal state as an “operating thetan”, it is entirely the “being at cause over matter, energy, space, time and thought”, and not in a body.<sup>208</sup>

In order to reach this state, the first objective of Scientologists is to become “clear”, i.e. “as a result of Dianetic therapy, free of any actively or potentially existing psychosomatic illnesses or *aberrations*”.<sup>209</sup> According to the definition used by Scientologists, an “aberration” is a departure from rational thought or behaviour.<sup>210</sup> Such departure from rationality can be caused by what they call “engrams”. Scientologists define the term “engram” as a “mental image picture which is a complete recording of every perception present in a moment of partial or full ‘unconsciousness’.”<sup>211</sup> “Auditing”<sup>212</sup> is designed to discover these “engrams” and to eliminate their effect.

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<sup>206</sup> Original title: “Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health”

<sup>207</sup> For the term “thetan”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung für Dianetics und Scientology* (Glossary of Dianetics and Scientology Terms), 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Copenhagen 1985 (in the following quoted as HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*), p. 98; HUBBARD, *Scientology - Die Grundlagen des Denkens* (Scientology: The Fundamentals of Thought), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Copenhagen 1973, p. 37.

<sup>208</sup> For the term “operating thetan”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung* (Glossary of Scientology & Dianetics Terms), p. 67.

<sup>209</sup> For the term “Clear”, cf. Hubbard, *Dianetik – Die moderne Wissenschaft der geistigen Gesundheit* (Dianetics - The Modern Science of Mental Health), 8<sup>th</sup> edition, Copenhagen 1990 (in the following quoted as HUBBARD, *Dianetik*), p. 215 ff.

<sup>210</sup> For the term “aberration”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 1.

<sup>211</sup> For the term “engram”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 27.

<sup>212</sup> For the term “auditing”, cf. HUBBARD, *Das Scientology-Handbuch* (The Scientology Handbook), Copenhagen 1995, p. XX.

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Under this procedure, the *auditor* (“one who listens”) – a minister of the “Church of Scientology” thus designated or someone trained as such<sup>213</sup> – helps the so-called *preclear* (PC – “some-one who is not yet Clear”)<sup>214</sup> to detect areas of grief or pain through a fixed sequence of questions or instructions.<sup>215</sup> The auditor uses what Scientologists call an e-meter, or electropsychometer, for this. The device is used to measure “the body’s resistance and its variations due to spiritual interaction” against an electric current while the preclear being questioned by the auditor holds both electrodes of the device in his/her hands.<sup>216</sup> The movements of the e-meter needle are caused by the flow of current and are supposed to help “the auditor and preclear locate areas of spiritual distress and travail”.<sup>217</sup>

In addition to “auditing”, the organisation offers a number of other seminars in Germany giving instructions for a successful way of life as understood by Scientology. The seminars and accompanying publications are offered for sale in a profit-oriented manner. This sales activity is one of the main tasks of the “churches” and “missions” in Germany.<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> For the term “auditor”, cf. *Was ist Scientology?* (What is Scientology?), Copenhagen 1998, pp. 164 ff.

<sup>214</sup> For the term “preclear”, cf. *ibid.* p. 164 ff.

<sup>215</sup> For more information on the “auditing procedure, cf. *ibid.* p.164 ff.

<sup>216</sup> For the term “e-meter”, cf. *ibid.* p. 165 ff.

<sup>217</sup> Cf. *ibid.* p. 164 ff.

<sup>218</sup> The brochure *Die Scientology Organisation – Gefahren, Ziele und Praktiken* (The Scientology Organisation – risks, aims and practices) (November 1998), published by the Federal Office of Administration on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, warns people of the possible risks which attending the very expensive courses or applying Scientologist methods may pose to the individual.

### 3. Objectives

#### **Court action by the SO against observation by the BfV**

In 2003, the Scientology Kirche Deutschland e.V. (SKD, Scientology Church of Germany reg'd society) and the Scientology Kirche Berlin e.V. (SKB, Scientology Church of Berlin reg'd society) filed an action before the Cologne Administrative Court against monitoring by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). As a reason for their action, the plaintiffs claimed that they belonged to an allegedly globally recognised religious community and as such did not pursue any political aims.

On 11 November 2004, the court dismissed the action against the BfV.<sup>219</sup> In January 2005, the SO filed an appeal against this decision with the Higher Administrative Court (OVG) in Münster; this appeal is still pending.

#### **Hard intelligence of anti-constitutional efforts**

The Cologne Administrative Court found that BfV observation operations targeting the SKD and SKB with both open and covert intelligence means were legal. The court said there was hard intelligence that the plaintiffs were working to undermine the free democratic order. According to the court, there existed a great number of sources, some of which were not available to the public, from which it could be derived that intentions were aimed at abrogating or restricting fundamental basic and human rights, such as human dignity, the right to free development of personality, and the right to equality. In addition, the court said that Scientology aspired to a society without general and fair elections. Therefore, the court ruled that observation of the plaintiffs by the BfV was necessary and appropriate and hence reasonable overall.

#### **Decision of the Higher Administrative Court of Saarland**

In its decision of 27 April 2005 in another case, the Higher Administrative Court of Saarland requested the *Land* Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Saarland to stop using intelligence service methods for observing the SO. In the court's view, the use of such methods was disproportionate under Saarland *Land* law because at that time the SO had no offices in Saarland and only a few members. However, as the court itself noted, its decision cannot be applied in analogy to the monitoring activities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Cologne Administrative Court, ruling of 11 November 2004, file reference 20 K 1882/03 (<http://www.justiz.nrw.de>).

<sup>220</sup> Higher Administrative Court of Saarland, decision of 27 April 2005, file reference: 2 R 14/03

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In both cases the court held the view that the question whether the SO had to be deemed a religious community had no effect on evaluating the permissibility of observation of the plaintiffs by the BfV. According to both rulings, certain activities obviously carried out for religious motives can at the same time be considered political activities.

**Unchangeable validity of the writings of Hubbard**

In its decision the Cologne Administrative Court noted that the Scientology Organisation continued to influence the political views of its members in a way that makes them oppose the constitution. The organisation publishes one edition after the other<sup>221</sup> of the writings of its founder L. Ron Hubbard, which are regarded as binding, without qualifying their content in any way.

With regard to the unalterability of Hubbard's writings, the Statute of the SKB says:

“The Church of Scientology should present, spread and practice the Scientology religion, make it popular and preserve and protect its purity and virginity, to enable every person ... to follow the path of redemption shown by L. Ron Hubbard, as he describes it in his writings about the Scientology religion or the Churches of Scientology – generally known as ‘the writings’ ...”<sup>222</sup>

On its website, the organisation states that it continues to regard the written and spoken words of L. Ron Hubbard concerning Scientology as holy.<sup>223</sup>

These writings contain passages in which he disparages democracy and calls for abolishing the main principles of a free democratic order and creating a “new OT civilization”<sup>224</sup> instead.

**Restricted validity of basic rights and no equality before the law**

In one of his other publications, Hubbard described the new Scientologist civilisation he envisaged as a legal order under which the existence of the individual is subject to the SO's arbitrary

<sup>221</sup> Cf. *Ursprung – Das Magazin der Scientology Kirche Bayern e. V.*, 312/2005.

<sup>222</sup> See Section 2 para. 3 of the Statute of the SKD (Church of Scientology of Germany) as at 21 March 2002 (Local Court Munich, register VR 6322). See also Section 5 para. 3 of the Statute and the membership application form of the International Association of Scientologists (IAS), copyright 2005; In this publication, the IAS says that the main purpose of its organisation is “to unite, support and protect the Scientology religion and Scientologists around the world to ensure that the aims of Scientology as defined by L. Ron Hubbard are achieved.” In their application for membership, applicants must certify with their signature that they “promise to abide by the rules, codes and policies of Scientology”.

<sup>223</sup> SO website, as at 19 November 2005.

<sup>224</sup> For the term “new OT civilization”, see *Freewinds*, 57/2005, p. 16.

discretion. Correspondingly, basic rights can be enjoyed only by those people who, after selection under the auditing procedure, are considered “honest” in the SO's view:

“If we now exert strong influence on others to become honest by subjecting themselves to an auditing procedure concerning their overts and withholds, ...”

(Hubbard: “Scientology can have a group win”, translated from the German; quoted from the arguments for the appeal filed by SO dated 10 May 2005, p. 134)

“In order to obtain help, you must be honest with your auditor. ... This is the path to mental health and true freedom...”

“A person's right to survival is directly linked to his honesty...”

(See *Einführung in die Ethik der Scientology* (Hubbard, Introduction to the Ethics of Scientology), Copenhagen 1998, p.36 et seq., p. 46)

“Freedom is for honest people. “There is personal freedom only for those who have the ability to be free.”

(*Persönliche Werte und Integrität - Gegründet auf die Werke von L. Ron Hubbard* (Personal values and integrity – Based on the writings of L. Ron Hubbard), Copenhagen 1991, p. 208)

In its decision<sup>225</sup>, the Cologne Administrative Court noted that in the SO's view, only Scientologists can be “honest” people and that, in Hubbard's view, only those people should be granted civil rights in a Scientologist society.

As formulated by Hubbard, the “aims of Scientology” (which remain valid to this day) point to the larger aim of this Scientologist society based on inequality:

“A civilisation without insanity, without criminals and without war, where the able can prosper and honest beings can have rights...”  
2004/2005 New Year's greeting card of the International Association of Scientologists distributed in Germany)

**Long-term changes in the political system to be achieved by SO's “expansion”**

In its messages to the public, the SO is anxious to present itself as an apolitical religious community that abides by the rules of democracy. Although the organisation is not openly involved in forming the political will of the people, the writings of its founder, which are the basis of all activities of the SO, reveal that the organisation's ultimate political goals are to be attained via a long-term strategy of expansion and increasing SP revenues as well as successfully defeating its detractors.

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<sup>225</sup> See footnote 222.

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**Defamation of critical voices and psychiatrists**

It is typical for the SO to defame all those who criticise and oppose their ideology, calling such people criminals or insane. Such propaganda is another actual indicator for the organisations attacks on human dignity.

Especially German politicians and private persons warning against the threat posed by the SO are discredited. For example, Heber JENTZSCH, the President of the International Church of Scientology, commenting on “creating a safe environment for orgs<sup>226</sup> in Europe, referred to Germany as follows:

“As in other parts of the world, the figures of public life in Germany who attack Scientology are not free of blame themselves. What can be said of all of them, without exception, is that they also oppress everyone else.”

(*IMPACT*, 111/ 2005, p. 15, translated from the German)

**Indoctrination through PTS/SP courses**

The SO is currently trying to indoctrinate their members through the “How to Confront and Shatter Suppression” course (PTS/SP course). This is one of the major courses offered by the German SO offices. Members pay a “special price” of € 1,186.<sup>227</sup> The course material refers to people speaking out against the organisation as follows:

“We see no critic of Scientology who does not have a criminal background. ...

Those who oppose us have crimes to conceal. ...

Never talk to a critic about Scientology. Talk only about his crimes...”

(*Wie man Unterdrückung konfrontiert und zerschlägt* (How to Confront and Shatter Suppression, PTS/SP Course), Copenhagen, 2001, p. 78 et seq.) (translated from the German)

The SO stirs up hatred particularly against psychiatrists:

“People like Genghis Khan, Hitler, psychiatrists and psychopathic criminals strive for power only to destroy.”

(*Wie man Unterdrückung konfrontiert und zerschlägt* (How to Confront and Shatter Suppression, PTS/SP Course), Copenhagen, 2001, p. 151 ff.) (translated from the German)

Another SO publication featured an article called “Closing the Book on Psychiatric Terror: Our crushing international assault on psychiatry”.

The article says that keeping Scientology available to people “requires

<sup>226</sup> “Orgs” (organisations) is the SO short term for local “Churches” or larger SO office.

<sup>227</sup> Cf. *Neue Zivilisation – Das Magazin der Scientology Kirche Hamburg e. V.*, 184/2005.

the eradication of the ‘whos’ behind all that humankind detests: psychiatry.”<sup>228</sup>

The Cologne Administrative Court, too, expressly notes that Scientology’s inhuman ideology is reflected in the fact that “suppressive persons” or “oppressors”, i.e. “enemies of Scientology”, should be removed by coercive means or, ideally, ruined. SO considers such “enemies” to be “fair game” to be “deprived of their property, injured by any means ..., tricked, sued or lied to”.<sup>229</sup>

**Intelligence service which has absolute rule**

Another actual indicator for SO’s activities directed against human rights and the rule of law is the existence of the organisation’s own intelligence service operating world-wide, the “Office of Special Affairs” (OSA).

The tasks of the “Director for Special Affairs” include gathering intelligence on enemies and critics of Scientology and fighting them.

“The Director for Special Affairs isolates and handles all groups of people hostile towards the organisation.

“The Director for Special Affairs has complete intelligence about all potential attackers who may want to target the organisation; he plans the handling of such persons and successfully handles every attack situation that occurs.”

(Hubbard, *Qualität der Abteilungen, Checklisten*, 1990, *Führungsabteilung Macht-Qualität*, issues 52, 54) (translated from the German)

**Gathering information through “Knowledge Reports”**

In German publications, the SO regularly calls upon its members to write “Knowledge Reports” to the Religious Technology Center (RTC) in the USA and report “suppressive acts” and violations of other Scientologic beliefs. “Matters of RTC concern” include:

“Public statements against Scientology or Scientologists... Any person who is hypercritical of Scientology or the Church. Publicly departing Scientology. ... Any actions or omissions undertaken to knowingly suppress, reduce or impede Scientology or Scientologists ... Anyone forbidding or advising against the writing of Knowledge Reports.”

(*INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, Issue 30, 2005, p. 54 et seq.)

**Expanding by**

At present, the SO is trying to expand certain larger offices and

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<sup>228</sup> *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS* Issue 29, 2004, p. 26.

<sup>229</sup> See footnote 222.

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**creating “ideal orgs”** transform them into “ideal orgs”. Among these are some German “orgs”, which are to be expanded to exert greater influence on society in the interest of Scientology. There are indications that the SO wants to use these “ideal Orgs” to increase its political influence. In the organisation's view, “creating ideal Orgs” is part of “the universal strategy to clear the planet”<sup>230</sup> In his 2005 New Year's Address, David MISCAVIGE, the head of RTC, referred to the activities of “orgs” as follows:

“Yes, for the individual, that does mean ascending The Bridge to the personal freedom of Clear and beyond. But that doesn't begin to state it... “While in the past some may have spoken of orgs in terms of bottom line processing and training we talk about our new breed of organization in terms of what's happening in their communities, cities and their entire geographic zone extending until it touches the geographic zone of the next org ... “How do you accomplish the magnitude necessary to create that New Civilization?(*INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, Issue 30, 2005, p. 33)

In Germany, the “Hamburg org” is trying to achieve the status of “ideal Org”. To this effect, it has started a full-fledged campaign among its members asking for their active participation and donations. According to its own reports, it has collected €250,000 in donations at a members-only event. It also claims to have won a significant number of new members in the course of this campaign. In a letter circulated among members, the “Hamburg org” explained the “actual and new tasks of ideal Orgs” as follows:

“Every sector of Scientology is at home in an ideal Org, and there it finds the basis from which to set off into society to create new institutions there, which will then house new activities and bring them into society.”  
(*NEWSLETTER Ideal Org Hamburg*, Issue IV, April 2005, p. 2)  
(translated from the German)

The SO office in Stuttgart is also making efforts to expand and become an “ideal org”. As part of this campaign, the SO organised a larger propaganda event in Stuttgart Bad-Cannstatt on 17 July, which was attended by some 250 persons. The purpose of this event was, among others, to raise money for a new, representative building.

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<sup>230</sup> *IMPACT*, 111/ 2005, p. 54 (translated from the German)

According to reports, the SO Stuttgart has so far collected a million Euros in donations for the financing of the “ideal org” in Stuttgart.

**Aggressive language in appeals by the SO leadership**

Using sometimes aggressive language, the SO leadership tries to unite the membership behind the idea of establishing a new Scientologist society and to convince them of the necessity of the organisation’s expansion policy.

“It is the motor of future actions: eliminate psychiatry in all its forms, offer governments the solutions developed by L. Ron Hubbard ... We know every minute counts. And we intend to take out of the road anything we have to take out of the road, no matter how big, to make a civilization that can survive....”  
(*IMPACT*, 110/ 2004, p. 43)

In this context, MISCAVIGE explicitly referred at an SO event to the elimination of “suppressive persons”, also known as “SPs”:

“What we are addressing today is directly related to and follows from our world-wide actions aimed at creating ideal orgs. This also means that we are eliminating SPs not only as a kind of sport ... we are working for a new Civilisation shaped according to our aims, nothing less ...”  
(*IMPACT*, 111/ 2005, p. 12) (translated from the German)

#### **4. Public relations**

**Increased political advertising of the SO**

The SO has increased its efforts in Germany and the rest of the world to convince political and societal decision makers of its ideology. In late 2004, the SO leadership reported about these efforts in a publication:

“To create an interest in our solutions at the top level, last year we launched a programme to put LRH<sup>231</sup> solutions directly into the hands of opinion leaders and elected people’s representatives in Europe. ... Since the launch of the programme, 550,000 brochures have been distributed in Europe.”  
(*INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, Issue 29, 2004, p. 30)  
(translated from the German)

In the same publication SO declared that in 2005 it would use “new channels” to bring its programmes for improving society up to the

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<sup>231</sup> Short for L. Ron Hubbard.

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highest government levels.<sup>232</sup> The SO believes that with its ongoing campaign it has already been successful among European politicians.

“All that, together with the many visits of the Church of Scientology International’s European Office for Public Affairs and Human Rights to embassies, national legislators, members of the European Parliament, figures of public life in various cities, religious leaders and educators, has undoubtedly influenced those who develop the guidelines for Europe’s future.”

(*IMPACT*, 111/ 2005, p. 39) (translated from the German)

German Scientologists are also called upon in serial letters to make personal appeals to politicians and promote the SO ideology:

“When we talk about LRH Tech, we want to reach out to all tiers of society. You should be the one who visits hospitals, the mayor, the governor, etc.”

(*FSM NEWSLETTER – The FSM newsletter of the Advanced Organization & Saint Hill Europe*, 2005, p.2)

#### **Brochures and public information campaigns**

The organisation continues to behave mostly in the same way in public as in the past. It has continued to distribute publications, brochures and flyers in the pedestrian precincts of German cities and to numerous private households and public authorities. Direct mail SO advertising was also received by the Federal Police and several other police offices. These public information campaigns focused on social issues, such as drug and alcohol abuse, or on what the SO considers the deplorable state of psychiatry. Moreover, the organisation organised public advertising events, such as the Cavalcade of Honorary Priests (a presentation of the “auditing” procedure in yellow tents) and “stress tests on an E-meter” in several German cities in order to gain the public’s attention and recruit new participants for its courses.

#### **The SO on the Internet**

Again in 2005, the SO presented comprehensive and technically sophisticated sites on the Internet containing information on its history, aims and subsidiary organisations. Numerous pages promote SO publications and courses. In addition, several hundred members in Germany openly acknowledge their adherence to the SO ideology and aims on their private homepages.

#### **Little response among the general public**

As in previous years, the SO’s publicity campaigns were not very successful. Despite the foundation of three additional “Missions” and the campaign to promote the establishment of “Ideal Orgs”, the SO had very little success in recruiting and retaining new members for

<sup>232</sup> *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS* Issue 29, 2004, p. 2.

any length of time. Many of the new members usually cancel their membership within a short time or are hardly active. Public advertising events were attended by very few people and attracted little media attention.

**Distribution of membership and activities remains uneven**

In Germany, the most important regions, in terms of membership and activities, are the greater Hamburg area and the *Länder* of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. Increased activities have also been observed in the greater Berlin area. In addition, significant numbers of members can be found in the *Länder* of Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine/Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate.

## **Definitions**

### **Definition of terms referring to the legal bases, tasks of and methods used by the offices for the Protection of the Constitution and the activities/persons under observation**

#### **Anarchism**

The supporters of anarchism desire a system without rulers, without outside pressure from society and its norms. In Germany, there are a number of small anarchist parties and groups who invoke the classic theories of anarchism, such as that of Bakunin, or develop their own ideas and theories.

#### **Anti-Antifa (anti-antifascist activists)**

Neo-Nazis calling themselves anti-antifascist activists (in reference to the left-wing extremist antifascist movement "Antifa") collect and publish information on political opponents, left-wing extremists. By calling themselves "Anti-Antifa" they want to express that their activities should be considered a response to left-wing extremist activities and as such may also include militant action. So far, however, their activities usually include propaganda activities to intimidate their opponents. Staff of security authorities are also considered opponents.

#### **Antideutsche (Anti-Germans)**

The "Anti-Germans" form a special group within the left-wing extremist autonomists. Based on the assumption that the German state wants to establish a "Fourth Reich" and dominate Europe, their followers call for the abolition of the national identity. Fearing German responsibility for another Holocaust, Anti-Germans demand extensive support for Israel and the Jews and subsequently for the USA. On an increased number of occasions Anti-Germans have verbally attacked rival left-wing extremist groups accusing them of anti-Semitism.

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### **Anti-Semitism**

In right-wing extremist discourse, anti-Semitism based on religion is almost completely insignificant; racist, social and political grounds play a larger role. For example, right-wing extremists increasingly take advantage of mainstream political and social criticism of individual policy decisions by Israel in order to make blanket denunciations and question Israel's right to exist. Their fundamental rejection of Israel is not derived from political considerations relating to the Middle East conflict, but is based instead on their fundamental rejection of Jews. Aside from this "anti-Zionist" variety, right-wing extremists also subscribe to "secondary anti-Semitism", which accuses Jews of exploiting Germany's responsibility for the Holocaust to blackmail Germans into accepting their financial and political demands. Finally, all forms of anti-Semitism attribute negative characteristics to Jews in general in an attempt to "justify" isolating them, discriminating against them, persecuting them and even murdering them.

### **Autonome Antifa (autonomous antifascists)**

The main purpose of autonomist activities is the "fight against fascism". Autonomists claim that the capitalist state, in order to preserve itself, tolerates, if not favours fascism. Therefore, in the view of autonomists it is necessary to take up the fight against fascism themselves. As part of what they call "anti-fascist self-help", their actions primarily address against their political opponents, i.e. actual or alleged Nazis. In their publications, autonomists often publish the addresses and "wanted posters" of political opponents, sometimes calling upon their followers to attack the persons included in such lists.

### **Autonomists**

The autonomist movement has its roots in the early student protest movement of the 1960s. Typically, autonomists reject outside pressure from society and its norms; instead they strive for a free and self-determined life in a society free of domination. They accept violence against the democratic state and its institutions as a means to achieve this aim.

Autonomists usually do not have a common, binding world view, but often follow diffuse anarchist or anarcho-communist ideas and spontaneous activist motives. Hence, they are no homogeneous group. "Classic" autonomous ideas have been subject to significant changes in recent years.

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## **Communism**

For the followers of Marxist theory, communism is the superior form of societal development. In a communist society, the diametrical opposition between capital and wage-labour no longer exists. Private ownership of the means of production has been abolished. To achieve this, capitalism has to be overthrown.

According to the theory of Marx and Engels, communism is characterized by the following:

- The means of production are owned by society as a whole, forming an “association of free producers”,
- Fulfilment of the principle “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”
- The withering-away of class rule and the state.
- Overcoming the rural-urban contrast.
- Overcoming the division of labour, and liberating the human personality.
- The abolition of all religion.
- Dissolution of national conflicts, and peaceful co-existence.
- Full social equality of all members of society.

## **Entryism**

Entryism is a method practised by the followers of Trotskyism who infiltrate specific other parties and associations in order to gain influence there, spread their ideology and ultimately to use these organisations for their own purposes.

## **Ethno-pluralism**

The ideal of “ethno-pluralism” is ethnic diversity in terms of a variety of ethnically homogeneous countries. Basically, this concept propagated by right-wing extremists is aimed at creating ethnically pure societies, to be achieved by expelling all those who do not belong to the “Volk” (the people).

## **Extremism by foreigners**

With their activities in Germany, foreign extremist organisations often pursue aims that are directly linked to current events or political developments in their home countries.

Depending on their political orientation, these include, for example, left-wing extremist organisations who want to establish a communist system in their home countries, or nationalist organisations with an exaggerated concept of national identity. The spectrum also includes separatist organisations fighting for political autonomy and sovereignty of their regions of origin and the separation from existing nation-states.

In Germany, there are also active Islamist organisations (foreigners' associations whose members or leaders are mostly foreigners, but also associations whose members or leaders are mostly German nationals) whose aim is to replace the existing state and social systems in their countries of origin with a strict Islamist state based on sharia law. Some of them openly acknowledge that their goal is the worldwide rule of Islam. Their members mostly have come to Germany as political refugees. From here, they support the (often violent) activities in their home regions with logistic and financial means or with propaganda activities. The two largest Islamist groups, which see themselves also as representatives of the interests of Muslims in Germany, are also endeavouring by legal means to create enclaves for their supporters in Germany so that they can lead their lives according to sharia law. In their view, sharia law constitutes an Islamic legal system which regulates all spheres of life and whose implementation in Germany is a precondition for practising "true" Islam. Islamists hold the view that all action by the state or society should not be controlled by human will, which would make it vulnerable to human despotism, but should be left to exclusively to Allah's will which is enshrined in the Koran and a binding "truth" for everybody.

Such organisations are observed by the authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution, if

- they are pursuing or supporting activities aimed at subverting the free democratic constitutional system of the Federal Republic of Germany, for example by attempting to establish a parallel society based on their principles and beliefs,
  - they use violence against their political opponents on German soil to achieve their aims and, in doing so, pose a threat to the security of the Federal Republic or one of its federal states,
  - they prepare or carry out violent activities in other states from German territory, thus jeopardising the foreign relations of the Federal Republic of Germany to these states,
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- their activities are directed against the idea of international understanding, in particular peaceful co-existence.

### **Extremist activities**

The authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution deem activities as extremist if they are directed against the basic values of the free democratic order or, in other words, activities aimed at abolishing the inalienable core concepts of our Constitution – the free democratic order – the supreme values and principles of our democracy.

The authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution distinguish between “extremism” and “radicalism”, although both terms are often used interchangeably. “Radicalism” is an exaggerated form of thinking and acting, sometimes tending to be extremist, which wants to solve problems and conflicts by getting at their roots (Latin *radix*). In contrast to “extremism”, radicalism is not about eliminating the democratic constitutional order or its basic principles.

### **Fanzines**

The word is a combination of “fan” and “magazines”. These right-wing extremist insider publications provide information about music groups, recordings, concerts and other events. Interviews give activists and right-wing extremist groupings the opportunity to present themselves and disseminate their opinions.

### **Free nationalists**

The concept of “free nationalists” was developed by neo-Nazis in the mid-1990s in response to the ban on numerous associations. The aim was to bring the dispersed neo-Nazi scene within non-associative structures, increase their capacity for action and prevent further bans on their organisations.

### **Islamism**

“Islamism” is a form of political extremism based on religious motives. In the view of Islamists, the writings and commands of Islam are more than rules for religious practice; they understand them as instructions for establishing an Islamist society, which they consider to be indispensable for practicing Islam. Therefore, Islamist organisations endeavour by legal means to create enclaves for their supporters in Germany so that they can lead their lives according to sharia law.

In contrast, the term “Islamist fundamentalism”, which is often used in public discourse, refers to a way of life in accordance with Islam and does not necessarily imply an extremist orientation.

### **Islamist anti-Semitism**

Islamist organisations direct their hatred against the state of Israel and the “Zionists”, among others. Depending on the level of extremism of the organisation in question, these are accused of conspiratorial manipulation of Western states, above all the United States. The Jewish immigration into Palestine, the founding of the state of Israel and the unresolved conflict between the Arab states and Israel triggered an Islamist anti-Zionism which since the 1950s aims primarily at eliminating the state of Israel and has deeply anti-Semitic undertones (anti-Zionist anti-Semitism). Statements and programmes published by Islamist organisations tend to use the terms “Zionist” “Israeli” and “Jew” interchangeably. This Islamist anti-Zionism was and is extremely anti-Jewish. Reference is therefore also made to the “eternal enmity” between the Jews and Muslims/Islam, of which Islamists believe reference is already made in the Koran and which is underpinned by Islamist concepts of history. In contrast to the anti-Semitism of German right-wing extremists, Islamist anti-Semitism is not rooted in racism.

### **Jihad**

The term *jihad* means the “personal struggle of the individual believer” or “holy war”. This term has several meanings: On the one hand it refers to the “inner struggle” or the efforts of an individual to purify his/her soul. On the other hand, the term is understood – mainly by Islamists – as an appeal and a duty to protect and expand Muslim territory. Under the guiding principle of this jihad, Islamist terrorists carry out their violent struggle/ “holy war” against the alleged enemies of Islam.

### ***Kameradschaften*, right-wing extremist ~**

The term “*Kameradschaften*” usually refers to special neo-Nazi structures. They are characterised by an evident will to take political action. Although these groups have few, if any, structural similarities to other kinds of associations, they are characterised by a definitive distribution of responsibilities. Some *Kameradschaften* use names which make them recognizable to the public. According to a definition binding for all authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution since late 2001, the following minimum criteria have to be fulfilled before a group may be called a *Kameradschaft*:

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- a limited number of permanent active members and little fluctuation,
- operating exclusively on a local level, in few exceptional cases on a regional level,
- existent, although rudimentary, structures and
- the capacity to take concerted political action on the basis of a right-wing extremist, particularly neo-Nazi ideology.

In autumn 2005, the definitions used by the police were updated correspondingly.

### **Left-wing extremism**

This term describes activities of parties, other organisations or individual members of society which are characterised by the following:

- Acknowledgement of Marxist-Leninist theories as a “scientifically based guidance for action”; in addition, depending on the orientation of the party or organisation, recourse to theories developed by other ideologues, such as Stalin, Trozki, Mao Zedong and others.
- Commitment to a socialist or communist transformation of society by a revolutionary putsch or long-term revolutionary changes.
- Commitment to the dictatorship of the proletariat or a society without rulers (anarchy).
- Acceptance of revolutionary violence as the means of choice to achieve (political) aims, depending on the actual circumstances.

Left-extremist parties and groups can be divided into two main political currents:

- Hard-line Marxist-Leninists and other revolutionary Marxists organised in parties or other stable associations whose express aim is to establish a socialist or communist society.
- “Autonomists”, anarchists and other “social revolutionaries” organised in loose structures, few, if any, organised in parties or formal associations who strive for a self-determined life free of any rule or state authority.

### **Maoism**

After the victorious Communists had come to power in China in 1949 under the leadership of Mao Zedong, Marxist-Leninist ideology was moulded to fit China’s conditions. This new theory and its practical

implementation were seen as the historico-concrete application and critical advance of Marxism-Leninism. The “New Left” (Dogmatic New Left), which emerged after 1968, was modelled on Mao’s ideas.

Based on Marxism-Leninism, Mao developed a new revolutionary theory taking account of the special circumstances prevailing in what was known as the Third World. In Mao’s view, the revolution had to be launched in a Third World country by a guerrilla war mounted by peasant partisans. Mao, too, emphasised the leading role of the Communist Party in this war, which he wanted to expand to the scale of a people’s war to overthrow the ruling class and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mao saw the developing countries as the true revolutionary centres, not the imperialist countries of the West, nor the Soviet Union and its claim to supremacy.

### **Marxism**

According to the theory on scientific socialism developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, life in society, in particular political, intellectual, and cultural life is determined by economic structures and conditions.

According to this theory, in capitalist society the bourgeoisie as the oppressor (who owns the means of production) and the proletariat as the oppressed class (who owns nothing but its labour force) stand in constant opposition to one another. In the process of capital utilisation, the value created by the labour force is not adequately rewarded. As a result of the difference between the value of labour power and the value created by it, a surplus value is created which the bourgeois capitalist accumulates on the expense of the working proletariat. This surplus value (profit) is invested in the development of new technologies and means of production (machines, factories, etc.), which in turn help augment profit even further and on the other side free superfluous labour force. This leads to low-wage labour and the impoverishment of the proletariat. Subsequently, the gap between the bourgeois class and the proletariat increases, which will result in the clash between the classes and the proletarian revolution. After a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat this process will end in a communist society without classes.

### **Marxism-Leninism**

Lenin developed the Marxist theories into a state doctrine and the theoretical basis for the establishment of a socialist society and the international class struggle.

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Marxism-Leninism places particular importance on the revolutionary aspect of Marxist theory and complements it by concrete organisational and structural instructions. Lenin's theory of a new type of party is mainly based on the assumption that the proletariat as a revolutionary subject cannot develop the necessary political consciousness all by itself. It has to be taught by a revolutionary party of cadres (the Communist Party's claim to be the "avant-garde"). In such a party, all functions have to be concentrated in the hands of a minimum number of professional revolutionaries. The party has to be tightly structured in line with the principles of "democratic centralism", according to which all decisions of executive bodies are to be strictly followed and factions within the party are banned.

### **Mujahidin**

Those waging a violent form of jihad are called mujahidin (Fighters for Allah's Cause). Most mujahidin have experience of fighting jihadi battles in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya; many of them have received religious and ideologic teaching in training camps in Afghanistan, Sudan or Pakistan. Especially Muslims of various nationalities have spent time in such training camps, including members of Islamist organisations based in Maghreb countries, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi-Arabia and the Middle East.

The spectrum of jihadi groups includes Osama BIN LADEN's al-Qaeda (The Base) and the mujahidin networks collaborating with it, as well as regional Islamist organisations.

### **Nationalism**

Nationalism is governed by the idea that one's own nation is superior to and more valuable than other nations. This automatically implies a devaluation of all persons who are not affiliated with one's own nation and is thus diametrically opposed to the principle of universal equality as specified in Article 3 of the Basic Law. Nationalist ideology restricts individual rights in the interest of the *Volksgemeinschaft*.

### **Neue Rechte (New Right)**

The New Right first emerged as a movement among French intellectuals in the 1970s which sought to raise the intellectual standards within the right-wing extremist camp. Among other things it invokes anti-democratic thought propagated by representatives of the "conservative revolution", a political current in the Weimar Republic. The activists of the New Right want to abolish or at least impair the democratic constitutional state. To this effect, they try to gain influence within the area of cultural politics in order to finally delegitimise the

democratic constitutional state and radically change the political system.

### **Organisations under the influence of extremists**

Organisations under the influence of extremists are associations founded or initiated by extremists or infiltrated and influenced by the latter to various extents.

Typical characteristics are:

- these organisations pursue political aims which are fully or partially in line with those of the mother organisations; in doing so, they support their mother organisations;
- some or most of their functionaries, above all in the secretariats, are members or followers of the mother organisation;
- often, their members are not extremists and instead belong to democratic organisations pursuing similar aims; they are either unaware of the extremist character of the organisation or are well aware of this fact but willing to accept it or, in individual cases, want to curb the extremists' influence.

### **Proliferation**

Proliferation means the distribution of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction and/or the material and know-how required for producing such weapons and carrier systems.

### **Racism**

According to racist ideology, all developments in culture and history have biological and anthropological causes, and do not originate from political or social conditions. Racists strive for an "ethnologically homogeneous" nation. Racism classifies groups of people and individuals according to ethnic and biological criteria. Usually, people are divided into racially superior and racially inferior groups or "races". Even cultural differences are explained as innate and unchangeable qualities. In both cases, racism denies the universality of human rights.

### **Revisionism, right-wing extremist ~**

The actually harmless term describing the intention to critically review knowledge or findings is used by right-wing extremists to re-interpret the past. In so doing they are less interested in historic research, than in manipulating the representation of the National Socialist era in history and in presenting the latter in a more positive light. A distinction is made between revisionism in the strict sense of the word

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which denies the Holocaust ever happened, and revisionism in a broader sense which denies that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of World War II.

### **Right-wing extremism**

Right-wing extremism refers to activities opposed to the fundamental equality of all as specified in the Basic Law and the universality of human rights. Right-wing extremists are opponents of the democratic constitutional state; they have an authoritarian concept of the state. The right-wing extremist world view is characterised by overemphasising ethnic origin, which results in xenophobic attitudes. It is governed by the idea that ethnic affiliation with a nation or race determines the value of a human being. Individual rights and organisations representing the interests of societal groups are suppressed in favour of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (anti-pluralism).

### **Sharia**

Sharia law constitutes a system of binding rules stipulated by God which regulate all spheres of life. This regime is based, among other things, on the written sources of the Koran and the records of the spoken words of the prophet Mohammed (originally: Muhammad), known as hadiths. In terms of content, the sharia law sets out the religious and ritual duties of Muslims and the rules governing their private and public relationships.

Within the Islamic world the importance of sharia law is subject to controversy. It is generally agreed that the religious rules of the sharia are invariably true and binding. Islamists see sharia law as the inalienable words of God which are for ever valid. In their view, states that do not comply with sharia law may not call themselves Islamic and are illegitimate.

### **Skinheads, right-wing extremist ~**

Right-wing extremist skinheads constitute a significant element of the right-wing extremist spectrum in Germany. Their sub-cultural lifestyle is often oriented more on entertainment than on political activity. Nor does the majority have a firmly held right-wing extremist worldview. But by belonging to the right-wing extremist skinhead subculture, young people are exposed to nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic ideology.

### **Stalinism**

In line with Stalin's theory of the possibilities of socialism in a single country (initially the Soviet Union), which is based on the theories of Lenin, in conjunction with the power of an international communist organisation – the Communist International (Comintern) – all activities of the communist parties organised in the Comintern were focused on the interests of the then Soviet Union as the leader and central power of international communism.

### **Sunna/hadith**

In Islam, the word *sunna* refers to the account of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad lived and his disciples. It has become the standard for all political, religious and legal action of Muslims. The words and deeds of the prophet and his followers were collected and written down in the 9<sup>th</sup> century in collections called hadith (pl. ahadith).

The ahadith are the most important source of jurisprudence after the Koran and are an integral part of sharia law. The ahadith are very important for contemporary political movements and their interpretation of Islamic law.

### **Suspicious cases**

“Suspicious cases” are those in which groups display concrete indications of anti-constitutional activities, though they are not yet clearly extremist (Section 4 (1), third sentence of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution). According to applicable law, involvement of the BfV requires the existence of “concrete indications”.

### **Terrorism**

As defined by the authorities for the protection of the Constitution, terrorism is the long-term struggle to achieve political aims by means of attacks on persons and property, especially serious criminal offences such as those named in Section 129a (1) of the Criminal Code, or offences that aid in their preparation.

### **Trotskyism**

This particular model of socialism named after its founder Leo Trotsky is a modification of Marxism-Leninism that has its roots mainly in Trotsky's opposition to Stalin and his ideas. Key elements are the theory of “permanent revolution”, the aim of establishing a

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“dictatorship of the proletariat” and upholding proletarian internationalism.

### **Xenophobia**

“Xenophobia” is a general term for all prejudices against people who are different from what is considered “normal” because of their appearance, their origin, their sexual preferences, their nationality, their religion or other characteristics, and who are therefore seen as “alien”. In the view of xenophobic criminal offenders, these people are “inferior”; they view such “inferiority” as justification for ignoring the human rights and violating the human dignity of their victims.